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Abstract 
This thesis explores “The Conditions of Effective Policy Representation in a Cross-
National Perspective: Veto Players, Public Opinion and Government Responsiveness”. 
When one indicator of a democracy’s quality  is whether and how well governments 
respond to citizens’ demands, continuing policy  responsiveness is a key concern. 
Various models of responsiveness claim to explore the responsiveness of government 
towards citizens’ preferences but these come to inconsistent conclusions about how 
context affects the opinion-policy relationship. 
My research contributes to the field (1) by  systematically  examining the commonly 
used models of the opinion-policy relationship (2) by providing a new theory of 
contextual effects based upon the veto player theory (Tsebelis, 2002) and clarity  of 
responsibility argument (Hobolt et  al., 2012, Whitten and Palmer, 1999, Powell and 
Whitten, 1993), (3) by cross-validating measures of issue preferences, and (4) by testing 
my theory using models of issue responsiveness and positional policy congruence. 
After careful analysis of the many models and approaches to the opinion-policy linkage, 
I argue that political representation is best explored by applying a model of effective 
responsiveness, that is, governments responding to preferences by implementing policy 
that the public wants. Other models examine whether government agendas correspond 
with public agendas. This is achieved by using issue responsiveness techniques and 
also, to a limited extent, positional policy congruence. 
Context is an important factor yet scholarship  comes to inconsistent conclusions about 
how it affects political representation. I therefore develop a universally applicable 
theory  of contextual effects, which borrows from the Tsebelis’ veto player theory (2002) 
and the clarity of responsibility  hypothesis from economic voting literature (Hobolt et 
al., 2012, Whitten and Palmer, 1999, Powell and Whitten, 1993). Succinctly, the fewer 
veto players enter the decision-making process, the clearer it is who is responsible to act 
and the more likely it is that governments respond to public demands.
The first empirical chapter focuses on the validity of public opinion measures in issue 
responsiveness research and asks whether thinking something is an important  problem 
is the same as wanting to increase public spending in the same domain. I find that both 
measures are related but that this relationship depends on the policy domain in question. 
The second and third empirical chapter test my theory of contextual effects, employing 
the salience model of responsiveness and the citizens’ perceptions model of positional 
policy congruence in a comparative framework. The results support  my theory: In 
contexts where fewer veto players are created and the responsibilities are clearly 
allocated, political representation is increased. 
This research finds its limitations in the quality and availability of the data, as well as in 
the non-dynamic nature of the model of ideological positions. 
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I. Introduction
“[A] key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing 
responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its 
citizens, considered as political equals.” 
(Dahl, 1971: 1)
 In representative democracies where one indicator of their quality is whether 
governments responds to citizens’ preferences (Powell, 2004: 91), continuous 
responsiveness and what shapes it are key concerns. The question of whether policy 
makers respond to public demands is a central one in the study of political 
representation. It links back to the core of what representation is all about, i.e. the 
delegation of powers to an overarching body that acts on behalf of the people. This 
implies that delegates represent public demands at the time of appointment, usually  in 
election years, but it also indicates that there is a link of the two between elections. 
Representation that occurs at the same point in time can be understood as static. It 
indicates that public opinion and policy are congruent at a certain time. By contrast to 
static representation, dynamic government responsiveness towards citizens’ preferences 
is characterised by change, i.e. “policy  makers act as a consequence of changes in 
public sentiment, which implies a sequence, inherently structured in time” (Stimson et 
al., 1995: 543). Responsiveness posits a two-way flow, where the public expresses 
preferences that are visible in the policy outputs produced by the incumbent government 
with a delay in time, and that these feed back to public opinion (Easton, 1965). It is 
dynamic representation that scholarship is increasingly interested in. 
 There are many  ways in which policy representation occurs. One major 
distinction is agenda versus effective representation. In agenda representation, 
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governments respond to public concerns by setting a policy agenda that is in accordance 
with public opinion. Agendas articulate the policy intentions of the incumbent 
government, but they  do not effectively translate preferences into policy outcomes. 
While agenda representation is an important  step towards political representation, it is 
not enough to show that representation actually occurs. For effective political 
representation to happen, public preferences need to be visible in policy action. In other 
words, we the people want to see our preferences mirrored in public policy  outcomes 
such as legislation, budgets and regulative acts. In essence, it is the effective 
representation of public preferences that matters most.
 Finally, the degree of government success in translating public demands into 
policy outcomes is not stable. It varies across context as well as time. The question of 
why some governments frequently  pay  attention to and account for the wishes of the 
people while others do not is a major concern of the field. Although scholars study 
contextual effects on political representation, it is still largely unclear how context 
affects the link between public opinion and public policy. The focus of this dissertation 
is therefore especially on how political institutions shape representation. 
 To fulfil their representative function successfully it is important for policy 
makers to know what conditions promote political representation of public demands. If 
we do not understand how context affects representation, we will be unable to reform 
the political system in way that enhances the translation of citizens’ preferences into 
policy. The consequences of this include protest movements and civil strikes, which can 
be dramatic for policy makers. In order to avoid these, understanding how policy 
representation can be increased is essential. If we know how to reform our institutions 
so that they lead to a clearer allocation of responsibilities and better representation of 
public demands, the danger of dissatisfied and revolting publics is mitigated.
 Comparative research helps us to understand how context impacts policy 
representation. Only a comparison across countries allows the drawing of general 
conclusions about how context influences policymaking. If we study the effective and 
dynamic representation of public opinion in a comparative framework, this will enable 
us to give a recommendation about the conditions under which continuing 
responsiveness occurs. In my  dissertation, I study the conditions of policy 
representation in a cross-national framework. Indeed, the study of policy representation 
as an indicator of the quality of a democracy is nothing new, nor is the question of what 
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moderates policy representation. However, previous work on policy representation 
comes to inconsistent conclusions about the impact of context with particular focus on 
electoral institutions. This may  be due to the different models and measures employed, 
the absence of a universally applicable theory of context, or insufficient data. In 
addition, many studies focus entirely  on the North American context. Admittedly  this is 
where the field was developed and where data are available to measure different 
dimensions of representation. Although data are limited outside the American context, 
scholarship  needs to move forward to explore the opinion-policy link elsewhere, with 
particular focus on how context shapes this relationship. Whether or not comparative 
work is done seems to depend on the approach chosen. While an extensive body of 
literature explores the ideological congruence, significantly less comparative work 
looks at the representation of issues. Further, little comparative work assesses context 
systematically. This is where my dissertation ties in. My study contributes to the field 
and to prior research in three important ways:
• It links the well-established veto player theory (Tsebelis, 1995, 2002) to the 
clarity  of responsibilities argument (Hobolt et al., 2012, Whitten and Palmer, 
1999, Powell and Whitten, 1993) and, thus, applies a combined theoretical 
framework of contextual effects to representation research. 
• It contributes to the debate about the measurement validity of public opinion 
measures in responsiveness research by crossing different indicators of the 
public’s issue preferences with one another and testing their content, 
discriminant and predictive validity. 
• Finally, it provides empirical evidence for the impact of institutional context on 
the opinion-policy  linkage that supports the idea of the veto player theory and 
clarity  of responsibility  argument. I test this in using the salience model of issue 
representation and the citizens’ perception model of positional policy 
congruence.
 Chapter 2 embeds my theory in the previous literature. I show why government 
responsiveness is important, how we can test it and what previous research suggests 
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with regard to context. In addition, Chapter 2 links the veto player theory  to political 
representation and lays out the key argument as well as my hypotheses. I begin by 
discussing how the idea of democratic responsiveness ties in with the theory on 
democratic representation (Chapter 2.1) and I explain in more detail how government 
can fulfil its representative function (Chapter 2.2). Next, I turn to models and measures 
of responsiveness. I argue that inconsistent findings about the context effects on the 
opinion-policy  relationship may be due to the different models and measures applied 
and point to the relevant studies. Chapter 2.3 discusses how public opinion and public 
policy are linked and how they are studied in previous research: in dyadic, collective 
and comparative studies. This sets out the basis for the review of the literature with a 
focus on contextual effects. Chapter 2.4 discusses what prior research suggests with 
regard to specific political institutions and points to the main gaps in the literature. In 
addition, it establishes a new theory of contextual effects (Chapter 2.4.1) that borrows 
from veto player theory (Tsebelis, 2002) and the clarity of responsibilities argument 
from the economic voting literature (Hobolt et al., 2012, Whitten and Palmer, 1999, 
Powell and Whitten, 1993). I distinguish between institutional and situational veto 
players. The former is defined as a county’s fixed, time-invariant institutional 
framework, the latter describes time-varying political situations that are created by the 
political game or that are a short-term consequence of the electoral institutions. I present 
my conclusions about contextual effects in Chapter 2.4.2, where I also set  out my 
hypotheses, which build upon my new, systematic theory  of context. One essential part 
of Chapter 2 is a discussion and evaluation of the models commonly  used to investigate 
policy representation (Chapter 2.5). In order to assess which approaches are most 
appropriate to explore the opinion-policy relationship, Chapter 2.5.1 develops 
evaluation criteria based on democratic theory. More specifically, it discusses why it is 
important to look at dynamic models that measure effective policy outputs in a 
comparative framework. Chapter 2.5.2 introduces the models and methods and at the 
same time assesses whether they  fulfil the three criteria outlined in Chapter 2.5.1. In the 
closing section of Chapter 2 (Chapter 2.6), I summarise the rationale of my  research, 
which links institutional and situational veto players, public opinion and government 
responsiveness. 
 In Chapter 3 I introduce my research design. In this, I discuss the nature of 
research in my field, which requires superior data and analyses techniques. Moreover, 
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Chapter 3 explores the data employed in the three empirical chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 
6) in more detail. I begin with an introduction about how the field has developed from 
its inception to the present day. Chapter 3.1 discusses the use of cross-sectional time-
series methods and the multi-level structure of the survey data employed for the 
analyses. Next, I turn to the question of conceptualising public opinion and public 
policy responsiveness (Chapter 3.2). Here I point to the fact that, to this day, there is no 
universal definition of what public opinion means. Public opinion research relies 
heavily on an operationalist definition of public opinion, which in turn is led by the 
specific research interest of the scholar. Chapter 3.3 introduces my  research design. It 
begins by  looking at the data and modelling techniques to test the measurement validity 
of public opinion measures (Chapter 3.3.1). Chapter 3.3.2 introduces the measures and 
models to investigate the conditions of issue responsiveness and Chapter 3.3.3 the 
research design to explore the conditions of positional policy  congruence. I specifically 
discuss the use of original, individual-level data and secondary, aggregate data sources. 
Chapter 3.4 introduces how I model the contextual effects on policy representation in 
the form of interactive terms.
 My empirical analyses are conducted in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Chapter 4 focuses 
on measurement. The review of the literature suggests that in issue responsiveness 
research different measures of public opinion are employed to model government 
responsiveness. However, the models come to different conclusions about the 
contextual effects modelled. Thus, Chapter 4 tests the measurement validity of public 
opinion measures in issue responsiveness research. I discuss how public opinion and 
public policy  responsiveness are related in issue responsiveness research (Chapter 4.1). 
There is academic controversy surrounding two dynamic models of representation used 
in issue responsiveness research, namely the thermostatic and salience models of 
representation. While both models test the responsiveness of government to citizens’ 
issue preferences, they  rely on different indicators of public opinion. I discuss the 
advantages and limitations of each model. Chapter 4.2 theorises how the salience 
measure of public opinion (the Most Important Problem) may be linked to the indicator 
of public opinion in thermostatic representation, i.e. spending preferences. I come up 
with three possible scenarios of how spending preferences and policy concerns may be 
related. Further, I explain how validity  can be assessed (Chapter 4.3). I set out my 
methodology on how I can empirically  test the validity of opinion measurements in 
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Chapter 4.4. Here, I also talk about the data I use.  I rely on original, individual-level 
data as well as secondary, aggregate data to test validity. Chapter 4.5 and Chapter 4.6 
present the results of the empirical analyses. I begin exploring how spending 
preferences and important problems in Britain are related on the individual level 
(Chapter 4.5). The main question is whether thinking something is an important 
problem is the same as wanting to increase spending on the issue domain. If people 
want to increase spending on a specific issue and it corresponds with what they think is 
an important problem, the measure may be valid. After presenting some descriptive 
results, I test the construct and predictive validity, i.e. whether the measures correlate 
with each other and whether the same demographic characteristics predict the two 
measures of issue preferences in the same way. Chapter 4.5 tests the predictive validity 
on aggregate-level data. The main research interest here is to see whether, on the 
aggregate, both measures predict spending in the upcoming year in the same way. I 
draw my conclusions about the measurement validity  of public opinion measures in 
issue responsiveness research in Chapter 4.7.  
 Chapters 5 and 6 explore the contextual effect on policy representation. While 
Chapter 5 looks at issue responsiveness and its moderators, Chapter 6 examines the 
conditions of positional policy congruence. Chapter 5 investigates the responsiveness of 
government to the public’s issue preferences in a European context. I begin by 
introducing the models of issue responsiveness and justify why I use the salience model 
of responsiveness for my analysis (Chapter 5.1). Next, I discuss the contextual effects 
on issue responsiveness (Chapter 5.2). I point to the previous findings as well as to 
some inconsistent results about context effects. Next, I state my  hypotheses based on the 
veto player theory of context effects and institutional and situational clarity. Chapter 5.3 
presents the data and methodology in more detail and discusses the trade-offs between 
temporal and spatial analysis in the European context. I present descriptive statistics in 
Chapter 5.4 and inferential statistics in Chapter 5.5 – the latter test the institutional and 
situational clarity hypothesis according to the veto player theory. I summarise and draw 
conclusions in Chapter 5.6. 
 Chapter 6 explores the conditions of positional policy congruence. While at first  
sight it seems that  I take a step backwards from dynamic representation to static 
representation, at the very beginning of Chapter 6 I discuss why it is important to look 
at the congruence of ideological positions in election years and what moderates it. I 
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critically  comment on the lack of a dynamic model of positional responsiveness. 
Chapter 6.1 introduces the citizens’ perception model of positional congruence and 
identifies it as the best model to explore positional correspondence. I also contrast the 
perception model with other models of ideological congruence. Next, I discuss the 
previous findings using positional policy congruence with particular focus on contextual 
effects and I set out my hypotheses (Chapter 6.2). Further, I introduce my methodology 
and data (Chapter 6.3). This includes a section where I discuss the trade-off between 
temporal and spatial research due to data availability. Chapter 6.4 and Chapter 6.5 
present my empirical results. First, I display my descriptive results (Chapter 6.4), then I 
discuss the inferential statistics with regard to the contextual effects of institutional and 
situational veto players on positional congruence. In Chapter 6.6 I summarise my 
findings and present my conclusions. 
 I present my final thoughts in a concluding chapter (Chapter 7). The first part of 
Chapter 7 recaps the main achievements, summarises the key findings and points to the 
implications of this research for the field (Chapter 7.1). I talk about the limitations of 
my research and incentives for future research (Chapter 7.2). 
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II. The Pathways of Democratic Responsiveness
 Democratic responsiveness is a multi-dimensional phenomenon integrated in the 
broader study of political representation. It is often described as the key characteristic of 
a representative democracy  (Dahl, 1971, Pitkin, 1967, Key, 1961) and is used as a tool 
to test its quality (Powell, 2004). This chapter introduces and evaluates the pathways of 
democratic responsiveness. I begin by  explaining what I mean when I say  that 
governments respond to citizens’ preferences. One essential concept in research on 
political representation is the distinction between static and dynamic representation. In 
other words, representation at one fixed point in time as opposed to political 
representation that  accounts for change in public sentiment (Stimson et al., 1995). 
Further, responsiveness describes a multi-stage process somewhat like a chain or cycle 
and at different stages there are various ways for a government to account for public 
opinion. I distinguish between the different ways in which government can respond to 
public opinion. This is followed by a discussion of how previous studies link citizens’ 
preferences to political actors in terms of dyadic, collective and comparative research. 
 I then turn to discussing how context affects responsiveness. In order to 
understand in what ways context  matters, I apply  the basic argument of the veto player 
theory  (Tsebelis, 2002). The veto players approach allows me thinking about context in 
a consistent  and systematic way  across countries. I link the veto player theory to the 
clarity  of responsibility argument (Hobolt et al., 2012, Whitten and Palmer, 1999, 
Powell and Whitten, 1993) in order to theorise in detail how different political contexts 
impact the opinion-policy linkage. By  looking at institutional and situational clarity  in 
this way, I am able to identify  the dimensions along which the opinion-policy 
relationship  varies and what conditions enhance or constrain policy representation. 
Previously, studies on the context effects of political representation have come to 
inconsistent conclusions. One explanation for this is that the results are biased because 
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context has been explored in an unsystematic way. An alternative explanation for the 
inconsistent findings of prior studies is that the diverse approaches model different 
dimensions and kinds of responsiveness. 
 To understand the various models and ways to study political representation, I 
develop criteria to evaluate the existing approaches. This is followed by an introduction 
to and discussion of the commonly used methods and measures. At the same time I 
identify the best  approach with which to model representation with regard to the 
specific needs of this thesis. In order to do this, I apply  my three evaluation criteria 
(dynamics, effectiveness, and comparability) to test this. I close by pointing to the gap 
and inconsistencies in the literature and by  emphasising the contribution of this thesis to 
field. I explicitly state the rationale of this research at the very end of Chapter 2. 
2.1 Responsiveness - A Key Characteristic of Political 
Representation
 The concept of democratic responsiveness is embedded in the idea of 
representation in the agency theory. Agency theory interprets a representative 
democracy  as the delegation of powers to an overarching body, where the people are the 
principals and the government acts as the agent. Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) note 
that “the principals seek to structure the relationship with the agent so that outcomes 
produced through the agency’s effort  are the best the principal’s can achieve, given the 
choice to delegate in first place.” (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991: 24). Hence, the core 
of this contract is that  the government acts in the best interest of the people who have 
entrusted it with the power to govern, i.e. it responds to public wishes. There is natural 
conflict implied for the agent, the government, responding to citizens’ preferences, 
however. In essence, delegation theory assumes that the priorities of the people and the 
priorities of the agents are identical. After all, policy makers have been appointed to act 
on behalf of the citizens. People are heterogeneous, however, and not all people have 
the same preferences – they can even have opposing ideas of how a country should be 
run. In a practice, the people do not formulate one coherent preference for policies, but 
rather articulate dispersed preferences. It falls upon the agent, the respective 
government, to respond to an aggregate of those preferences. The above argument has 
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implications for political theory, but also for research methodology. If priorities differ 
amongst the individuals that we understand as “the public”, how can research account 
for these differences? This is one question that I discuss in further detail in the research 
design chapter (Chapter 3). 
 Another possibility  is that governments have to make some decisions that do not 
correspond with public preferences. Is this against the social contract per se? It is not if 
the decision has been made in the best interest of the citizens and it may be based on 
hidden actions or hidden information of which the public is not aware (Kiewiet and 
McCubbins, 1991: 25). One related idea is the question of to whom government are 
accountable and to whom they are meant to respond in a representative democracy. 
Dahl (1971) suggests that representatives have to be completely  or almost completely 
responsive to their citizens, who should be considered as political equals (Dahl, 1971: 
2). This implies that there is equality in representation. However, a growing body of 
literature suggests that policymaking in modern democracies increases unequal 
representation (inter alia Bartels, 2009, Gilens, 2009). If preferences are dispersed and 
clustered around societal subgroups, it is harder for a government to respond to an 
aggregate of preferences as it is unable to recognise what this preference is. For 
instance, research on the US finds that well-educated citizens and people from high-
income groups are more likely to participate in politics, to formulate preferences and to 
vote on Election Day  (Gilens, 2009, Bartels, 2009, Bartels, 2008, Gilens, 2005).1 
Further, Lijphart (1999, 1994, 1984) argues that those to whom governments have to 
respond depends on how the political systems is designed. In particular, the electoral 
rules determine whose wishes governments should account for. As a rule of thumb, 
Lijphart (1984: 4) outlines that governments based on majoritarian rules are accountable 
to the majority of the people, or at least those who voted for the government in the 
election. The rules for governments based on proportional rules are less clear. These 
kinds of governments are accountable to as many people as possible. 
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1 The idea of inequality in representation is beyond the scope of this thesis but most certainly it defines 
where the field is going and it will be subject to future research by this dissertation’s author.
2.2 Studying Representation and Responsiveness
 Political system theory  has taught us that political representation is about 
demands and supply (Easton 1965). Those who hold the democratic power initially, the 
people, have demands, these are requests for or against a particular policy. Demands can 
occur in terms issue demands, public opinion towards regulating a cause within a 
particular issue domain, or ideological demands, preference for a broader set of issues 
or beliefs. The public frequently expresses their demands through election, but also 
between elections, for instance, through opinion polls, through political parties or other 
political organisations and political action. Policy makers and elected representatives 
are asked to supply solutions for public demands. They can do this by providing public 
policy that  is in accordance with public opinion. 
 An extensive body of literature has discusses the mechanisms behind political 
representation and what happens between the expression of demands and the provision 
of supplies. Many view political representation as a chain of events (inter alia Powell 
2004; Strom 2000; Lupia and McCubbins 2000), where voters delegate powers to 
elected representatives. Through the process of delegation representatives are expected 
to represent and respond to public demands. In turn, the reverse mechanism helps the 
public to hold representatives accountable by punishing or rewarding representatives 
retrospectively for their action. This usually happens through the next elections (Fearon 
1999: 55). Thus, it  is in the interest of the representatives to serve public opinion as they 
have to fear to be voted out of office otherwise.  
 Figure 1: The Chain of Responsiveness (Powell, 2004)
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in the figure labeled “Structuring Choices,” “Institutional Aggrega-
tion,” and “Policy Making”2—can cause failures of responsiveness.
A correspondence between the policies that citizens desire and the
outcomes that government produces does not necessarily indicate demo-
cratic responsiveness. Good luck or advantageous circumstances are not
the same thing as systematic responsiveness. In a democracy, moreover,
responsiveness cannot depend solely on the good will of policy makers.
Responsiveness implies that institutionalized arrangements, and above
all elections, reliably connect citizens to those who make policy in their
name.3
High-quality democracy is sustained when institutional arrangements
provide incentives supporting each of the major linkages of respon-
siveness. Such inducements might flow from: 1) the systematic eviction
of unresponsive or inept policy makers, encouraging their successors to
anticipate and realize citizens’ desires more carefully; 2) the direct elec-
tion of powerful, promise-keeping governments that are publicly
committed to policies the citizens want; and 3) the election of multiple,
representative parties that are committed to negotiating as agents on
behalf of the respective policies favored by the various subgroups of
citizens who elected them. Different theorists and commentators on
democratic processes have varying opinions as to the relative likeli-
hood that one or another of these connections will be effective.4 In
addition to these incentives deriving from competitive national elec-
tions, other facilitating conditions must be present.
Conceptual Difficulties and Theoretical Disputes
It is difficult to evaluate and compare democratic responsiveness
over time and from one country to another. The last half-century of
theoretical and empirical research by political scientists has taught us
that such key concepts as citizens’ preferences, election outcomes, po-
litical influence, and policy consequences pose exquisitely complex
analytical challenges. Moreover, the connections that can break down
or be subverted are manifold, and may vary widely from case to case.
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 Figure 1 more precisely  outlines delegation theory with particular focus on the 
responsiveness function of representatives according to Powell (2004). The chain begins 
with the formulation of public preferences (demands), which are expressed though the 
public’s voting behaviour and vote choices. The first discrete step  is the delegation of 
powers from voters towards elected representatives (Strøm 2000: 267). This may  be 
particularly affected by citizens level of information. Lupia and McCubbins (2000: 294) 
note that the principals (the citizens) may be asymmetrically  informed about what their 
agent (policy  makers) have planned or are doing. While well-informed citizens are 
making the correct decision with regard to their level of information, it can be argued 
that less well informed citizens make less reasoned decisions. However, research on 
media effects shows, that even low-information voters are able to make reasonable 
choices by relying on short-cuts or heuristics (Lupia 1994).2 
 Secondly, the election outcomes are shaped by  political institutions such as the 
electoral rules and the resulting party system (Mitchell 2000; Lupia and McCubbins 
2000). This is crucial for our understanding of policy  representation. If institutions 
moderate how well powers are delegated, they  also affect how well policy  makers 
respond to public opinion. This aspect is investigated in detail by  this thesis (see 
Chapter 2.5 for a review of the literature and theory  as well as Chapter 5 and 6 for the 
empirical analysis). 
 Thirdly, election outcomes determine how government is formed and who will 
be in charge. Hence, powers are delegated from the legislators towards the respective 
executive body (Strøm 2000: 267). This is not predominant concern in my thesis, but 
plays a role when I discuss the moderation of opinion through institutions.
 Finally, in Powell’s chain the last step is the process of policy making (supply); 
how well are policy preferences (demands) reflected in the policy  outcomes (supply) of 
the incumbent government? This may be shaped by the short-term influences on policy 
making and depend upon how flexible or inflexible a government is to follow public 
opinion. 
 Pushing the argument further, policy making is also delegated down by  the 
respective government to particular executive branches, the specialist ministries. And 
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2 While the question of media effects and unequal information is an important one, it is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation to clarify in how far the media and levels of information affect the choices citizens 
make with regard to delegating powers to representatives. 
once a policy  decision has been made powers are delegated to the bureaucracy  and civil 
servants to implement the policy  (Strøm 2000). This dissertation shall not focus on the 
last two steps of delegation theory, but end with Powell’s final step in the equation the 
measurable supply or a policy outcome. 
 This dissertation focuses on the supply  side of the equation and explores how 
well representatives respond to public demands. Thereby, I do not completely ignore the 
steps between stage 1 and stage 2, but I account for these steps by modelling the 
especially the institutional aggregation of preferences at and between election times. By 
taking into account how institutions shape preferences and consequently modelling 
whether governments respond to these preferences, this thesis accounts to some extent 
for stages 2 and 3.
 In order to explore responsiveness, students do not necessarily have to focus on 
each single linkage, however. Some people are interested in how preferences lead to 
vote choice, others in how election outcomes lead to government formation, again 
another growing body of research looks at the relationship between initial preferences 
and policy  outcomes. Whatever scholars study we need to keep  in mind that every stage 
and linkage between those we study  determines how we have to study responsiveness 
and that the principals are likely to suffer from agency  losses along the way as the 
agents are to some extent self-interested (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991: 24). Examining 
the overarching relationship between stage 1 and 4 always means accounting for how 
this linkage is moderated by  context, for instance, and considering that voting behaviour 
and the selection of policy  makers may  have impact as well. But, the further powers are 
delegated up to experts and from there down to civil servants, the less clear it is for the 
public who made the final decision and thus to hold policy makers accountable for their 
action. 
 Powell’s (2004) chain of responsiveness misses out on an essential linkage, 
however. Theoretically, his chain of responsiveness ends after a policy is supplied. 
Policy  outcome (supply) feeds back to citizens’ preferences (demands) though, and is 
reflected in reoccurring or new preferences. Easton’s model of political representation 
(1965) has shown that  any outcome of the political system will be picked up  upon again 
by the people, who are either satisfied with the outcome and new preferences are 
expressed or they are dissatisfied and formulate the same (or very similar) preferences 
again. Further, the above argument suggests that there is one essential prerequisite for 
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the responsiveness of governments towards public opinion. Continuous responsiveness 
(Dahl 1971: 1) requires that there is also continuous expression of preferences on the 
part of the people. Without clearly expressed preferences, governments are unable to 
respond accordingly. Thus, the relationship between opinion and policy is a reciprocal 
one. It is characterised by government responding to citizens’ preferences and citizens 
responding to government policies. While Powell (2004: 92) notes that government 
responsiveness is not entirely  up  to the good will of the policy makers, he does not 
acknowledge that policy responsiveness requires public responsiveness as well. Powell 
does not reflect on the reciprocal relationship and he does not incorporate the idea of 
public responsiveness or feedback in his visualisation of the responsiveness chain. 
Instead of thinking about representation and responsiveness as a chain of events, we can 
rather think of it as an ongoing cycle.  Government responsiveness cannot apply if 
public responsiveness is absent (Thomas, 2010: 534). In this thesis I solely focus on the 
idea of government responsiveness towards public preferences, the supply  side of the 
equation. But in order to get a full grasp  of how policy representation works, I 
acknowledge that public responsiveness on the demand side is a crucial mechanism as 
well. To emphasise, the idea of public responsiveness is not tested in this dissertation.
 A two-way flow of information suggests that  there is a difference between a 
static and a dynamic dimension of representation. The former explores the 
correspondence of opinion and policy at the same point in time, the latter focuses on 
change, that is, “whether policy makers act as a consequence of changes in public 
sentiment, which implies a sequence, inherently structured in time” (Stimson et  al., 
1995: 543). This differentiation has consequences for how we understand 
‘responsiveness’, in particular. Strictly speaking, policy responsiveness is only studied 
by dynamic models that account for change in opinion, which leads to change in policy. 
By definition a responsive government is characterised by a lagged reaction to changes 
in opinion at a previous time. Nevertheless, the term ‘responsiveness’ is also used, and 
often mistakenly used, by scholars to indicate a static relationship between public 
opinion and governments – see for example Powell (2000). Powell claims to explore the 
responsiveness of government towards the median citizen’s ideological position on a 
left-right continuum by investigating whether ideologies correspond at election times. 
However, his model of ideological representation is static and reflects the congruence of 
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ideological positions, but not the responsiveness of government ideology towards the 
median citizen dynamically. 
2.3 Kinds of Democratic Responsiveness 
 While it has been emphasised above that there is essential linkage between 
public preferences and governments, it is yet unclear what it  means when I say that 
governments respond to public opinion and in what ways a government is able to 
account for public wishes. The term ‘responsiveness’ implies that someone or 
something is reacting to someone or something else. To date scholars have failed to 
confidently  define what responsiveness means (Kuklinski and Segura, 1995: 18). 
Political representation is an eminently complex, multi-dimensional phenomenon of 
which responsiveness is only one fragment.  To some, responsiveness means that the 
representatives act in the interest  of the represented (Pitkin, 1967: 209). Others add that 
it is the policy makers’ duty to act according to the preferences of those who have 
chosen them, as this is the main reason why they  have been elected and the precise 
purpose for which they  have been selected (Birch, 1971: 125). Still others state that 
responsiveness aims for a relatively close policy correspondence with the wishes of 
relatively many citizens for a long period of time (Lijphart, 1984: 2). The above 
definitions are rather broad and they  do not give any  information on how a government 
practically  responds to public opinion. Powell (2004) gives us a very clear and a 
narrower interpretation of the meaning of responsiveness: “Democratic responsiveness 
is what occurs when the democratic process induces the government to form and 
implement policies that the citizens want” (Powell, 2004: 91). In other words, 
responding to public opinion means that there is an effective policy outcome that 
reflects preferences, something that is measurable in implemented law. While the author 
agrees with this definition of effective democratic responsiveness, she acknowledges 
that there are other ways in which government responsiveness can occur. 
 Schumaker’s (1975) work on protest group demands theorises that there are five 
kinds of responsiveness (or criteria as he calls it): access (1), agenda (2), policy (3), 
output (4), and impact responsiveness (5). Access responsiveness – the degree to which 
interest groups have access to policy makers – and impact responsiveness – the degree 
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to which protest  action succeeds in satisfying demands of the groups – focus 
specifically on the demands of protest movements. The crucial contribution of 
Schumaker’s work with respect to this thesis is how he theorises agenda, policy and 
output responsiveness. Agenda responsiveness is about whether policy  makers’ agendas 
respond to public agendas. Scholars test if policy makers pick up upon the most salient 
topics amongst the citizenry (inter alia Bonafont and Palau, 2011, Jennings et al., 2011b, 
Bevan and Jennings, 2010, Jones et al., 2009, Jennings and John, 2009, Jones and 
Baumgartner, 2004) or they analyse whether the median citizen is reflected in 
government speeches on the left-right scale (Warwick, 2012, Hakhverdian, 2010). 
While agendas give an indication of what the government plans, they describe policy 
promises only. An agenda can change, it can be adjusted or it can be given up on 
completely. Agenda responsiveness is not  enough to make general statements about the 
effective responsiveness of government towards citizens’ preferences. In order to ensure 
accountability and responsiveness, a more effective indicator is needed. 
 By contrast, policy and output representation go beyond the notion of using 
policy promises by  indicating policy outputs effectively in terms of specific policy 
issues (inter alia Soroka and Wlezien, 2010, Wlezien, 1996, Wlezien, 1995) or on 
positional congruence (inter alia Budge and McDonald, 2007, McDonald et al., 2004, 
Powell, 2000). Policy responsiveness indicates the degree to which preferences in a 
country  are adopted by or are congruent with legislation (Schumaker, 1975: 494). This 
corresponds with Powell’s (2004: 91) definition of responsiveness. Output 
responsiveness goes even further. Here it  is not  the correspondence of outputs with 
public opinion that matters, but how well implemented laws are executed in daily 
political life, for example, within the administrative work of cities, councils, states or 
other administrative authorities. Testing the output responsiveness of governments is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, which focuses on the policy responsiveness and 
representation defined as the formulation, adoption and implementation of legislation 
that the people want.
 If responsiveness is one essential mechanism to test the quality of political 
representation and democracy, it is important to look at effective responsiveness in 
terms of policy outputs. This does not mean that other forms of responsiveness are not 
important. They are rather complementary perspectives on how (well) representation 
works. 
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2.3 Perspectives on Democratic Responsiveness: Dyadic, 
Collective and Comparative Studies
 Previous responsiveness studies cluster around three types of research: 1) 
dyadic, 2) collective and 3) comparative responsiveness research. Early studies focus on 
the dyadic opinion-policy  relationship, i.e. the relation between a single legislator and 
her constituents. Pioneering research by  Miller and Stokes (1963) suggests that the 
responsiveness of US congresswomen and -men is only imperfectly satisfied and that it 
depends on the issue domain whether responsiveness occurs. Using a similar approach, 
research by Achen (1978) suggests that that public opinion is well represented and 
responded to in all policy  fields to a satisfactory degree. Individual legislators seem to 
listen to their constituents and reflect public opinion at least to some degree in their 
political decisions. While it is certainly important to explore the representation of 
constituents by individual legislators, research quickly shifted towards investigating 
responsiveness in collective terms, i.e. in the form of institutions collectively 
representing a people (Weissberg, 1978: 535). The idea of a representative body as a 
whole representing public demands became the focus of representation studies in the 
mid 1970s. Arguably, Weissberg’s work (1979, 1978) suggests that the US congress as a 
whole responds a lot more to the preferences of the people than initially  assumed by 
dyadic research. In addition, he presumes that institutional arrangements influence 
responsiveness. Other collective studies support these findings and show that public 
preferences and policy  change in the US largely  correspond (Monroe, 1979, Monroe, 
1998, Dalton, 1985, Page and Shapiro, 1983). Notably, all studies mentioned so far look 
at political representation from a rather static perspective and track the correspondence 
of opinion and policy at the same point in time.  
 The transition to dynamic responsiveness research occurs in the 1990s. Stimson 
(1991) and Stimson et al. (1995) find that the relationship between public opinion and 
policy is a dynamic one. However, question remains open as to whether opinion 
prompts policy or vice versa. Follow up  research suggests that there is a two-way flow 
between opinion and policy where policy makers follow public opinion and the 
outcome feeds back into public preferences (Wlezien, 1996, Wlezien, 1995, Canes-
Wrone and Shotts, 2004). Until the late 1980s, collective representation was exclusively 
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studied in the US. Initial studies outside the US indicate that responsiveness also occurs 
in France (Brooks, 1987), Germany (Brooks, 1990), and Canada (Pétry and 
Mendelsohn, 2004, Pétry, 1999, Bélanger and Pétry, 2005). 
 While it is important  to know whether representation occurs, the field opens up 
to comparative research around the same time. The observation that context  has a 
bearing on representation, as well as the question of how well the people are represented 
across different countries, led to an increase in comparative studies. While Erikson et al. 
(1993) successfully demonstrate that the US states respond to public opinion, 
Klingeman et al. (1994) show that governments in 10 Western countries represent the 
policy priorities of the political parties as a proxy for public preferences. In a series of 
static, comparative studies, scholars show that representation of ideological beliefs is 
moderated by the electoral rules and party system (Budge and McDonald, 2007, 
McDonald and Budge, 2005, Powell, 2000, Powell and Vanberg, 2000, Huber and 
Powell, 1994), although it remains unclear whether these differences are significant 
(Powell, 2011, Golder and Stramski, 2010, Powell, 2009, Blais and Bodet, 2006). 
Dynamic responsiveness research focuses on the representation of opinion regarding 
specific issues and the impact of institutions (Soroka and Wlezien, forthcoming, Soroka 
and Wlezien, 2010, Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008, Brooks and Manza, 2006, Soroka 
and Wlezien, 2005, Hobolt and Klemmemsen, 2005, Soroka and Wlezien, 2004).
2.4 Contextual Effects on the Opinion-Policy Linkage 
 Institutions affect  both sides of the opinion-policy equation. They can constrain 
or foster opinion expression as well as increase or decrease the number, quality  and 
pace of policy outcomes. Prior research focuses on a variety  of institutional contexts 
(legislative, executive and other political system characteristics) that affect the opinion-
policy relationship. 
 One set of institutional contexts focuses on the electoral rules and the party 
system. Indeed, both institutional features are closely  linked as the electoral rules 
determine which party  system evolves (Powell, 2000, Katz, 1997, Downs, 1957, 
Duverger, 1954). Majoritarian electoral rules have long been believed to be superior for 
they  create few parliamentary parties with distinct programmes that cluster around the 
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median voter and lead to decisive and stable single-party governments (Downs, 1957, 
Duverger, 1954). This assumption is first challenged Lijphart (1999, 1994, 1984) who 
finds that in fact consensus democracies are more successful in translating public 
wishes into policies as they represent all opinions and not just majority  preferences. 
Indeed, further empirical research on the ideological correspondence of citizens and 
government supports Lijphart’s findings (Budge and McDonald, 2007, McDonald and 
Budge, 2005, Powell, 2000, Powell and Vanberg, 2000, Huber and Powell, 1994). 
Powell (2000: 254) and Powell and Vanberg (Powell and Vanberg, 2000: 411) even 
conclude that proportional visions of democracy outperform their majoritarian 
counterparts. But more recent studies challenge these finding and suggest  that neither 
majoritarian rules nor proportional ones increase the level of representation (Powell, 
2011, Golder and Stramski, 2010, Powell, 2009, Blais and Bodet, 2006). These authors 
find that the differences in representation between electoral systems are marginal and 
not statistically significant, so the conclusion is that electoral rules perform equally 
well. 
 One explanation for these findings is that it is simply the timing of parties 
positioning themselves around the median that is different, and that the results are the 
same. While parties in majoritarian systems place themselves around the median voter 
before the election, parties in proportional systems are pulled back to the median voter 
during the coalition bargaining process (Golder and Stramski, 2010, Budge and 
McDonald, 2007, Blais and Bodet, 2006, McDonald and Budge, 2005). A similar 
picture is drawn in issue responsiveness research. While some scholars suggests that 
proportionality increases responsiveness (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008), others show 
that the opposite is the case (Soroka and Wlezien, forthcoming). How the electoral rules 
affect the opinion-policy relationship  is still unclear. The inconsistent results may be 
due to different approaches, data, time or measures; they  at least suggest that further 
research is needed to disentangle this problem. Some of these issues are addressed later 
in this dissertation. For instance, evaluations of the different approaches are given in 
Chapter 2.5. Here I also focus on questions of measurement. A detailed empirical test of 
the measurement validity of public opinion in issue responsiveness research is provided 
in Chapter 4.  
 A very  similar argument applies to the impact of the party  system on political 
representation.  The political parties are believed to be the essential link between public 
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opinion and outputs. Thus, party systems are crucial for the formation of majorities in 
parliaments and governments (Lijphart, 1999: 112). Few parties resulting form 
majoritarian rules usually  lead to decisive single party governments, while multiple 
parties based on proportional rules normally bring out coalition governments (Downs, 
1957: 144). However, instead of dividing between two and multiple party systems, 
scholarship  suggests counting the effective number of parliamentary parties (Gallagher 
and Mitchell, 2008, Golder, 2005, Lijphart, 1999, Laakso and Taagepera, 1979, Sartori, 
1976). According to the Downsian assumption, party systems that frequently bring out 
single party governments have been believed to be more likely  to represent public 
preferences than their counterparts (Downs, 1957, Duverger, 1954). Research by Cox 
(1997) and Powell and Vanberg (2000) shows that in multipartyism the governing 
parties are pulled back to the median throughout the coalition bargaining process. This 
demonstrates that multipartyism is at least not inferior to two-party  systems. Current 
studies even assume that governments in multiparty  countries perform slightly  better 
than those in two party systems, although the differences are not very large or 
statistically  significant  (Golder and Stramski, 2010, Powell, 2009, Blais and Bodet, 
2006). Further research is needed to clarify  how the party  system affects political 
representation. In addition, it is also up to further research to unravel whether the 
electoral rules and party  systems measure the same concept and for this reason have the 
same or at least very similar impact on the opinion-policy relationship. 
 In order to clarify the impact of these institutions on the opinion-policy linkage, 
I develop and employ a new comprehensive theoretical framework of contextual effects. 
It is founded in the veto players theory and allows me to systematically  analyse context 
across countries. In addition, I evaluate and empirically  review the popular approaches 
and measurements in order to rely on the best  approaches and measures for my 
responsiveness analysis. 
 Another set of contextual effects explored previously are executive 
characteristics, in particular, the difference between presidential and parliamentary 
government. The distinction between them is that governments are either selected by the 
legislature and are dependent on its trust (parliamentary governments) or they are 
elected by popular vote or an electoral college that is independent form the legislature. 
A hybrid and less common type of government is the semi-presidential one, where an 
elected president and the head of government selected by the elected parliament share 
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responsibilities, e.g. France. Prior research finds that decision making in presidential 
systems is superior as the president is more decisive, because she is independent. A 
directly  selected executive is more responsible and accountable than an executive that is 
only indirectly chosen by the people (Samuels, 2004, Powell and Whitten, 1993). In a 
case study on the United States, Canes-Wrone and Shotts (2004) find that presidents are 
highly  responsive, especially when the next election is imminent. They also demonstrate 
that the popularity  of the president is important. While moderate approval of the 
incumbent leads to increased responsiveness, high or low levels of popularity do not. 
Comparative research suggests that presidential systems are more likely to respond to 
the preferences of the people than parliamentary executives (Soroka and Wlezien, 
forthcoming, 2010, Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008). In addition, studies suggest that the 
political orientation of government determines how likely  it is to respond (Hobolt and 
Klemmensen, 2008).
 There are other characteristics of a political system that moderate the opinion-
policy relationship. Whether or not a country is organised centrally  or federally seems to 
be one important factor. Federalism describes the delegation of powers to sub-national, 
self-governing bodies, where the division of powers has been codified in one way or 
another and is guaranteed for all levels by law (Wheare, 1963: 11). It is distinguished 
from other forms of decentralisation that are not explicitly guaranteed by law, e.g. the 
British devolved governments or the French administrative municipalities. The impact 
of federalism on political representation is assumed (Lijphart, 1999, 1994, 1984), but 
little empirical research demonstrates how it affects it. While Brooks (1985) finds no 
substantial variation in political representation in Germany due to different levels of 
(de-)centralisation (there is some variance, but it is statistically insignificant), Wood 
(1992) demonstrates that federalism dampens responsiveness in the US.Comparative 
research on the impact on federalism on the opinion-policy  link suggests that it  confuses 
public opinion expression (Soroka and Wlezien, forthcoming, Soroka and Wlezien, 
2010). They argue that  different levels of government make it  hard to express specific 
preferences on the correct level – the level of government that is actually concerned 
with the policy problem. Further, political representation in government is decreased as 
preferences are not distinctly expressed. Although the results of the few studies 
modelling federalism point into the same direction (federalism deceases 
responsiveness), there is yet further research needed to get a more comprehensive 
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insight into its effect  on the opinion-policy relationship. While studies specifically 
suggest that the public opinion side of the equation is affected by federal state-building, 
there are reasons to believe that the public policy  side is also affected. Policy provision 
generally  gets more complex the more actors are involved. In addition, a federal 
structure may have a serious impact on the lag structure of responsiveness, for example, 
a federal government may need more time to achieve consensus and respond to 
preferences than a central government. Further, the country samples in previous 
research are limited to a case study or less than a handful of countries, only  one study 
looks at the effect cross-sectionally. Furthermore, although scholarship acknowledges 
that there are substantial differences between dual and cooperative federalism (Soroka 
and Wlezien, 2010), potential differences have not been tested. 
 There are many other characteristics that are likely to affect political 
representation, e.g. bicameralism (Lijphart, 1984, Sjölin, 1993, Druckman and Thies, 
2002), political competition (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008), timing in terms of at 
what time representation is looked at in the electoral cycle (Canes-Wrone and Shotts, 
2004), the kind of government in terms of minimum-winning versus over- and 
undersized government (Tsebelis, 2002, Vowles, 2010), and so on. 
 Prior research explores the context effects on political representation but it  
appears that moderators have been chosen more or less at  random rather than 
systematically, and especially not across approaches. For example, the positional policy 
congruence literature solely models the electoral and party system as contextual effects. 
While there has been no final answer as to whether those concepts tap  into the same 
contextual effect – after all electoral and party systems are strongly  linked – other 
factors important for policymaking have not been regarded at all. Issue responsiveness 
research has dealt  with context similarly. There is little research that conducts 
confirmatory studies on the impact of institutions, but different covariates are modelled. 
Further, there are problems with the theory of contextual effects on the opinion-policy 
relationship. Previous studies embed contextual effects in very specific theoretical 
frameworks, but it  seems that  there is no general, systematic theory of exploring 
context. This is another explanation for inconsistent findings. 
 Thirdly, there are also differences across institutions: Are they fixed or do they 
vary over time? Are they codified by law or results of the political game? Are they 
measurable in a dichotomous way? The list of questions goes on. What is needed is a 
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systematic clustering of political system attributes that enables researchers to analyse 
complex institutions in a consequential and consistent way (Tsebelis, 2002: 2). That is, 
what consequences do political institutions for political representation have and can we 
apply  the same argument to different countries and at different levels of analysis? By 
conducting cross-national research and by employing issue and ideology approaches, 
my thesis contributes a larger sample, which enables me to generalise as well as 
perform an comparison across approaches.
2.4.1 Explaining Contextual Effects on the Opinion-Policy 
Nexus Applying Veto Player Theory
 Why governments are expected to respond to citizens’ preferences was outlined 
earlier in this thesis. Especially Chapter 2.1 and 2.2 have discussed in how far 
government responsiveness is a key characteristic of representation. In this section, I 
develop a more focused view on the role of institutions in the framework government 
responsiveness. Previous research has emphasised the effect of institutions for the 
demand side of the representation equation (inter alia Wlezien and Soroka 2011; John et 
al. 2011; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). According to this literature, particularly  the 
institutional designs affect how well citizens can formulate and express their 
preferences. For instance, federal state-building has been identified as one institutional 
feature that “confuses” (Wlezien and Soroka 2011; Soroka and Wlezien 2010) citizens 
and prevents them from expressing clear preferences. In federal systems citizens may  be 
unclear of how responsibilities are allocated and who is responsible to account for their 
demands, hence, citizens do not know who to address their demands to - the federal 
government or the sub-level government - and may not express preferences whatsoever. 
This mechanism is similar for other institutional features. 
 The mechanism of institutions and representation may affect the supply side at 
the same time, however. While citizens may be confused because the institutional 
framework is too complex and prevents them to express clear preferences at and 
between election times, institutions may at  the same time affect how successful 
governments are in supplying policies. Let me go back to example of federalism. 
Federal state-building means that policy making is split horizontally across levels of 
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government. Depending on the kind of federal system established - dual or cooperative 
federalism - supplying public policies may  involve more (or less) coordination with 
lower levels of government or even second chambers if the federal state building is tied 
to that. Coordinating policy and cooperating with other institutional actors means that a 
government is less flexible when it comes to policy making and providing policies in 
accordance with public opinion. It has to take into account other opinions before a final 
decision can be made. Further, this is a matter of time. Perhaps federal governments are 
as responsive as governments in unitary states, but it simply  takes them more time to 
respond to citizens’ preferences, because they have to account for the other actors’ 
policy positions, negotiate aims and supply and, thus, respond with a longer delay in 
time. This should emphasise how institutions also effect the supply side and not  only the 
demand side. This dissertation only focuses on the supply side of the equation. While 
the opinion policy nexus clearly has two side and both are important to study 
responsiveness, in this thesis I aim to disentangle how the supply  side is affected by 
institutions. 
2.4.1.1 A Systematic Theory of Institutions
 In order to get a more structured insight into how the institutional context affects 
the opinion-policy linkage, a systematic theory institutions is required. For along time 
Lijphart’s (1984; 1999) distinction into majoritarian and consensus democracies has 
served as a guideline to study the impact of institutions on political phenomena. 
However, more recent research suggests that Lijphart’s rather static classifications are 
deficient frameworks (Kaiser 1997: 421) of studying institutional effects on dynamic 
political behaviour. Today many studies - and so is this one - are interested in the 
structuring effect as well as the consequences of institutions for political action. Since 
Lijphart a variety  of ideas have been proposed by political scientist  how to explain 
policy outcomes by studying institutions. For instance, Immergut’s (1992) 
acknowledges: 
“Constitutional rules, the organization of political parties, and patterns of electoral 
participation - the standard political variables - create decision-making structures,  each of 
which has its own logic. These formal institutional features and the ways in which they are 
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combined with electoral results produce different kinds of political dynamics. (Immergut 
1992: 5)
 Immergut’s idea of using veto points to structure the impact of institutions has 
been further developed by other scholars. Veto points are scores associated with 
institutions’ ability to veto decisions. Huber et al. (1993) study institutional impact on 
welfare states  in a similar way as Immergut suggests. In a comparative study  on the 
institutional impact of policy-making, Cowhey and McCubbins (1995) develop, as 
Kaiser (1997) notes, “a whole range of different veto terms [...] to describe the 
motivational effect of institutions”, where each term describes a different veto situation, 
e.g. veto point, veto player and veto office. 
 Tsebelis (1995a, 1995b, 2002) develops veto player theory with regard to the 
stability  of political systems. In a nutshell, Tsebelis (2002) argues that in order to 
change policies, a certain number of institutional actors, the veto players, have to agree 
on the proposed change. Further, any significant departures from the status quo are 
impossible if the winset is small, that is, if the number of veto players is high (Tsebelis, 
2002: 2). For political stability, which is what Tsebelis studies, this means that stability 
is greater when the number of veto players is higher. 
 Further, Kaiser (1997) develops a veto player argument accounting for the 
consensual and conflictual competition between actors that may  or may  not be used by 
actors depending on their strategy. Veto points are thus classified according to their 
intended effects. Kaiser divides veto points across static and dynamic institutional 
designs, which he calls hard and soft veto points. 
 Birchfield and Crepaz (1998) push Kaiser’s argument even further. They find 
that the ability to veto decisions is not equal across institutions, but divides alongside 
collective and competitive veto points. Competitive veto points occur when different 
political actors operate through separate institutions with mutual veto powers, such as 
federalism, strong bicameralism, and presidential government. Collective veto points, 
on the other hand, emerge from institutions where the different political actors operate 
in the same body and whose members interact with each other on a face to face basis. 
Typical examples of collective veto points are proportional electoral systems, multi-
party legislatures, multi- party governments, and parliamentary regimes.
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 While the way of theorising the different veto dimensions differs across these 
studies, they have a common denominator. Kaiser (1997: 421) notes that political 
institutions are interpreted as structuring variables for political action, which is the 
viewpoint I also take in this dissertation. I build my institutional argument on Tsebelis’s 
veto player theory. While on first sight may seem inferior to newer conceptualisation of 
institutions' abilities to veto decisions, it  is the most straightforward way of 
systematically  structuring institutions for the purpose of this research. While I pick up 
on Kaiser’s idea of structuring players according to static and dynamic designs, which is 
important considering the time-series nature of this research, I do not follow the idea of 
competitiveness of veto actors. Kaiser’s (1997) as well as Birchfield and Crepaz’s 
(1998) argument are more sufficient when investigating how a combination of 
institutions affect representation altogether. This research, however, takes a step back 
and aims to identify institutional effects in a continuum of their own to provide an initial 
indication of how institutions affect representation. For this purpose, Tsebelis’s  (1995a, 
1995b, 2002) classification is sufficient and offers a much clearer picture of institutions 
by simply counting the veto power. I lay out my veto player argument in more detail in 
the following section.
2.4.1.2 Institutional and Situational Veto Players 
 In order to study political stability in a systematic way, I employ Tsebelis’s 
(1995a, 1995b, 2002) veto player argument to explain policy responsiveness in a 
comparative framework. Tsebelis’s work focuses on political system stability.  In a 
nutshell, he argues that in order to change policies, a certain number of institutional 
actors, the veto players, have to agree on the proposed change. Further, any significant 
departures from the status quo are impossible if the winset is small, that is, if the 
number of veto players is high (Tsebelis, 2002: 2). In other words, stability is greater 
when the number of veto players is higher as it is harder for players to move away from 
the status quo.
 However, the direction of the institutional effects shifts when applying the veto 
player argument to the study of contextual effects in representation research. While 
Tsebelis’s interest is in maintaining political system stability, representation research is 
interested in tracking the change from the status quo of policies. Following this notion, 
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representation should be greater when the number of veto players is lower. Tsebelis 
further distinguishes between two kinds of veto players: “If veto players are generated 
by the constitution, they  are called institutional veto players. [...] If veto players are 
generated by the political game, they are called partisan veto players” (Tsebelis, 2002: 
19). The distinction between different political actors according to their attributes is also 
found in the voting literature, especially in the clarity of responsibility  hypothesis. 
Powell and Whitten (1993) first theorised the idea of the clarity of responsibility  in the 
context of economic voting. Complex institutions, they  argue, lead to blurred 
responsibilities and make it difficult for voters to judge governments on economic 
performances. They make a distinction between high and low clarity of institutional 
responsibility. Palmer and Whitten (1999) further developed this argument and 
distinguish further between institutions that  lead to high, medium or low clarity of 
responsibility.3 
 Hobolt et al. (2012) suggest explicitly  distinguishing between two dimensions of 
the political context, institutional clarity and the clarity of governance. Whereas the 
former focuses on the rather static institutional set-up of a country that does not vary 
over time, the latter looks at the time-variant cohesiveness of the government.4  This 
enables scholars to test specifically what voters in this case are concerned with – the 
institutionally  defined concentration of powers or an ad hoc cohesive actor in a 
particular situation.
 Here, I link the idea of different kinds of veto players with the clarity  of 
responsibility hypothesis. Indeed, there is a number of fixed institutions, i.e. actors that 
do not vary over time and are often specified by a constitution. For example, these 
include a country’s regime type, its electoral rules and party system, whether its 
legislative structure is bicameral or unicameral and whether government is organised 
centrally or federally. Following Tsebelis (2002), these established veto players that do 
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3 In order to test the clarity of responsibility hypothesis, Powell and Whitten (1993) construct an index 
consisting of five variables to indicate high and low clarity of responsibility (opposition control of 
committee chairs, weak party cohesion, bicameral opposition, minority government, and the number of 
parties in government). The index is refined by Palmer and Whitten (1999), in so far as it distinguishes in 
more detail between three levels of clarity – high, medium and low. 
4 Hobolt et al. (2012) also work with indexes to test their hypotheses. Instead of one index they create two 
for each hypothesis and differ between high and low clarity in accordance with the Powell and Whitten 
index (1993). 
not vary over time, but are fixed in time (and often by a constitution as well), are called 
institutional veto players. 
 By contrast, there is also a number of veto players that are not fixed in any way, 
that vary with the political situation or the political game. For example, there are 
characteristics of governance (single party versus coalition governments, minimum-
winning versus over-/undersized governments, the effective number of parties in 
government) as well as of the legislature (the effective number of parties in parliament. 
These time-variant veto players are called situational veto players.5 Figure 2 exhibits 
how veto players are categorised.
 These players semantically  connects that they are plain institutional features and 
that they affect how government looks like as well as whether or not it  is able to 
respond to preferences. The regime type is an overall important feature as it determines 
the relationship  between the legislature and executive. How does a government come 
and stay in office? The electoral rules and party system are strongly linked as the party 
system is a result of the electoral rules, however, it is important to consider both. 
 Recent assumptions made about electoral rules and party  systems are violated. 
For instance, single member districts do not necessarily lead to a two-party system any 
longer as we see in the case of the United Kingdom. Federal state building has 
previously been found to affect  the demand side of responsiveness: public 
responsiveness. Federal state building affects public responsiveness by  preventing 
citizens to formulate and express clear preferences as they are unsure who to address 
their policy  demands to in a federal state, the federal or the sub-level government 
(Wlezien and Soroka, forthcoming). This research argues that federalism also impacts 
the supply side as it may require more effort form governments to make decisions in 
federal states and may  thus decrease responsiveness. Further, federalism is likely to 
slow down decision making, so it  may take governments longer to respond. Often a 
federal state building is tied to second chambers in legislature, for instance, in the USA 
or Germany, which the reason why I want to investigate bicameral assembly as well. 
 In term of the time-varying situational veto players the semantic connection is in 
how more (or less) veto players affect the decisiveness and flexibility  of government’s 
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5 I consciously abstain from calling these veto players partisan veto players as originated by Tsebelis, 
because the term is misleading in this context. The focus is on the situation created by the political game, 
which generates more or less veto players. Partisan veto players in the context of governance and 
legislation suggest an affiliation with a party, however. 
decision making. The effective number of parliamentary parties links up with the 
electoral and party system, but it gives a more precise measure of how many veto 
players are created by the system. It may also change with elections, so ideally its 
impact can give a more precise answer to the veto player argument. There is a similar 
reasoning behind the idea of including the plain number of parties in the government. 
Two time-varying indicators that are strongly connected are the single party  versus 
coalition governments and the maybe more precise measure of minimum winning 
versus over/-undersized governments. I use both characteristics to get a clearer image 
what government enhances responsiveness. It is important to test the simpler argument 
single party  government versus coalitions. But more recent research shows that 
minimum winning coalitions are as successful in policy making as single-party 
governments Tsebelis, 2002, Vowles, 2010. By contrast minority and sur-plus 
governments face more veto players and hence are believed to be less successful. 
 Counting the institutional and situational veto players is consequently the 
simplest way of theorising veto players and it is sufficient for the design of this study as 
well. This study  delivers an initial insight to the application of veto player theory to the 
study of policy  representation by testing one institutional and situational feature at a 
time. Thus complex indices or ways of assigning veto points may not be necceassay, 
because I am not interested in a combined effect. However, distinguishing between 
institutional and situational veto players still makes sense as it  gives a more 
differentiated, yet simple insight to political institutions. Previous studies in the field do 
not provide a sufficient reasoning for picking institutions. Here I give a distinction 
between time variant and time-invariant  institutions in a more systematic way, but  also 
in a simplistic way. 
 Tsebelis strategy of counting the numbers of veto players is therefore sufficient 
to give a first insight to and test  of veto player theory. Both, institutional and situational 
veto players, directly  measure the institutional features. Certainly, veto player theory 
also touches the debate about how cohesive or distant the different players are in terms 
of their policy or ideological beliefs, this is something I do not consider in my 
dissertation. As outlined earlier in this chapter, I am interested in plain institutional 
features at this stage of my research and not the policy  beliefs leading each actor to 
behave in a particular way. I acknowledge, however, that ideological and issue 
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convictions of each player are important  when it comes to policy negotiations, 
competition and decision making. 
Figure 2: Characteristics of Institutional and Situational Veto Players
Institutional Veto Players
(Time-invariant)
Situational Veto Players
(Time-variant)
- Regime Type
- Electoral Rules
- Party System
- Federalism
- Bicameralism
- Effective Number of Parties in the 
Legislature 
- Number of Parties in Government 
- Single Party versus Coalition 
Governments
- Minimum-winning versus over-/
undersized Governments
 
 An institutional design that enhances governments’ ability to respond to 
preferences may be desirable. If the number of veto players that are involved in the 
policymaking process is high, the clarity of responsibilities is low and the ability of 
governments to respond to citizens’ preferences is constrained. The resulting flexibility 
and ability to change policy directions is crucial. Governments that have this ability and 
flexibility to adjust policy easily, may  be more likely to respond to public opinion in 
first place. It simply is easier for such governments to account for public demands. By 
contrast, governments who have to negotiate and unite the interest of many veto players 
to make decision and consequently are less flexible make those decision, are less likely 
to respond to public opinion as they are constrained in first place. 
 Now if few veto players lead to more flexible governments that have the ability 
to respond to public opinion, one may  question that these governments will actually 
respond to public opinion. They might be rather self-interested if they are flexible and 
serve their own interests. The question occurs why would governments also have the 
incentive to respond to public opinion instead of doing what pleases them? The answer 
seems to be re-election. One major goals for all governments is to get  re-elected (inter 
alia Tufte 1978). In order to increase their chances of getting re-elected, incumbent 
governments need to please their voters and the public. This can be done by taking into 
account or responding to the public’s demands in order to increase the their chances of 
getting re-elected. It seems to be a logical consequence to assume that whenever the 
public is satisfied and pleased with government activity, they will vote for the same 
government or governmental parties in the next general elections (Miller and Stokes 
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1963; Eulau and Karps 1977). Spinning this argument further, governments who have to 
unite a larger number of veto players to take decisions, may have the same incentive, to 
get re-elected, but not the same ability  to respond to public preferences as governments 
that face fewer veto players. 
 Clarity of responsibilities on the demand side of the equation may  worsen this 
dilemma of governments with many  veto players. In a constellation where the 
responsibilities of institutional actors are less clearly  allocated and citizens are unsure 
who is taking the final decision, they may abstain from expressing clear preferences 
through election as well as between election (Soroka and Wlezien, 2009, Wlezien and 
Soroka, forthcoming). Where no clear preferences are expressed, governments may 
struggle to respond to demands. Hence, while governments facing more veto players in 
decision making may  have the incentive to respond to the public, but they  have the 
constrain of being less able to respond to opinion, because they  are constrained by more 
veto players participating in the decision making, as well as picking up on clearly 
defined preferences, which may be due to the same muddy institutional framework that 
constrained government’s ability to respond in first place. 
 The demand side of the opinion-policy equation is, however, no concern in this 
dissertation. It may be relevant  to the study of government responsiveness, however.  I 
argue that electoral incentives keep  governments responsive, but that responsiveness 
under more complex institutional conditions might decrease governments ability  and 
incentive to respond, because circumstances are less clear for governments’ decision 
making as the responsibilities are less clear and more actors are involved in decision 
(lack of clarity). A similar lack of clarity caused by  institutional and situational 
complexity may lead to voters being unclear about their preferences at  the same time, 
which affects the public responsiveness side, which is not focus of this dissertation. The 
idea of public responsiveness and the impact of clarity of responsibilities has been 
studied previously (inter alia Soroka and Wlezien, 2009).  Yet the consequence of the 
clarity  of preference expression on policy responsiveness has not been studied 
explicitly. This may be relevant, but the idea is substance for further research. In this 
thesis I only investigate the supply side and institutions: the impact of institutional and 
situational veto players government responsiveness. For emphasis, I only test under 
what conditions governments have the ability and the incentive to respond to public 
demands. I take this as a measure of how well policy supply works. 
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 There are also differences in the contextual effect of institutional and situational 
veto players on the opinion-policy linkage. The core characteristic of institutional veto 
players, I have argued, is that they do not vary over time, while situational veto players 
do. Now for short- and mid-term responses of governments towards public preferences, 
changing situations and fixed institutions matter, while long-established preferences, 
e.g. ideological positions, may be affected a lot more by the fixed institutional veto 
players, but not by situational ones. Ideology is less volatile and less subject to 
situational change. I elaborate on this argument in the hypothesis section. 
 Embedding the conditions of the opinion-policy relationship  in the veto players 
theory  with a focus on the clarity of responsibilities hypothesis is a new approach to 
theorising context in this field. Previous research has not distinguished between 
contexts this clearly. This way of theorising generally gives a clearer direction on how 
institutions may affect the opinion-policy  relationship  and it also helps to clarify how 
far institutional and situational context matter across approaches. This may have 
implications for prior research as well and may  lead to a re-evaluation of the 
interpretation of contextual effects on policy responsiveness.6
 
2.4.2 The Clarity of Responsibility Hypotheses 
 In the following I propose and justify the hypotheses that I test in this 
dissertation. The overall concept investigated is the clarity  of responsibilities 
hypothesis. I argue that the clearer the responsibilities are allocated in a country, the 
more likely it is that a government responds to distinct preferences. This overarching 
hypothesis, however, divides into two subordinate hypotheses: the institutional and the 
situational clarity hypotheses. What I understand by those terms and what reasoning is 
behind each hypothesis is elaborated in more detail below. In order to examine the 
impact of institutional and situational clarity I make use of two sets of propositions 
based on different institutional and situational characteristics. 
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6 Most of the institutional and situational veto players are operationalised in a dichotomous way. 
Admittedly, the world is more complex than having only two options. Golder (2005) has noted 
dichotomising institutions does not give justice to the complexity of the institutions. However, for reason 
of practicability and simplification of the analysis dichotomous items are useful and frequently used by 
scholars. While I acknowledge that the world is more complex, I rely on dichotomous classifications. I 
discuss the operationalisation of the institutional variables in further detail in the methodology section 
(Chapter 3.4.1).
2.4.2.1 Institutional Clarity Hypothesis
 Institutional clarity is “about the institutional concentration of power, which 
captures the formal division of powers both horizontally between the executive and the 
legislature, and vertically  between different levels of government” (Hobolt et al., 2012: 
10). It also incorporates other fixed attributes of the legislature. In this sense institutions 
are long-established and often fixed in a written form in the constitution. Hence, 
institutional clarity is concerned with the time invariant components of the political 
system. 
 
Institutional Clarity Hypothesis:
The fewer (time-invariant) institutional veto players are involved in policy 
making, the higher is the degree of government responsiveness.
 The clearer the institutional structure, the more likely  it is that the people 
express distinct policy preferences at elections times as well as between elections. 
Consequently, if citizens have clearly defined demands, governments should be able to 
account for those. Further and maybe more importantly, the supply  side is affected. 
Fewer institutional veto players means that responsibilities are clearly allocated and the 
decision-makers have to rely  less on cooperation and coordination with other 
institutional actors. This enables decision makers to be more flexible in policy making 
and to implement policy  that is in accordance with public opinion. In reverse, the more 
institutional veto players are involved in the decision-making process, the more 
complex is the network of actors who take part in making decisions. Complex networks 
affect the demand side - citizens may be less confident in who to address their demands 
to. But they also affect the supply side, more institutional veto players and a more 
complex system of institutions required cooperation and coordination between these 
actors to come to a final policy decision. Hence, policy  makers may  be less flexible and 
less able to implement policies in accordance with public opinion. Government 
responsiveness is decreased. 
 In order to empirically test  the institutional clarity hypothesis I rely on a set  of 
sub-propositions that focus more precisely  on specific institutional veto players. I 
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consider the executive type , the electoral rules , the party system, federalism , and the 
establishment of a second legislative chamber. Thereby, I rely  on dichotomisation. 
While the author acknowledges that some institutions are more complex and may 
require a distinction in more detail (Golder 2009), she also has keeps in mind her 
country  samples for the empirical chapters. Especially, the second empirical chapter 
does not allow a more detailed differentiation for some of the explanatory variables as 
most European countries are fairly similar. 
H1a:  Presidential governments are more likely to respond to public 
 opinion.
 
 One crucial criterion to distinguish between executive types is the relationship 
between the executive and the legislature.  Parliamentary governments are elected by 
the legislative body and are subject to a legislature’s confidence to exist, whereas 
presidential governments are usually  popularly  elected and independent from the 
legislative assembly to exist (Carey, 2005: 91). The term “legislative confidence” refers 
to dependencies between the legislature and the government. Many parliamentary 
systems apply mechanisms that enable the parliament to withdraw its trust in the 
appointed government and select a new one or alternatively initiate early elections. In 
presidential governments such mechanism does not exist; the government is elected for 
a fixed term and cannot be removed from office between elections (Linz 1990). 
However, Cheibub and Limongi (2002: 176) argue that the “reality of of both 
parliamentary  and presidential regimes is more complex than it  would be if we derive 
these systems’ entire behavior from their first principles.” While the author 
acknowledges that deadlock, coalitions, and central decision making can happen in both 
systems, she also ascribes to the view that in “parliamentary  systems the government 
controls the agenda and the legislature accepts or rejects proposals, while in presidential 
systems the legislature makes the proposals and the government signs or vetoes 
them“ (Tsebelis 1995: 325). However, spinning this argument further, it seems that 
presidential governments may yet be more flexible and successful in translating 
preferences into policies. As Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) note, presidents can do a 
lot more than sign or veto legislation, they often have the right to initiate legislation in 
some areas and have the power to act for a limited time period without the legislators 
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approval. Following this argument, it  leads to the conclusions that parliamentary 
governments are less flexible to take policy decisions. While they usually have a more 
or less comfortable majority in the legislature that sustains the government, they  have to 
please more veto-players at the same time, e.g. coalition parters in the government as 
well as coalescing parties or even opposing parties in the parliament. Admittedly, 
presidents also require legislators to sign off on policy  decision, however, the 
president’s veto as well as decree powers bring her in a more comfortable position when 
it comes to follow public opinion or not. 
  In the review of the literature on the context effects on policy representation, I 
have pointed to prior findings that suggest presidential governments are highly 
responsive to citizens preferences, particularly when the election date is close (Canes-
Wrone and Shotts, 2004) and in comparison are more likely to respond than their 
parliamentary  counterparts (Soroka and Wlezien, 2010, forthcoming). One argument is 
that a directly  selected executive is more responsible and accountable, and thus also 
more responsive, than an executive that  is indirectly  chosen by the people (Hellwig and 
Samuels, 2007, Samuels, 2004, Powell and Whitten, 1993). 
 Thinking about veto player theory and its link with the clarity  of responsibilities 
hypothesis, a parliamentary  executive has more veto players to agree to proposed 
changes than a presidential government. The parliamentary executive is dependent on 
the trust of the parliament and has to negotiate and find a consensus on policies with the 
agreement of the respective parliamentary majority. Presidential governments are 
independent. They have been selected by popular vote and the legislature has no powers 
to withdraw the trust or mandate of the incumbent government. The presidential 
executive is free to decide on policy changes and more flexible when it comes to 
following public demands. 
H2a:  Two-and-a-half party systems, are more likely to respond to public 
 demands.
 Political parties are understood as the primary vehicles that  articulate citizens’ 
policy beliefs and convert them into public policies (Adams, 2001: 3). They act as a 
mediator between the public and the government, and give content and structure to the 
processes of competition which are essential, by definition, to a representative 
 
45
democracy  (Klingemann, 1998: 185). Whether there are few or many  parties competing 
for office is crucial for the formation of government (Lijphart, 1999: 112). In countries 
where there are fewer parties, the parties supposedly take more distinct positions on 
policies so that voters can clearly distinguish between them, e.g. in the US. Where many 
parties are represented the distinction between their policy  priorities is blurry – parties 
may take very similar positions on policies that only  differ in detail (inter alia Downs, 
1957, Duverger, 1954). 
 Similarly  to that on the effects of the electoral rules, scholarship  on the impact of 
the party system is divided on how party systems affect representation. To some, the 
coalition bargaining process in multiparty governments is likely to have less definite, 
less coherent, and less integrated programmes than governments in a two party  system 
(Downs, 1957: 144). To others, multipartyism pulls the coalescing parties back to the 
median voter during the bargaining process because parties will form a minimal 
winning coalition with like-minded parties (Van Eijk and Franklin, 2009, Powell and 
Vanberg, 2000, Cox, 1997, 1990). Once again, recent scholarship only  finds marginal 
differences between the two party systems (Golder and Stramski, 2010, Powell, 2009, 
Blais and Bodet, 2006).
 From a veto player perspective, the fewer institutional veto players are involved, 
the clearer the responsibilities are and the more likely it is that policy  responds to public 
demands. Applied to the party system this means that having fewer parties in the 
legislature, each with clearly distinct propositions, usually leads to decisive, single-party 
governments that are likely to respond to public opinion. Multipartyism, by contrast, 
frequently leads to coalition governments, so the number of veto players is high, while 
the responsibilities are less clear, so coalitions are less likely to respond to preferences. 
H3a:  Governments in unitary states are more likely to account for public 
 opinion.   
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 Government in many modern democracies is divided vertically in terms of a 
federal structure.7  Federalism means the delegation of powers to sub-national, self-
governing bodies, where the division of powers has been codified in one way  or another 
and is guaranteed for all levels by law (Wheare, 1963: 11).8 Around 30 countries around 
the globe are federally organised, amongst them are some long established modern 
democracies, e.g. the German Länder and US states9. While federalism is not studied 
much in relation to the opinion-policy connection, the few studies that there are suggest 
that federal state-building decreases responsiveness (Soroka and Wlezien, forthcoming, 
Soroka and Wlezien, 2010, Wood, 1992). 
 From a veto player perspective this is logical as federalism means multi-
level governance and is associated with an increased number of veto players. Sub-
level governments and other institutional actors take part in the decision-making 
process and it is largely unclear who acts and decides on which matters. If the 
number of veto players in federal countries is high and consequently  the clarity  of 
responsibility is low, the public is unable to express distinct preferences and 
government responsiveness is likely  to be low too. In turn, unitary systems have 
fewer institutional veto players, so the allocation of powers and responsibilities is 
clearer, and people can form more distinct preferences that government are more 
likely to respond to.
H4a:  Governments in unicameral countries are more responsive to 
 public preferences.  
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7 Over 26 countries are federally organised, amongst them some long established modern democracies 
such as Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Comoros, 
Ethiopia, Germany, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Micronesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Serbia & 
Montenegro, St. Kitts & Nevis, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, UAE, USA, Venezuela, Iraq, Palau, 
Papua New Guinea, Sudan, Sri Lanka (http:// www.forumfed.org, en, federalism, by_country, index.php, 
accessed 12/07/2012). 
8 By contrast, the delegation of powers to sub-national entities that are not guaranteed under the 
constitution can be revoked by the federal government at any time (Bardhan 2002:185). The 
administrative municipalities in France and devolved Welsh and Scottish governments in great Britain 
indicate decentralisation, but are by no means characteristics of a constituted federalism.  
9 Federalism occurs as dual and cooperative federalism. The former refers to a de-central structure where 
the national and sub-national bodies are independent and their responsibilities are clearly dispersed 
between the different layers. In co-operative federalism, by contrast, the responsibilities are blurred in a 
hierarchical, interdependent system (Soroka and Wlezien 2010: 50; Wood 1992: 851) and the national and 
sub-national bodies compete over competencies in the shared issues. For practicability reasons scholars 
divide between unitary and federal political systems, however. Often, it is also unclear how to classify 
federal systems correctly as transitions are floating.
 “Bicameralism is a constitutional arrangement, where the legislative function is 
distributed over multiple chambers” (Diermeier et al., 2004: 4). It is often linked to 
federal state-building, for example, the US or Germany, where the second chambers 
represent the federal government, but this is not a necessity, e.g. the House of Lords in 
the UK. While the importance of legislative bicameralism on coalition politics has been 
emphasised (Druckman and Thies, 2002, Lijphart, 1999, Sjölin, 1993, Lijphart, 1984), 
the impact of bicameralism on governance is yet to be studied in more detail. Some 
have argued that bicameralism is important when the multiple chambers share the right 
to appoint and remove members of the executive, however, there are only  few 
(European) cases where this is relevant (Diermeier et al., 2004: 4). It is the impact of 
second chambers on government politics rather than whether they  are involved in 
appointing/removing members of the government that is relevant here. Bicameralism as 
an institution means taking into account another veto player’s opinion when making a 
policy decision. While second chambers have to agree or can veto decisions made by 
the first  chamber, governments in unicameral states do not have this additional veto 
player to win over in order to support their decisions.10 
 While no responsiveness research has looked at the bicameral structure, it is an 
institution that affects government and especially coalition government politics 
(Druckman and Thies, 2002). With a second chamber entering the political arena as an 
institutional veto player, decision-making processes are less clear. Citizens do not 
necessarily know whether the second chamber’s agreement is necessary to make a 
decision or how much influence they have. In addition, the second chamber’s 
attendance slows down the decision-making process until a consensus is reached as 
bicameralism adds to the number of interests that are represented in the policy process 
(Heller, 1997). Adding another institutional veto player in form of bicameralism means 
the responsibilities of both citizens and governments are less clear. Bicameralism leads 
to less pronounced policy preferences and a decrease in policy representation. In turn, 
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10 Pushing the argument further, another crucial aspect for governing is that a government needs 
majorities in both chambers to pass certain laws. Ideally, the governing party or coalition is dominant in 
both chambers, however in reality this is often not the case. In addition, rolling elections change 
majorities in the upper chamber frequently. This is the case in Germany, where the composition and 
partisan control of the Bundesrat changes with the parliamentary elections in the Länder. In this sense, 
bicameralism transforms from an institutional veto player to a situation veto player. The partisan control 
of government changes over time and thus is a time-variant characteristic of the political game. In this 
thesis I do not investigate this opportunity further, but I acknowledge that the partisan control of 
governments in unicameral states are more likely  to respond, the responsibilities are 
clearly allocated, and public preferences are more pronounced. 
H5a:  Governments brought about by majoritarian electoral rules are 
 more likely to respond to citizens preferences. 
 Electoral systems are a set of essentially unchanged rules under which one or 
more successive elections are conducted in a particular democracy  (Lijphart, 1994: 13). 
In other words, they are understood as methods of translating votes into seats. For 
representation research, the different rules or procedures are important to account for as 
they  bring out legislative majorities, which influence the concentration of powers in 
government. Powell (2000: 21) notes that  if the election rules encourage the equitable 
representation of multiple parties and the decision rules encourage dispersion of power 
among these parties in policymaking, then the constitution embodies the proportional 
vision. If it  leads to a minimum representation two-and-a-half-parties and the power 
concentrates on only one of these parties it is a matter of a majoritarian vision. 
Previously, scholars have drawn inconsistent conclusions about the impact of the 
electoral rules on the opinion-policy  nexus. To some, proportional visions outperform 
majoritarian ones (Powell, 2006, Powell, 2000, Powell and Vanberg, 2000, Lijphart, 
1999), to others, there are only marginal differences between the dominant electoral 
formulas (Golder and Stramski, 2010, Powell, 2009, Blais and Bodet, 2006). There are 
many factors that influence the opinion-policy nexus, which may be one reason do 
inconsistent results. One explanation may be that ideological congruence is based on 
different measurements of public’s ideological preferences (See Chapter 6.1). However, 
Blais and Bodet (2006) have demonstrated that all measures of citizens’ preferences 
are highly  comparable and valid. In a series of publications, Powell (Powell, 2006, 
Powell, 2000, Powell and Vanberg, 2000; Powell 2009) comes to different conclusions 
and speculates that the inconsistent  results are due to time. Congruence and its 
moderators have changed across time. Golder and Stramski (2010) come up  with a more 
comprehensive argument. They find that the electoral connection affects congruence. 
While we expect to congruence between citizens and the elected MPs to be high, the 
link between citizens and government may be weaker, but there should be increased 
congruence between the elected MPs and the government ideologies. 
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 Theoretically, majoritarian electoral rules should lead to a more responsive 
government. They produce a manufactured majority, but frequently  lead to decisive and 
stable single-party governments (Norris, 2004: 42). From a veto player perspective there 
is little competition in the legislature. Usually majoritarian rules lead to a party structure 
of two strong parties in the parliament and they frequently produce single-party 
executives. The responsibilities are clearly allocated and there is frequent contact 
between citizens and their representatives which fosters accountability and legitimacy 
(Curtice and Shively, 2009: 174).11  Fewer institutional veto players lead to clear 
decision-making structures and, hypothetically, to increase responsiveness. 
 By contrast, proportional electoral rules produce a broad and fair representation 
of all opinions (Blais and Massicotte, 2006: 61) as the seats are allocated in proportion 
to the votes of each party. While proportionality emphasises the inclusion of all voices, 
it requires negotiation and compromise within the parliament as well as the government 
(Norris, 2004: 50). Proportional electoral rules frequently lead to coalition governments, 
so there are more veto players created in the legislature and the government that need to 
be included in the decision-making process. The responsibilities are blurred (Van Eijk 
and Franklin, 2009: 70) and policy responsiveness decreases.
2.4.2.2 Situational Clarity Hypothesis
 By contrast, the situational clarity dimension is not directly  concerned with 
formal institutional rules, but rather with situations resulting from the political game. 
Political situations can change more frequently, for example, with the beginning of a 
new legislative period. Here, I differentiate between situations regarding governance 
and changing situations in the legislature. The clearer the political situation is, the more 
likely it is that the people express distinct policy preferences and that governments 
respond to public opinion. Situational clarity  occurs when only a few situational veto 
players are involved in the decision-making processes. In other words, the smaller the 
number of situational veto players is, the clearer the responsibilities in that situation are 
and the more likely it  is that governments represent opinion. In reverse, the more 
situational veto players enter the political arena, the more confusion there is surrounding 
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11 There are certainly exceptions from this rule, for instance, the 2010 British General Elections have 
brought out a three party competition in the electorate and as a consequence a coalition government.
decision-making responsibilities, so it  is less likely that the public expresses distinct 
opinions and governments are less likely to respond.
Situational Clarity Hypothesis:
The fewer (time-variant) situational veto players are involved in policy 
making, the higher is the degree of government responsiveness.
 In order to empirically  test the situational clarity  hypothesis I rely on a set of 
sub-propositions that focus more precisely on specific situational veto players. I 
consider the effective number of parties in parliament, the number of parties in 
government, coalitions versus single party governments, and minimum-winning versus 
over-/undersized governments.
H1b:  The smaller the number of effective parliamentary parties, the 
 more likely it is that governments respond to public opinion. 
 
 One time-varying characteristic of the legislature is the effective number of 
parliamentary  parties (ENPP). While the party system type (multiparty  versus two party 
systems) is relatively stable, the ENPP is determined anew with each parliamentary 
election. Certainly  both features are linked to some extent. For instance, party systems 
may change over time as well, but this change may come along a lot slower. The 
effective number of parties in the legislature can vary  significantly  with each election, 
party  systems may vary in the long-rum, when new parties slowly establish. In order to 
answer the question of whether a larger number of parties (Lijphart, 1984) or smaller 
number of parties in the legislature (Duverger, 1954) foster the responsiveness of 
governments, it  is important to operationalise what the ENPP is (Laakso and Taagepera, 
1979). 
 How many  effective parties there are in the legislature is important for 
government formation as well. The higher the number of parliamentary parties, the 
more likely it is that the votes are distributed amongst them and that  there is no clear 
mandate for one single party to form a government. While previous findings on the 
dichotomous party system have come to inconsistent conclusions, the time varying 
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ENPP measure may  help  to clarify how parties affect the opinion-policy relationship. 
From a veto player perspective the claim is clear. The more parties that participate in 
decision making, the less likely it is that responsiveness occurs. The fewer parties there 
are in the legislature, the clearer the structures are for government formation and 
decision making and thus it is more likely that responsiveness towards public priorities 
occurs. 
H2b:  Government formed with a smaller number of parties are more 
 likely to respond to public demands. 
 The logic behind this is a similar one as that for the ENPP. In a nutshell, the 
more parties join the government, the less flexible that government is to follow public 
opinion. A larger number of government parties means that within the government every 
decision needs to be decided by  consensus among the parties. A higher number of veto 
players means that more negotiation and bargaining over policies takes place and delays 
occur.  By contrast, a low number of parties in government – ideally  one – means that 
the government does not have to go through the process of bargaining and negotiation. 
Small governments are more flexible and solve issues in a shorter time than large 
governments. The smaller the number of parties in government, i.e. the smaller the 
number of situational veto players is, the more likely  it is that the government represents 
public opinion. 
H3b:  Single party governments are more likely to translate public 
 opinion into public policies. 
 One crucial characteristic of the executive is whether a single party  or a coalition 
is in office. Single party governments are believed to be significantly  more stable and 
more decisive than multiparty  governments (Taylor and Herman, 1971, Downs, 1957, 
Curtice and Shively, 2009). Tsebelis (2002) argues that single-party governments have 
the power to change the status quo of policy, while multiparty ones only make 
incremental changes. If single-party  governments are more decisive and able to achieve 
change in policy, one would assume that  single-party  government are also likely to 
respond to public priorities. Coalitions by contrast  need more time and effort to reach a 
consensus on policies between the coalition partners and are, thus, less flexible and less 
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likely to respond to preferences. The claim from the veto players’ perspective is logical 
one: The responsibilities in single party governments are clear; there is no other direct 
actor within the government that is able to veto decisions. Hence, those governments are 
likely to respond to preferences and achieve change in policy. By contrast, the 
responsibilities in coalition governments are less clear; there is at least one other actor, 
if not several coalition partners, directly involved in the decision-making process. 
Multiparty coalitions are less likely  to translate public preferences into policies because 
they  are less flexible to make decisions that follow public opinion. Instead they have to 
negotiate until they reach a consensus on the policy. 
H4b:  Minimum-winning governments are more likely to respond to 
 public opinion. 
 Policy  representation is also believed to be affected by  the executive-legislative 
relationship. This is characterised by the contrast between minimum-winning and over- 
or undersized government. Minimum-winning governments include only  those parties 
that are needed to form a parliamentary majority. A minimum-winning government can 
be a single party government if one party has the support of a majority of parliament or 
a minimum-winning coalition, which includes only as many parties as needed to secure 
a parliamentary majority. By contrast, oversized governments include more parties than 
necessary  to ensure a parliamentary  majority and undersized governments include fewer 
parties in government than needed to form a majority. Undersized governments are also 
known as minority governments. With regard to the veto player argument, minimum-
winning governments ensure that there are as few veto players to object  to 
policymaking as possible. Over- and undersized governments always have an increased 
number of veto players participating in the decision-making process. In an oversized 
government, the additional situational veto players are the additional parties that are not 
necessary  to form a majority. Minority governments deal with veto players within the 
parliament. In order to make a decision, a minority government needs to win votes from 
parliamentary  parties that are not participating in the government. In both situations that 
potential to block policy is increased and the government is less flexible to regulate. The 
fewer veto players involved in the decision-making process, the clearer responsibilities 
are and the more likely it is that governments respond to public opinion. Therefore, 
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minimum-winning governments are more likely  to respond to citizens’ preferences, 
because they aim for the smallest number of situational veto players inside and outside 
the executive. Over- and undersized governments are less likely  to respond to public 
demands because they have to agree with a larger number of situational veto players 
inside and outside the cabinet. 
2.5 Approaching the Opinion-Policy Relationship 
 In the previous sections I pointed out that democratic representation is 
approached in many different ways. One major distinction is between static and 
dynamic models and, strictly speaking, only dynamic models capture the responsiveness 
of governments towards citizens’ preferences. The reason for this is simple: only 
dynamic representation accounts for a response inherently structured in time (Stimson et 
al., 1995: 543). We need to be wary about the use of the term responsiveness in 
particular when discussing the different models and methods of studying the opinion-
policy connection. Keeping this in mind, I discuss and evaluate the different approaches 
in the following section. In Chapter 2.5.1 I define the criteria that a good model of 
policy representation should fulfil. Next, I present a typology of the commonly used 
approaches and apply my evaluation criteria to assess which approach best fits my 
research interest. 
2.5.1 Developing Criteria to Find the Best Approach to 
Explore Responsiveness 
 To be able to evaluate which approach best suits my research interest, I establish 
criteria to review the commonly  used methods. In the following I focus on developing 
these criteria, while a more detailed discussion of each method and the assessment 
according to my criteria is presented in Chapter 2.5.2. A summary of the criteria and 
their assessment can be found in Table 1. 
 In this thesis I explore the conditions of policy responsiveness in a cross-
national perspective. I have outlined in Chapter 2.1 that, strictly speaking, only dynamic 
models that explicitly model responses structured in time capture the responsiveness of 
governments towards public preferences. This means that static models capture at most 
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a momentary condition of representation, that is, the congruence of opinion and policy 
at a given point in time. This is reflected in my first criterion – the method of 
investigating policy responsiveness needs to capture dynamics in some way. In order to 
ensure that dynamics are accounted for by the methods, I ask: Does the approach allow 
for analysing responsiveness as a sequence inherently structured in time (lags or leads)? 
Stimson (1991) has noted that this is the characteristic for the transition from static 
analyses to dynamic models of political representation. The idea is that policy  is looked 
at in time as a lead, that is, regarded in a future year, or opinion is looked at lagged in 
time, that is, measured in a previous year. The key concept captured by dynamics is 
whether there is a policy  response as a reaction to opinion measured at a previous point 
in time.
Table 1: Evaluation Criteria 
Criterion Assessment Factor
(1) Dynamics • Does the approach analyse responsiveness as a 
sequence inherently structured in time (lag or lead)?
(2) Comparability • Does the approach capture similarities and 
differences across countries (and time)?
• Are data and measures comparable across 
countries (and over time)?
(3) Effectiveness • Is policy measured effectively in terms of 
implemented legislation or spending outlays? 
  Secondly, the method employed needs to enable me to compare across 
countries (and time). In order to make general statements about how context affects 
policy representation I need to rely on comparative methods that allow the drawing of 
probabilistic inferences between countries and across time and enable scholars to make 
generalisations about context (Lijphart, 1971). To capture comparability across 
countries, I ask: Does the approach allow for the testing of similarities and differences 
across countries (and time)? There is more to the criterion of comparability, however. 
The idea of comparison is strongly linked to the availability and quality of data and 
measures. Comparability is a particular challenge in public opinion research. To date, 
scholars have failed to confidently define what public opinion means (Kuklinski and 
Segura, 1995: 18). To some, is the general will of the people, which is the interest of the 
citizenry as a whole and it is the same for everyone whether it punishes or protects 
(Rousseau, 1762). To others, public opinion is what  is formulated and expressed freely 
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in discussions and debates in a public sphere (Habermas, 1989). Still others think of 
public opinion as “a shared thing carried by individual people that varies with changes 
in the environment” (Stimson, 1991: 3). What exactly  public opinion means or how it is 
defined is largely  unclear and a detailed clarification cannot be achieved in this 
dissertation.
 In my thesis, I follow a conceptionalist point of view about public opinion. Form 
a conceptionalist perspective, public opinion consists of public opinion polls (Blumer, 
1948: 542, see also Manza and Cook, 2002). While scholarship is unable to define 
clearly  what public opinion is, it can rely on opinion polls to figure out how people 
think about political phenomena. Public opinion in this minimal sense is the collection 
of people who hold opinions on some issue (Weissberg, 1976a: 9) or on an ideology 
(Albig, 1956: 15). With regard to the comparability criterion, this means that the 
indicator of public opinion has to be comparable across countries and time. 
Consequently, survey respondents need to understand questions in the same way across 
countries.
 In comparative surveys the question wording is usually coherent as 
questionnaires are professionally  translated. Depending on the country sample, one 
problem could be how people understand political concepts. For instance, the 
positioning on the left-right continuum means something different in the Western 
countries than it  does in many Asian countries, where another value dimension 
applies12. To capture the comparability of measurements, I ask: Are the data and the 
measures comparable and valid across countries (and over time)?
 Finally, the criterion of effectiveness is inherent in the term ‘policy 
responsiveness’. Responding to public opinion means formulating and implementing 
policies that the public want (Powell, 2004: 91) and it is indicated by the degree to 
which preferences are adopted by legislation (Schumaker, 1975: 494). There is a 
difference between effective and rhetorical (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008: 310) and 
policy and agenda responsiveness (Schumaker, 1975). The former employs effective 
policy outputs as an indicator for public policy. These can be implemented laws or 
budgets. The most common indicator of policy outputs is public expenditure or, more 
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12 This is made clear in the CSES surveys, where the left-right scale is replaced with an alternative scale 
for countries that rely on other values.. For example, the attitude towards religious values may be an area 
of difference. 
precisely, spending outlays. Spending gives a clear statement of the government’s goals 
and priorities (Heller, 1997: 486, see also Soroka et al., 2006, Wlezien and Soroka, 
2003) and it is an available measure across time and space. For instance, the 
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) provides the national 
accounts of its member states.  Admittedly, while expenditure is an important 
component of public policy, it is certainly not all there is to it (Klingemann et al., 1994: 
41).  However, spending is a reliable indication of effective policy outputs, which 
capture the political agenda only. While fiscal speeches and manifestos give an 
indication of what policy makers plan to achieve, these policy promises and rhetorical 
statements can change along the way. Agendas are not an indication of effective policy 
outputs. To capture effectiveness, I ask:  Is policy measured effectively in terms 
implemented legislation or spending outlays? 
 In conclusion, I apply three key criteria to adjudicate which methods are most 
suitable for investigating how government responsiveness is shaped by  institutional and 
situational context in a comparative framework, namely  1) dynamics, 2) comparability 
and 3) effectiveness. Dynamics are implied by the word “responsiveness”, comparability 
follows on from a “comparative framework” and effectiveness is a consequence of 
“policy responsiveness”. In the next Chapter, I apply these three evaluation criteria to 
the established approaches to investigate the opinion-policy linkage. 
2.5.2 Approaching the Opinion-Policy Relationship 
 The opinion-policy linkage is studied in many different ways and the main 
distinctions area static versus dynamic dimension and an issue versus ideology 
dimension. Wlezien and Soroka (2007) have identified three ways to investigate the 
relationship  between public opinion and public policy: (a) policy consistency, (b) policy 
co-variation, and (c) policy congruence. In a nutshell, consistency (a) approaches the 
opinion-policy  relationship at one point in time and tests whether priorities and policy 
(coincidently) correspond. Co-variation (b) expands this approach and maps preferences 
and policy before and after policy implementation. Co-variation studies either focus on 
time or space. Congruence (c) studies public opinion and policy outputs dynamically, 
that is, to what extent do preferences influence policy and policy preferences over time. 
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The use of terminology in Wlezien and Soroka’s typology is unsatisfying and the 
typology appears incomplete, however. 
 Let me talk about the terminology first. Strictly speaking, consistency and 
congruence are very similar terms. Both describe the agreement or correspondence of 
opinion and policy at a time. The crucial difference between consistency and 
congruence methods is the idea of dynamic relationships. According to Wlezien and 
Soroka (2007), the latter is characterised by  an over-time analysis that is also structured 
in time, whereas the former explores opinion and policy at the same time. I have argued 
earlier that in a case where the opinion-policy relationship is inherently structured in 
time and therefore represents a dynamic relationship, this is defined as responsiveness. 
What Wlezien and Soroka (2007) describe as congruence, I define as responsiveness. 
By contrast, the original typology speaks of consistency when a correspondence of 
opinion and policy at the same point in time is investigated. More precisely, when 
opinion and policy correspond at a given point in time, this is described as 
consistency.13 Here, I refer to this relationship as policy congruence. Finally, I refer to 
co-variation when opinion and policy  are measured at two different points in time and 
across time or across space, which is in accordance with Wlezien and Soroka’s typology 
(2007). In comparison to responsiveness, the co-variation relationship  regards a limited 
(shorter) time period, which makes it hard to ascertain whether opinion or policy came 
first (Wlezien and Soroka, 2007: 804). In comparison to congruence, it moves beyond 
looking at the same point in time and captures some dynamics by looking at policy or 
opinion again at a later point in time.
 The typology  is also incomplete. Most  studies referred to by the authors focus 
entirely  on whether public issues preferences correspond with public policy, but the idea 
of political ideology is neglected. An extensive body of literature explores positional 
policy congruence, that  is, the positional correspondence of the median citizen and her 
government’s ideology on a given continuum (inter alia Huber and Powell, 1994, Budge 
and McDonald, 2007, Blais and Bodet, 2006). Arguably, ideology may  or may not be a 
good indicator for public policy. Form a narrow perspective, government ideology is not 
policy in terms of what has actually  been achieved or implemented. Ideology in this 
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13 Let me note that congruence can also be tracked over time. However,  an over-time analysis of the 
congruence of public opinion and public policy, which are measured at the same point in time, does not 
make a dynamic approach. Dynamics are characterised by responses by the public or by the policy maker 
with a delay in time. 
sense is at  most  an indicator of the general policy  agenda as it accumulates the parties’ 
stances on a collection of topics or an “ideological super-issue” (Pierce, 1999: 30). 
Following this definition, ideology captures nothing except the political agenda of a 
party  or government and is no measure of actual policy outputs. By contrast, a broader 
view refers to ideology as the basic guideline for decisions and policy outcomes. Here, 
ideology is ascribed a central role in public policy, which goes beyond agenda setting. 
Ideological positions in this sense build a foundation for policy  that gives governments 
a general notion of the direction of a policy, e.g. more or less welfare. Rightist 
governments usually  want less welfare, while leftist governments prefer more welfare. 
Both governments could emphasise social problems as an issue in their manifestos, 
however. Following this argument, ideology is indeed an indicator for public policy. 
Political ideology is a more general measure of attitudes and it may be more likely to 
miss reactions to a particular issue (Zaller, 1992: 27). Nevertheless, it gives an 
indication of the policy  direction. This is why I rely on the broader definition of 
ideology, which interprets it as a guideline for effective policy outputs, at least to a 
certain degree. 
Figure 3: Exploring the Opinion-Policy Nexus
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 I have developed a revised typology of the methods to study the opinion-policy 
nexus that explicitly distinguishes between static and dynamic approaches and includes 
the idea of positional policy  representation: 1) Congruence, the static study of opinion 
and policy  at the same point in time, 2) co-variation, the study of opinion and policy 
measured at two different points in time and over time or across space and 3) 
responsiveness, the study of dynamic representation, where opinion and policy are 
structured in and studied over time. Figure 3 represents a schematic overview. I discuss 
the diagram in more detail in the following and begin by introducing static 
representation. Next, I discuss the transitioning from static to dynamic approaches (co-
variation), and finally I present methods to explore dynamic representation.
2.5.2.1 Static Approaches to the Opinion-Policy Nexus
 The models of static representation are grouped under the term ‘policy 
congruence’. By  definition, congruence tests whether opinion and policy  correspond at 
the same point in time. Although some studies track congruence over time, this is no 
indicator for a full dynamic relationship. A dynamic model tracks whether changes in 
opinion affect  policy at a later point in time or vice versa. None of the congruence 
methods meet the criterion of dynamics. Nevertheless, static representation is important. 
It gives an indication of whether opinion and policy match, usually at election times. 
While it  does not allow one to draw conclusions about who is cueing whom, i.e. 
whether policy follows or leads opinion, we still know that at a certain point in time 
opinion and policy correspond. Broadly, congruence research clusters agenda and policy 
congruence, where the former looks at  government agendas, e.g. speeches, and the latter 
at actual policy outcomes. Both strands of research have two dimensions, the degree of 
congruence between the public’s issues and policy makers’ issues and the degree of 
congruence between the public’s ideologies and policy makers’ ideologies.
a) Agenda Congruence
 Agenda congruence is a complementary approach to policy congruence and 
provides a fuller picture of the representational process before implementation (Jones 
and Baumgartner, 2004: 2). Scholars examine whether the most salient issues amongst 
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the public match policy makers’ agendas at a time. Public opinion is captured by a 
survey item known as the most important problem and matched with data collected 
from the content of debates, speeches or other political texts that set out the 
government’s agenda. Jones and Baumgartner (2004) study the agenda congruence of 
Congress and the American public. They find that  there is an impressive congruence 
between the priorities of the public and the priorities of Congress over time. While they 
observe the public focuses on a limited number of issues, Congress spreads out its issue 
priorities more and also handles multiple issues simultaneously. Jones et al. (2009) 
examine the agenda as well as policy congruence of policy makers’ issue positions with 
public priorities. The authors observe a general correspondence of opinion with policy 
agendas that is stronger on salient issues. In addition, they find that the public’s 
priorities tend to be less well represented where institutional friction is higher. They 
conclude that the higher the decision and transaction costs imposed by a policymaking 
channel, the lower the correspondence between the actions of policymakers and the 
priorities of the public (Jones et al., 2009: 286). In other words, priorities are likely  to 
be represented in the agenda setting process but less likely to be represented in public 
policies. 
 Agenda congruence represents a static model of representation and does not 
capture any dynamics in the opinion-policy  relationship. There are also doubts about the 
applicability of agenda congruence to comparative research. The most important issues 
that citizens in a country are concerned with dictate the policy agenda, but this agenda 
might be different across countries. When comparing the agenda congruence of the 
public’s agenda and policy  makers’ agenda, this may results in comparing apples and 
oranges. For example, in the US, defence may be the most important concern, while in 
the UK it may  be the health care system. This also ties in with the criterion of the 
effectiveness of output measures. Agenda congruence measures the emphasis given to 
topics in speeches or other political texts and does not give an effective measurement of 
outputs, but is an indicator of rhetorical representation. 
 In conclusion, agenda congruence is important if one studies the match-up of 
policy intentions but it is not an approach for capturing responsiveness. However, 
agenda congruence is by no means unimportant. After all, whether agendas correspond 
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gives us an indication of what to expect from effective representation. Agenda 
congruence can thus be seen as a pre-requisite of effective political representation.
b) Policy Congruence 
 The focus of policy congruence studies is the match-up between public opinion 
and actual policy outputs. Hence, policy  congruence moves beyond agenda 
representation by focusing on the decision itself. Policy congruence distinguishes 
between the issue congruence (aa) of opinion and policy  and the congruence of 
ideological positions (bb). 
aa) Issues Congruence
 Issue congruence studies identify whether citizens’ preferences for change on 
policy issues are consistent with public policy at one single point in time. Although 
some studies also conduct over-time research, they are not interested in any dynamic 
interaction between opinion and policy. Preferences for change are measured in a non-
directional directional way, that is, either respondents want to keep the status quo or 
they  would prefer change per se without indicating the preferred level of change. Public 
policy is measured by coding official documents or news documentaries about policies 
in a similar manner. Either the documents indicate change or no change from the status 
quo. In a nutshell, the greater the correspondence between policy preferences and 
policy, the higher is the degree of congruence.
 Pioneering congruence research focuses on the United States. Monroe (1979, 
1998) observes congruence between public opinion and public policy in two-thirds of 
his cases. He also finds that  the degree of congruence varies among areas of substantive 
policy. For instance, foreign policy decisions are more often consistent with public 
preference than domestic ones. Monroe also demonstrates that the degree of congruence 
in the US decreases over time. Brooks’s (1985) work on the US confirms Monroe’s 
early findings and suggests that consistency  is also higher in election years. Similar 
studies investigate issue congruence in France (Brooks, 1987), Germany (Brooks, 1990, 
Brettschneider, 1996) and Canada (Pétry and Mendelsohn, 2004, Pétry, 1999, Bélanger 
and Pétry, 2005). French politics in the fourth and fifth republics were and are generally 
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characterised by incongruence between opinion and policy, there are some minor levels 
of correspondence, however. Congruence is higher on redistributive issues than on non-
redistributive ones (Brooks, 1987). In the German case, the degree of opinion-policy 
congruence depends on the issue as well, but it is unclear how the issue type affects 
consistency. While Brooks demonstrates that the opinion-policy correspondence is 
lower on salient  and redistributive issues (Brooks, 1990), Brettschneider observes 
increased congruence on salient issues (Brettschneider, 1996). These inconsistencies 
might be due to the time period regarded and data employed. For example, 
Brettschneider looks at the post-war period from 1945 to 1990, whereas Brooks regards 
a shorter time series in the 1980s. In addition, while the former study relies on one data 
source, the latter employs various different data sets. Work on the Canadian case 
suggests that there is an overall congruence between public opinion and policy, but it 
decreases from the 1970s to the 2000s (Pétry  and Mendelsohn, 2004, Pétry, 1999). The 
studies also suggest  that ideology and the degree of issue salience affect the level of 
congruence between opinion and policy. There seems to be higher correspondence when 
issues are salient and a conservative government is in office. 
 The congruence of policy preferences and effective policy outputs describes 
political representation in static terms. Thus, the criterion of dynamics is not met. In 
addition, there are concerns about the other criteria – the comparability across countries 
and the effectiveness of the output measure. In essence, the comparability  of issue 
congruence studies depends on the measurements of opinion as well as policy and is 
strongly linked to the effectiveness criterion. By employing a simple coding of whether 
people want change in a policy area or not, it should be fairly  simple to compare across 
countries, provided that the issue areas are the same. Coding survey responses this way 
is not very  economical. It is cost, labour and time intensive, which is one big drawback 
of this approach. With regard to the effective measurement of policy outputs, issue 
congruence studies mostly meet the criterion. Issue congruence research looks at the 
content of enacted bills or at news documentaries about implemented laws, budgets etc. 
There are concerns about the comparability of the effective output measures, however. 
While comparable budgets are available, for example, provided by the OECD for its 
member states, it is unlikely that the content of bills or news documentaries about laws 
is coherently coded across countries. Once again this is not an economical way of 
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gathering data. It is a costly, time and labour-consuming undertaking to code these 
documentations by hand as well as electronically and come up with a coherent coding 
for a larger sample. The comparability criterion is not met. 
bb) Congruence of Ideological Positions 
 Positional congruence studies explore whether the position of the median citizen 
on the left-right ideological continuum is congruent with her government at election 
times. Once again, while some research also tracks congruence over time, these studies 
do not  examine a dynamic relationship, which additionally  requires that opinion or 
policy is structured in time. While issue congruence specifically  investigates the 
relationship  between public and policy issues, ideological policy  congruence focuses 
rather on an ideological super-issue (Pierce, 1999: 30), that is, the collection of a variety 
of issues in terms of ideology. 
 The median citizen’s position on the left-right scale is indicated by  asking 
survey respondents where they place themselves on a 10-point left-right scale, where 0 
means the political left and 10 the political right. The average, mean or median citizen, 
is the measure of public opinion. The political parties are the essential linkage for 
capturing government positions on the same continuum. If a single-party  government is 
in office, the party’s placement on the left-right scale equals the government’s 
ideological position. If a coalition government is elected, the weighted ideology of each 
party  in the coalition gives the overall government’s position on the left-right  scale. 
Studies divide into three specific models of positional congruence. While the logic 
behind them is the same, it is the measurement of party and government ideology that 
differs. The models are: (1) the expert model, (2) the manifesto model and (3) the 
perceptions model of positional congruence.
(1) The Expert Model of Positional Congruence
 The expert model of positional congruence employs expert surveys to define 
party  positions on the left-right scale and to determine government ideology (Powell, 
2006, Powell, 2000, Powell and Vanberg, 2000, Huber and Powell, 1994). Powell and 
his co-authors find a great deal of congruence between the median citizen and 
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government’s ideological positions on a left-right scale conditioned by  the electoral and 
party  system. For example, Huber and Powell (1994) observe a closer match between 
ideologies in proportional systems than in majoritarian or mixed ones. Powell and 
Vanberg (2000) go even further and conclude that proportional systems outperform their 
majoritarian counterparts. They  also demonstrate that the party system’s degree of 
disproportionality affects responsiveness in a similar pattern, i.e. disproportionality 
decreases congruence. Powell’s (2000) explanation for the enhanced performance of 
proportional systems is that the broader distribution of opinions in proportional systems 
leads to a closer match between citizen’s and government’s ideology. In further 
research, he steps back a little from the strong conclusion drawn in earlier research and 
admits that the proportional vision does not significantly enhance congruence, rather he 
concludes that pre-election coalitions shape and influence the degree of congruence 
positively (Powell, 2006). More recent research suggests that the difference between 
proportional and majoritarian systems is only marginal (Powell, 2011, Powell, 2009).
(2) The Manifesto Model of Positional Congruence
 The manifesto model employs data collected from party manifestos to indicate 
their position on the left-right continuum and government ideology. A content analysis 
of manifestos is conducted that assigns issues into leftist and rightist categories, from 
which an ideology score – the ratio of leftist to rightist statements – is determined (Kim 
and Fording, 2002, 2001, Kim and Fording, 1998). Studies using the manifesto model 
come to similar conclusion as those based on the expert  model. While McDonald et al. 
(2004) show that ideology between voters and governments in proportional systems is 
generally  more congruent, less biased and more reliably than in majoritarian systems, 
later research suggests that the impact of system differences on policy  responsiveness 
are rather small and vanish in the long-term (Budge and McDonald, 2007, McDonald 
and Budge, 2005). With regard to party system effects, these authors conclude that  they 
cancel each other out during the electoral process. Whereas parties in disproportional 
systems position themselves around the median voter before the election, parties in 
proportional systems are pulled back to the median voter during the coalition building 
process, so that as a result both party systems represent the median voter.
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(3) The Perceptions Model of Positional Congruence 
 A more recent model employed to test the degree of congruence is the citizens’ 
perceptions model. This approach is entirely survey-based. While survey respondents 
are asked to place themselves on the left-right continuum, they are also asked to place 
the respective parties in parliament on the same ideological scale. The average 
perceived ideology score of the parties is then used to calculated the government’s 
position on the left-right continuum. Where single party governments are concerned it is 
the average score a party was given. Where a coalition is concerned the weighted 
average scores of the coalescing parties indicates government ideology. The perceived 
positions of the political parties on the ideological scale are as accurate as the expert 
assessment and manifesto measure (Blais and Bodet, 2006). The results suggest a 
different story of congruence, however. While studies applying the perceptions model of 
congruence consistently find that there are indeed differences between majoritarian and 
proportional representation, the results also suggest that those differences are only 
marginal and statistically insignificant (Golder and Stramski, 2010, Powell, 2009, Blais 
and Bodet, 2006). The inconsistent findings of positional policy congruence research 
show that there is yet further research required in order to draw conclusions about the 
best model to apply. Powell assumes that the time frame causes inconsistent results and 
that there has simply been a shift in the quality of representation performance within the 
systems (Powell, 2009: 1492). The quality  of data and the modelling technique may be 
other factors to re-consider for positional policy congruence. 
 Positional policy congruence is characterised by the static representation of the 
median citizen’s ideological position at a given time. While research is also conducted 
over time – usually with larger gaps as left-right positions of the respective parties and 
government are recorded in election years only – the over-time analyses does not 
account for full dynamics. There are some minor concerns about the comparability  of 
ideology scales. Countries outside the Western world rely on different value scales than 
the left-right continuum. This problem is solvable, however, by either sampling or 
employing alternative value scales for those states. Admittedly, this brings up other 
issues, e.g. the question of randomisation and the validity  of such alternative value 
scales with the left-right dimension. Another concern is the effective measurement of 
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policy outputs. I have argued earlier that there are two opposing assumptions here. 
Ideological positions imply nothing but an expanded policy  agenda.  Or, in a broader 
sense, ideological positions also serve as the basis of policy  content and direction. 
Following the broader definition, where ideology  plays a central role in policymaking 
and builds the foundation of decision making, I conclude that the criterion of 
effectiveness is met. 
2.5.2.2 Transitioning Approaches – Policy Covariation over 
Time and across Space
 So far I have discussed the static representation of public opinion in public 
policy. Before turning to the dynamic approaches it is important to look at the transition 
from static to dynamic representation – the co-variation methods. While co-variation 
does not fully capture the dynamic structure of the opinion-policy  relationship, it  does 
take into account at least some of these dynamics. Policy co-variation captures 
explicitly the change from one point in time to another, but most  studies only employ 
very short time series and are unable to explore causality (Wlezien and Soroka, 2007: 
803). Studies are either conducted across space (a) or across time (b). Both kinds of 
study assume a causal direction between opinion and policy, i.e. policy  follows opinion. 
Whereas the former kind is interested in spatial similarities and differences, e.g. 
between countries or federal states, the latter tests this assumption over time. 
a) Co-variation across Space
 Co-variation across space explores whether opinion and policy covary across 
spatial area rather than over time. This allows comparison across contexts. Opinion is 
indicated by survey data on issues or ideology, whereas policy  is measured accordingly 
as the content of implemented bills, news about enacted laws, spending or ideology. For 
example, Eriksen et al. (1993) have developed a liberalism index, which takes into 
account ideology  as well as spending on policy issues. A study of party elites 
demonstrated that parties’ ideologies covary with public ones in nine European 
countries (Dalton, 1985). In addition, it is shown that issue correspondence between 
public and policy issues depends on the issue type. For example, policy makers pick up 
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upon economic issues rather than on foreign policy issues. Stimson (1991) contributes a 
more dynamic method of looking at issue correspondence in the United States. He 
demonstrates that policy  makers respond to a change in the public mood within 
approximately one year. A follow-up study by Erikson et al. (2002) supports Stimson’s 
previous results. Employing a similar method, the scholars find that the US government 
responds to public preferences over time. In addition, they find that the elected bodies 
are more likely  to respond than those institutions that are appointed. Eriksen et al. 
(1993) look at the US states as cross-sectional units and show that  the states’ 
governments respond frequently to public preferences on an ideological (liberal-
conservative) level. While a liberal public gets liberal policies, conservative states serve 
conservative publics. On the EU level (EU parliamentary  candidates and publics), 
Thomassen and Schmitt (1997) demonstrate that opinion and policy  covary on 
ideological lines as well as on salient issues. Manza and Cook (2002) observe that 
opinion and policy covary on social issues and suggest that variation in policy 
responsiveness is due to different polities, issues and ideologies.   
 While the co-variation across space captures dynamic structures to some extent 
and models spatial similarities and differences, it lacks over-time tracking, which is not 
a severe violation of the dynamics criterion, however. The approach explicitly accounts 
for cross-sectional variation, for example, across the US states (Erikson et al., 1993). 
With regard to the principle of comparability there are some concerns. Admittedly, the 
approach relies on a complex measure to capture public opinion from a large battery of 
survey items. This is costly and incredibly time- and labour-intensive, particularly if one 
aims to replicate the mood measure for different countries. Some comparative studies 
with smaller samples demonstrate that it is possible to compare cross-sectionally using 
this approach, however. With regard to the effectiveness criterion, there are similar 
concerns. For instance, constructing a complex index of liberalism (Erikson et al., 1993) 
building on effective measures as well as rhetorical measures of policy outputs requires 
vast resources and there are doubts as to whether the compiled output variable would be 
comparable across countries. There are comparative data about the spending outlays 
available, but no comparative data based on enacted laws or news documentaries about 
implemented bills.
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b) Co-Variation across Time
 In order to be able to test whether opinion and policy covary  over time, survey 
data about citizens’ issue preferences are employed, e.g. spending preferences. 
Whatever indicator one picks, it is crucial that the same question is asked in the same 
format at different time points and also over time. The output indicators are usually 
political content about implemented legislation or news documentation about it. 
 The findings of covariation studies across time are largely consistent. Burstein 
(1979) finds that opinion and policy on civil rights in the US covary over time. He 
shows that the Congress usually picks up  on public preferences on social issues if at 
least half of the people support a policy proposal. In addition, he observes that civic 
engagement enhances public opinion expression and forces policy makers to introduce 
laws more quickly. Page and Shapiro (1983) study a variety  of issues and demonstrate 
that policy  follows opinion especially if the issues are salient amongst the public. They 
do observe differences in government responses, however. Wlezien and Goggin (1993) 
study the covariation of opinion and policy on abortion issues and show that the public 
reacts directly to the activities of the courts, becoming more supportive of current 
abortion policy. Although absolute preferences remained largely  unchanged, they show 
that the public perceived an increasing threat to the status quo and became 
correspondingly less enamoured with further restrictions on the availability of abortion. 
While opinion stability  is important for governments in order to respond (Bélanger and 
Pétry, 2005), comparative work on France, Germany and Italy demonstrates that public 
opinion is not as stable in those countries, but fluctuates depending on how policy  on 
the issue changes (Isernia et al., 2002). 
 Testing whether opinion and policy covary  over time implies that the models 
account for dynamics, but it does not allow generalisations about the causal relationship 
of opinion and policy. The focus on change in opinion and its influence on policy over 
time are evident in the idea of co-variation across time studies. The principle of 
dynamic representation is generally  met. There are some minor concerns about the 
comparability  and effectiveness of this type of co-variation study. The co-variation-
over-time method focuses on tracking opinion change and policy  over time. All studies 
that cluster under this approach focus entirely on an individual case study. Whether 
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comparative work can be done depends on the availability  of comparative data. This 
links up to what I have discussed with issue congruence methods. It depends on whether 
the same questions are asked in a larger number of countries, either in a comparative 
survey or in individual surveys. I have similar concerns about the comparability and the 
effectiveness of the output measure. While co-variation studies employ effective 
measures of outputs, there are doubts whether these are comparable. There are 
comparative data available that capture spending outlays, but comparative data on 
enacted laws or news documentaries about implemented bills are rare. 
2.5.2.3 Dynamic Approaches to the Opinion-Policy Nexus
 Dynamic representation focuses on change or more specifically whether policy 
makers act as a consequence of changes in public sentiment, which implies a sequence 
inherently  structured in time (Stimson et al. 1995: 543). While static approaches explore 
opinion and policy  at the same point in time (and perhaps across time), co-variation 
studies describe the transition to dynamic models, but do not allow for testing the causal 
relationship  between opinion and policy. By definition, responsiveness research 
captures dynamic relationships. They do not only track the opinion-policy relationship 
over time, they  also structure either opinion or policy in time looking at  opinion lagging 
in time or policy leading in time. Responsiveness can tell us whether shifts in mass 
opinion occur prior to changes in government policy or not (Pétry and Mendelsohn, 
2004: 510). Studies divide between two dimensions: agenda (a) and policy 
responsiveness (b). 
a) Agenda Responsiveness
 Agenda responsiveness examines how the public’s agenda and policy  makers’ 
agenda are related. That is, do policy makers pick up upon issues that are salient 
amongst the public (aa) or do policy  makers shift on the left-right scale in response to 
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changes in ideological preferences of the public (bb). Here, the left-right  positions of the 
government are deduced from executive speeches.14 
aa) Issue Agenda Responsiveness
 
 An increasing body of literature explores the agenda responsiveness of 
governments towards citizens’ issue preferences, i.e. whether government agendas 
respond to the most salient topics amongst the public in a dynamic way (inter alia 
Jennings and John, 2009, Bevan and Jennings, 2010, Bonafont and Palau, 2011, John et 
al., 2011). While opinion is indicated by an aggregate of the most important problems 
facing the country today, policy is captured by analysing the content of executive 
speeches and other written policy agendas. Jennings and John (2009) study the effect of 
public opinion on government attention in the United Kingdom and find that short-term 
responsiveness of government attention to public opinion occurs in a variety of policy 
areas. Their results suggest that there is coexistence of policy-opinion responsiveness. 
Further, punctuations in political attention can be explained by differences in theoretical 
conceptions of negative and positive feedback, as well as by the use of different 
methods. Bevan and Jennings (2010) replicate these findings for the UK and US. In 
addition, their results suggest that government agendas become less responsive to public 
opinion when agenda responsiveness (speeches) moves towards policy  responsiveness 
and decision making (budgets). Public issue preferences, they demonstrate, also have a 
stronger effect in the long-run. John et  al. (2011) explore the responsiveness of the UK 
and Scottish parliaments to public issue preference and the impact of institutions on the 
opinion-policy  relationship. They observe that responsiveness of the British parliament 
has decreased with the devolution of the Scottish parliament. One explanation they give 
is that the clarity of responsibility  in decision making is confused with the addition of 
another legislative level. The study shows that no responsiveness of the Scottish 
parliament towards public issue preferences occurs, however. A study on the agenda 
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14 Let me clarify and emphasise at this point that positional responsiveness can be studied and has been 
studied previously. However, the models of positional responsiveness we currently know are classified 
here as positional agenda responsiveness. They are not positional policy responsiveness models that test 
ideological responsiveness by looking at effective policy outputs. These models look at (fiscal) speeches, 
which, i argue, an effective measure of policy outputs, but a rhetorical one. Actual policy may emerge 
differently from the policy making process than the original position stated in a speech or text that sets 
out the aims, goals and agenda of an actor. 
responsiveness of the Spanish government towards public priorities demonstrates that 
policy makers follow public preferences for policies, but that the relationship varies 
across policy venues and issues (Bonafont and Palau, 2011). Bonafont and Palau show 
that the degree of responsiveness is related to elections, the type of government, issue 
jurisdiction and institutional friction. While overall responsiveness is observed, the 
results illustrate, for example, that Spanish policymakers are more responsive to public 
opinion on those issues without shared jurisdiction when the executive governs without 
a majority and immediately after elections.
bb) Positional Agenda Responsiveness
 Hakverdhian (2010) has developed a dynamic approach in order to explore the 
responsiveness of governments to ideological positions. He extracts the left-right 
position of governments from executive speeches (agendas) and employs survey data to 
capture citizens’ positions on the same continuum. UK government policy shifts on the 
left-right scale as public preferences change. While popular incumbents are less likely 
to adjust their policy position to the public, unpopular incumbents adjust frequently  to 
changing public opinion. In addition, Hakverdhian shows that a public with right-wing 
preferences votes for the Conservatives, who then pursue right-wing policies in office.
Warwick (2012) replicates Hakverdhian’s design, but analyses budget speeches to 
capture government policy. He argues that budget speeches closely approximate actual 
government policy. However, they only indicate spending intentions and do not 
represent spending outlays. Warwick demonstrates that policy positions respond 
significantly to both changes in the governing party and changes in public opinion. He 
finds no evidence for ideological congruence, however. 
 Agenda responsiveness captures the dynamic structure of the opinion-policy 
relationship. There are concerns about the comparability  and effectiveness criteria, 
however. While comparative data are collected and more and more countries are added 
(see for instance, the Comparative Agendas Project, which collects public opinion and 
rhetorical outputs), the comparability of positional agenda responsiveness is more 
difficult. Many large-scale surveys and individual-country surveys provide the annual 
left-right positions of citizens (for instance, see the Eurobarometer surveys). The output 
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side is more problematic. Although executive speeches or other documents are analysed 
cross-sectionally, they are not coded in order to deduce the left-right position in a 
continuous (annual) time series, which is needed to capture ongoing change. There are 
data available for election years (see for instance, the Comparative Manifesto Project) 
but the gaps between elections are too large to run a reliable positional agenda 
responsiveness model. There are also some concerns with regard to the criterion of 
effectiveness. By  definition, these models are concerned with the political agenda, i.e. 
promises and policy intentions given in political speeches, manifestos or appropriations. 
These do not represent compulsory aims for the government, however. Promises and 
intention can change in the short and long term and do not have to result in effective 
policy outputs. Agenda responsiveness models are not a suitable model to apply  in my 
dissertation as they  score poorly on the effectiveness criterion, although they do capture 
dynamic relationships and there are possibilities to overcome the comparability issue.
b) Policy Responsiveness
 Policy  responsiveness describes the degree to which governments implement 
policies that the public prefers. It goes beyond agenda setting and tracks whether actual 
policy outputs match public preferences in a previous year. Policy  responsiveness 
research entirely focuses on issue responsiveness of governments to citizens’ 
preferences. While there are several ways to capture public opinion, spending outlays 
are employed to capture public policy outputs. Policy responsiveness distinguishes three 
models: (aa) the thermostatic model, (bb) the salience model, and (cc) the party model 
of policy responsiveness. 
aa) The Thermostatic Model of Representation
! The thermostatic model of representation model posits a reciprocal relationship 
between public preferences and policy. Government follows the public’s relative 
preferences, that is, the difference between its ideal preferences and actual policy, while 
the public responds to change in policy (Soroka and Wlezien, 2010, Wlezien, 1996, 
Wlezien, 1995). Canes-Wrone and Shotts (2004) study presidential responsiveness 
towards the public’s spending preferences and show that responsiveness is higher on 
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salient issues and when the next election is imminent. In addition, policy  representation 
varies with the popularity of presidents. Further, an increase in popularity leads to a 
decrease in responsiveness, while low popularity  forces presidents to increasingly 
respond to public preferences. Moreover, the relationship  between the president’s 
ideology and Congress’s ideology matters. When Congress’s ideology corresponds with 
the president’s beliefs, responsiveness is generally  higher. In series of comparative 
studies, Soroka and Wlezien (forthcoming, 2010, 2005, 2004) observe that thermostatic 
representation varies across countries. They explain the observed variation by different 
institutional contexts. For instance, responsiveness is higher in unitary, presidential and 
majoritarian systems than in their counterparts. Johnson et al. (2005) use preferential 
opinion data on attitudes towards the environment to replicate the thermostatic model 
on a more specific issue. Their findings suggest that public opinion responds to policy 
outputs on the improvement of the environment.
bb) The Salience Model of Responsiveness 
 The salience model of responsiveness follows the general notion of thermostatic 
representation, but it  employs another indicator if public opinion. I call this model the 
salience model of responsiveness because it  uses the most important problem question – 
a measure that captures the most salient issue the public is concerned with at a specific 
time – and tests whether these are reflected in spending outlays. If a policy  area is 
considered a problem, this model assumes that government increases spending in the 
following fiscal year as a response to public opinion. Further, the proportion of people 
considering that the respective domain is a problem should then decrease in response to 
the change in policy. In two comparative studies, Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008, 2005) 
demonstrate that agenda and policy  responsiveness occur in Denmark, the UK and the 
US, but that  it varies across contexts. While rhetoric responsiveness is highest in the 
Danish and the US system and lowest in the UK, effective responsiveness is higher in 
the US than in Denmark and the UK. One explanation is that presidential executives are 
more responsive than parliamentary ones and majoritarian electoral rules lead to 
increased responsiveness. In addition, low popularity and high uncertainty about re-
election increase the degree of responsiveness. 
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cc) The Party Model of Responsiveness
 The party model of responsiveness focuses on the political parties as a medium 
for public preferences. The compiled issue priorities of all parliamentary  parties 
indicated by the space parties dedicate to a particular issue serve as the public opinion 
measure. The underlying assumption is that party  manifestos mirror public preferences 
almost perfectly. Government policy is indicated by  public expenditure. Klingemann et 
al. (1994) demonstrate that government continuously  responds to party  priorities. They 
also test the relationship  in left-right terms, but find that the opinion-policy connection 
is more pronounced on specific issues than on a general left-right ideological scale. 
 Issue responsiveness models capture the dynamic relationship between public 
opinion and public policy  and the comparability  criterion is less problematic with these 
kinds of models as well. The most important problem question is asked in many 
individual-country and cross-sectional surveys over time using the same question 
wording, meaning high comparability. In contrast, spending preferences are less 
available for a larger number of countries over a longer time period. Some individual 
country  studies provide long time series of people’s spending preferences, yet cross-
sectional data are hardly available. There is a trade-off between time and space. Parties’ 
issue priorities are deduced from manifestos. While there is serious doubt as to whether 
manifestos mirror public opinion perfectly as claimed by the model, party priorities are 
definitely only  available in election years and lack a complete time series. Depending 
on the size of the country sample, at  least the salience and thermostatic model meet the 
comparability  criterion. With regard to the output effectiveness, issue responsiveness 
approaches rely on effective measures of policy outputs. All approaches use spending 
outlays to indicate government policy. Admittedly, spending is not all there is to policy, 
but it is a major factor in policymaking. 
 There are a variety of ways to study how opinion and policy are related. 
However, not all of these methods perform equally well with regard to the three 
evaluation criteria. To recap, the approach required to answer my  research question has 
to allow conclusions about effective responsiveness across time and space. It  needs to 
allow testing for a dynamic relationship between opinion and policy  that employs a 
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measurement of effective policy outputs and enables me to compare across contexts. 
Table 2 provides a summary  of the assessment using my evaluation criteria.  The issue 
responsiveness models are the best way to explore responsiveness accounting for 
dynamics, effectiveness and comparability. The focus on issue or ideology seems to be 
of particular importance, however. This thesis is interested in whether positional and 
issue models are affected by  the same contexts. I employ an issue responsiveness model 
to explore the conditions of the opinion-policy relationship on policy issues.
Table 2: Evaluation of Policy Responsiveness Approaches
Approach Occurrence Measures DynamicsComparabilityEffectiveness
Congruence Agenda 
Congruence ✘ ▲ ✔
STATIC 
REPRESENT-
ATION
Issue
Congruence ✘ ▲ ✔
Positional 
Congruence
Expert 
Model ✘ ✔ ▲
Manifesto 
Model ✘ ✔ ▲
Perceptions 
Model ✘ ✔ ▲
Co-Variation Co-Variation 
across space ▲ ▲ ✔
Co-Variation 
across time ▲ ▲ ✔
DYNAMIC 
REPRESENT-
ATION
ResponsivenessAgenda 
Responsiveness
Issue 
Agenda 
Responsiveness ✔ ✔ ✘
Positional 
Agenda 
Responsiveness ✔ ✔ ✘
Issue 
Responsiveness
Thermostatic 
Model ✔ ✔ ✔
Salience 
Model ✔ ✔ ✔
Party 
Model ✔ ✔ ✔
✔: Criterion fulfilled; ▲: Criterion partly fulfilled/debatable; ✘: Criterion not fulfilled
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 There are doubts about the measurement validity of the two main models 
(thermostatic and salience model). Is thinking a problem is important the same as 
wanting to increase spending on the issue domain? I dedicate the first empirical chapter 
(Chapter 4) to explore the validity  of spending preferences and policy concerns. In 
Chapter 5 I then apply  a salience model to investigate the contextual effects on the 
opinion-policy  relationship. Unfortunately, there is no model of effective positional 
policy responsiveness, which is mainly due to the unavailability  of data. This means I 
have to rely  on a static congruence model to explore the conditions of positional 
representation (Chapter 6).
 
2.6 Rationale
 The above review of the literature shows that it is important to examine the 
opinion-policy  relationship. It builds on the core assumption of political representation, 
i.e. that the public delegates powers to a collective body that acts on its behalf. The 
linkage between public opinion and policy is a dynamic one. It is characterised by 
reciprocal behaviour between the public and policy makers that is structured in time. 
This is how I understand democratic responsiveness. However let me emphasise at this 
point that in my thesis I focus solely  on the supply side of the equation. I am interested 
in the responsiveness of governments towards public opinion by looking at whether or 
not public opinion is reflected in policy  outputs. I do not focus on how public opinion 
formation and expression may be constrained or enhanced. To some extent I account for 
the public responsiveness by looking at government responsiveness to change in public 
opinion in the relevant Chapter (See Discussion in Chapter 3.3.2 as well as Chapter 4, 
where I test this empirically). Responsiveness is also about the effectiveness of the 
response. While policy makers respond in terms of policy intentions and promises, 
which is agenda responsiveness, they can also represent citizens effectively by 
implementing legislation or increasing/decreasing public spending, which is effective 
government responsiveness. 
 I have concluded that effective policy responsiveness is what matters most, but 
this does not mean that other kinds of responsiveness are unimportant. They are 
complementary  approaches that complete the picture of political representation. For 
effective political representation to occur, there must be agenda responsiveness of some 
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kind, for example, correspondence between the issue priorities of the public and the 
government (Jones and Baumgartner, 2004: 1). While the responsiveness link is long 
established (inter alia Dahl, 1971, Key, 1961, Birch, 1971), research also suggests that 
successful responsiveness is moderated by a country’s institutional context (inter alia 
Lijphart, 1999, Powell, 2000, Soroka and Wlezien, forthcoming). Although previous 
studies give explanations about how institutions affect  the opinion-policy link, the 
inconsistent findings suggest that further research is necessary  to disentangle what 
effect context has on policy representation. 
 The review of the literature contains three gaps with regard to contextual effects: 
First of all, while we test the institutional impact on the opinion-policy relationship, the 
institutions chosen for analyses are often picked at random. There is a lack of a theory 
exploring more systematically how institutions affect responsiveness. Secondly, it is 
unclear why studies come to inconsistent conclusions. While some suggest that it  is 
simply  the different time periods regarded, others suspect it is the different data sources. 
Inconsistent conclusions could also be due to the different approaches chosen. Finally, 
in order to get a fuller picture of the impact of institutions on political representation, it 
is important to focus even more on the comparison. Comparative research enables us to 
model similarities and differences in institutional designs and draw general conclusions 
about their effect. While some comparative research on the opinion-policy link has 
already been conducted, it is crucial to extend this into a dynamic study of policy 
responsiveness.
 My thesis contributes to all three aspects. I deliver a systematically structured 
theory  of how context affects the relationship  between opinion and policy. The 
foundation for this I find in the veto-player theory (Tsebelis, 2002) as well as the voting 
and performance literature (Hobolt et al., 2012, Whitten and Palmer, 1999, Powell and 
Whitten, 1993). In addition, the thesis compares whether institutions have the same 
impact on issue and positional representation. While both strands claim to study the 
same concept, there are presumably differences between short- and mid-term 
preferences on issues and the long-established priorities of ideological positions. I apply 
the same theoretical argument about the effect of institutions to an issue and a positional 
approach in order to explore whether or not institutions affect both in the same way. 
Finally, I employ  a comparative research design in order to be able to test hypotheses 
about a larger number of institutional features and draw general conclusions about the 
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contextual effects. The evaluation of the approaches has determined the best methods to 
employ in order to study  the opinion-policy relationship. While I use a dynamic issue 
responsiveness approach, I rely  on a static positional congruence approach. The reasons 
for this are twofold. No approach has been developed to study positional responsiveness 
dynamically. The reason is simply  that there are no continuous data available to indicate 
a government’s policy positions on the left-right scale. To sum up, my thesis asks: What 
are the conditions of policy representation? Are they similar or different for issue and 
positional representation? 
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III. Research Design
 The study of responsiveness has been developed and established in the United 
States. It is therefore not surprising that the US is still the best explored country with 
regard to policy  responsiveness. In fact, research started as a non-comparative field that 
focused on single country case studies at very few different points in time. For instance, 
scholars have only  studied the correspondence of issue preferences and policy outcomes 
in the US (Weissberg, 1978, Monroe, 1979, Monroe, 1998, Page and Shapiro, 1983), 
France (Brooks, 1987), Germany  (Brooks, 1990), and Canada (Pétry, 1999). Soon US 
studies moved on to accounting for variation across the US states and, thus, to cross-
sectional, comparative research (Stimson, 1991, Erikson et al., 1993, Stimson et al., 
1995) as well as to looking at responsiveness of the US government towards its 
citizens’ preferences over time and to a limited extent also across space (Soroka and 
Wlezien, 2010, Soroka and Wlezien, 2004, Soroka and Wlezien, 2005, Wlezien, 1995, 
Wlezien, 1996). First attempts to study issue responsiveness in terms parties’ priorities 
in a comparative way  were made as well (Klingemann et al., 1994), yet have not been 
followed up upon. Around the same time the left-right ideological dimension was 
discovered as an indicator in representation research and with that the first significant 
comparative ideological congruence studies was conducted (Kim and Fording, 2002, 
Kim and Fording, 2001, Kim and Fording, 1998, Huber and Powell, 1994). Ideological 
congruence has developed very fast and is studied not only  cross-sectionally, but also 
over time, with the drawback of larger gaps in the data (Powell, 2009, Budge and 
McDonald, 2007, Powell, 2006, Brooks and Manza, 2006, McDonald and Budge, 2005, 
McDonald et al., 2004, Powell, 2000, Powell and Vanberg, 2000). More recent research 
on policy representation in terms of ideology employs superior data, which, without 
complex re-scaling, allows ideological congruence to be examined cross-sectionally15. 
80
15 One data project is the CSES who collects respondent’s left-right self-placement and people’s 
perceptions of where the political parties stand on the same scale. 
These data are not time series though and are limited to a time period from the mid 
1990s until 2011 (Golder and Stramski, 2010, Powell, 2009, Blais and Bodet, 2006).
 There is a difference between issue responsiveness and the congruence of 
ideological positions. Issue positions are volatile and can be affected by short- and mid-
term changes in the political environment. Positions on issues change quickly. By 
contrast, ideology is an underlying moral, something that has developed over a long 
time and is less volatile and less affected by short- or mid-term changes than issues. 
Both approaches are important. Issues give us an indication of how opinion and policy 
on specific topics, as well as on emerging issues, flows over time and behaves under 
changing political conditions. Ideological positions on the other hand allow one to 
capture the underlying morals and how established beliefs are reflected in 
policymaking. In the 2000s issue responsiveness research moved on to more time-series 
work as well as some comparative studies that focused on a handful countries (Soroka 
and Wlezien, 2010, Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008, Soroka and Wlezien, 2005, Hobolt 
and Klemmemsen, 2005, Soroka and Wlezien, 2004). Issue responsiveness research has 
only recently attempted to explore the phenomenon across a larger number of countries, 
although this research is limited to very few time points (Soroka and Wlezien, 
forthcoming). 
 The main benefit of cross-sectional studies is that  they allow one to examine the 
conditions under which responsiveness occurs (Soroka and Wlezien, forthcoming, 
Soroka and Wlezien, 2010, Golder and Stramski, 2010, Powell, 2009, Hobolt and 
Klemmensen, 2008, Blais and Bodet, 2006, Powell, 2000,  Powell and Vanberg, 2000, 
Huber and Powell, 1994). In particular, the electoral institutions were believed to cause 
variation in this respect. However, recent research also finds that time-varying political 
situations impact the degree to which governments respond (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 
2008, Canes-Wrone and Shotts, 2004). However it is largely unclear how institutions 
and situations influence the responsiveness of governments towards their citizens’ 
preferences. 
 In summary, previous research on policy responsiveness is characterised by  four 
properties with regard to their research design: 1) Research on issue representation is 
dominated by case studies that focus on the United States; 2) cross-national research is 
largely limited to ideological congruence approaches; 3) time-series analyses are mainly 
limited to individual case studies or comparative pieces comparing a very  small number 
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of countries; and 4) there is a lack of knowledge about context effects on the opinion-
policy linkage. Admittedly, there are always trade-offs between time and the cross-
sectional components. Either responsiveness is looked at over time in a single case 
study or few countries or it is studied cross-sectionally, but not over time. In my 
dissertation I aim to combine the cross-sectional and time-series components. I explore 
the conditions of issue responsiveness cross-nationally  and over time. In addition, I 
examine the conditions of ideological congruence across countries and, to an admittedly 
limited extent, across time. My research design allows me to compare the conditions of 
issue and ideological representation. Although the design is not entirely new, it relies on 
unique measures and models and clarifies issues concerning measurement, while 
contributing new insights into the context effects on issue and ideology  representation. I 
rely on original individual-level and secondary data. 
 In this chapter I introduce the research design I employ in order to explore my 
overall research question: What are the conditions of government responsiveness to 
citizens’ policy  preferences? I begin by explaining the choices concerning cross-
national and time-series research and argue why this is the best way  to approach my 
research question. My research relies on survey data, which is why I also discuss the 
idea of multi-level data. I then explain the concepts of public opinion and policy 
responsiveness both theoretically and with regard to operationalisation. In this chapter I 
also discuss several approaches to public opinion responsiveness and policy 
responsiveness, as well as different ways to measure these. Some of these challenges are 
also the focus of the first  empirical chapter (Chapter 4), where I specifically  discuss and 
empirically  analyse the measurement validity  of public opinion measures. Thirdly, I talk 
about the different kinds of data sources and types I employ in the empirical chapters. I 
use original as well as secondary data and link analyses on the individual level with 
results on an aggregate data. For instance, Chapter 4 mainly  focuses on original, 
individual-level data, but additionally validates the results employing aggregate data 
and comparison. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 employ aggregate data in order to compare 
the main effects of context on responsiveness on the country  level. Finally, I give an 
overview of the contextual effects I am interested in and how I can test  these. In doing 
so I discuss what kinds of contexts I account for as well as how I test  these with regard 
to my models. I distinguish between contexts that lead to more or less institutional and 
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situational clarity. I understand the first set  of variables to be fixed, whereas the second 
set of factors varies over time. 
3.1 Exploring Policy Representation as a Cross-Sectional 
Time-Series Phenomenon
 Policy  responsiveness and its conditions are best studied employing a cross-
national and over-time research design. There are numerous reasons why  it is prudent to 
choose the comparative method and a time-series approach, which I discuss in the 
following. In addition, I look at the consequences of the nature and structure of the data 
that I employ and look at which data require specific modelling techniques. 
3.1.1 The Comparative Method as a Tool for Modelling 
Policy Representation  
 The comparative method focuses on suggestive similarities and differentiates 
between cases and is a commonly-used tool for hypotheses testing as well as hypotheses 
and theory  building (Collier, 1993: 105). It can be applied to large n samples and 
employs statistical modelling to analyse complex political phenomena. Robert W. 
Jackman (1985) considers comparative, cross-national research to be a very powerful 
tool particularly, in the study of political behaviour, which is where my research is 
located. Comparative research is important for the exploration of my key research 
questions. This study aims to identify  under what institutional and situational conditions 
governments respond to public opinion. These institutional and situational 
characteristics of countries, the similarities as well as differences amongst states, need 
to be taken into account in order to draw conclusions about the general conditions of 
responsiveness. Studying one case only would give us information about the ability of 
governments to respond to preferences in that specific country, but it would not allow 
me to conclude what characteristics promote or constrain governments’ performances in 
general. The author acknowledges that it  is not less important to study a single case or 
fewer cases. However, in order to explore circumstances under which responsiveness is 
most successful or inefficient, comparison is required.  
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 The comparative method has been criticised now and then. For instance, 
Macridis (1968), Satori (1970), and Ravenhill (1980) argue that cross-national research 
is rather superficial, and oversimplifies complex phenomena as it ignores detailed 
linkages or information about an individual case. Furthermore, they suggest that cross-
sectional research excludes the interesting cases that do not fit the pattern. Admittedly, 
statistical outliers are excluded from further analysis, but good practice requires one to 
formulate an argument about why these countries do not fit the observed pattern. The 
criticism is harsh, saying that comparative research neither describes reality, nor allows 
generalisation or the drawing of causal inferences. 
Figure 4: Arguments in Favour of Cross-National Research
(1) It is easy to deal with and/or increase the number of small n samples.
(2) It allows macro and micro hypotheses testing.
(3) It permits controlling for a large number of explanatory factors.
(4) The danger of oversimplification is as high as under any other method.
(5) The exclusion of outlier cases has to be justified and therefore the interesting cases 
! are not ignored.
(6)!The goals is to make probabilistic generalisation about a causal relationship between 
! variables, not to make definite generalisations and causal inferences. 
 There are more convincing arguments in favour of comparative research, which 
reassure me that it is a powerful method for political, behavioural and related research 
after all. In fact these arguments outweigh all criticism against a cross-national design. 
Figure 4 summarises the advantages of cross-sectional research. First of all, Lijphart 
(1971: 685) teaches us that cross-national research designs apply  specifically  when the 
number of cases is restricted, e.g. we are dealing with a particular number of countries. 
This means whenever political systems are concerned it is necessary to use the 
comparative method, especially  if the research interest is about comparison. It  is even 
possible to apply comparative research with smaller n samples as it is fairly simple to 
increase the number of cases in order to enhance the explanatory power of the statistical 
analyses, for example by looking at  a sample over time. My thesis studies countries and 
I am interested in the similarities and differences across them, which makes the use of 
the comparative method inevitable. Moreover, I look at responsiveness over time. I talk 
about the benefits of studying responsiveness over time and why it is necessary later in 
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this section. But let me point to the fact that in order to increase he explanatory power 
of the analyses conducted in this thesis, more than one election or survey is needed to 
verify  patterns of responsiveness. A time-series analysis of many elections in the same 
countries increases the number of cases and the meaningfulness of the findings. 
 In addition, a cross-national research design aims to explore macro as well as 
micro hypotheses. Rokkan (1966) notes that the interrelation of structural elements in a 
political system can only be investigated applying a comparative method that allows for 
testing country-specific propositions at the same time in a different setting. This is an 
essential aspect with regard to testing the conditions of representation. Looking at 
institutional and situational clarity  cross-sectionally allows me to look at similar and 
different structures in more than one setting and to draw general conclusions, as well as 
discuss the effects in a micro sphere, i.e. a particular country that may stand out. To 
model representation, I rely  largely on multi-level data – individual-level responses that 
I aggregate up on the country level – which allows me to track micro and macro level 
behaviour. I am predominantly interested in the macro level factors that impact 
government responsiveness to aggregate citizens’ preferences on the country level. 
Once again, I discuss the multi-level data structure later in this chapter.
 Thirdly, a cross-national design permits to control for a large number of 
explanatory  factors that  may cause variation in the dependent variable. Usually, 
phenomena in the social sciences are rather complex and we need to control for more 
than one factor that might bias the response variable. Lijphart (1971) observes that  by 
holding constant certain variables in a comparative design, the number of operative ones 
is reduced considerably, but the total number of variables inevitably  stays the same. 
This, he argues, also helps when studying relationships under controlled conditions 
without the problem of running out  of cases, which is exactly what my thesis aims to 
do. I am interested in explaining why  some governments are more successful than 
others in translating public demands into policies. Not only  do I aim to test  similarities 
and differences, but also a large number of institutional and situational attributes that 
affect responsiveness, which again lead to the conclusion that the comparative method 
is the best way to examine the phenomenon.
 Further, cross-national research requires a certain degree of simplification, but 
this is true for other methodologies as well. Oversimplification is a mischief that all 
methods, apart from experimental designs, have to deal with. Specifically, phenomena 
 
85
in the social sciences are extraordinarily complex, because social scientists deal with 
people. A certain degree of simplification is necessary to make units comparable. 
However, the question is not whether or not we simplify what we study to its core 
attributes, but it is a question of the degree of simplification of reality (Blalock, 1964: 
8). This is not solely  a problem of comparative cross-national research. Contrary  to the 
assumption that comparativists oversimplify in general, the argument is rather that the 
comparativist accounts for complexity while adding and removing explanatory factors 
to the models. The aim certainly  is to find the balance of simplification and 
oversimplification, which is a problem other disciplines face in the same way. With 
regard to responsiveness research, this study simplifies in so far as it is concerned with 
the overarching link between public preferences and policy outputs (See for example, 
Figure 1, Chapter 2.1). There are certainly other linkages between the overarching 
relationship  that influence how preferences are translated into policies, e.g. election 
outcomes, government formation etc. However, the choice of measures, classification 
and the decision on my explanatory  variables and statistical methods largely account for 
some the complexity within the black box of representation. For instance, what measure 
of public opinion I use accounts for and also depends on what is going on between 
opinion formulation and policy outputs. The institutional and situational characteristics 
leading to more or less clarity partially account for events occurring after opinion 
expression and before policy implementation. For example, I predominantly use dummy 
variables to indicate opposing institutional and situational concepts. By using dummy 
variables to model the contextual effects I tie in with prior research that has looked at 
institutions in a similar way. 
 Outliers can be problematic in quantitative analyses as they may affect  and 
distort findings drastically. This is especially crucial when the number of units is 
limited, e.g. when dealing with countries. If statistical outliers do affect the results, they 
need to be excluded from the analysis. In quantitative research and elsewhere, 
problematic cases are not simply  excluded – the exclusion of cases needs to be justified 
and explained by  the researcher. In fact  the so-called interesting cases that do not fit  the 
observed pattern are still looked at in some more detail and are usually carefully 
investigated. After all, quantitative research aims at keeping as many cases as possible 
in the statistical analysis to get meaningful and robust results. The removal of outlying 
cases from the analysis accounts for the robustness and the reliability  of the findings. In 
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Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 I deal with samples that  are limited to countries. I include as 
many states in my analyses as possible. However, there are some problems with new 
democracies and countries that employ different value schemes, so I have to drop those 
from the analyses. I discuss this in the respective chapters in more detail. 
 Finally, there is also a debate about the final goal(s) of cross-national research. 
As Lijphart (1971) and Jackman (1985) argue: The main goal is not to give a 
comprehensive image of reality, but to make probabilistic generalisation about a causal 
relationship  or at least a relationship  between two or more variables. Incidents in social 
and political science are more extensive than in other sciences, meaning that a 
researcher could never reach a perfect model that displays the reality  or a perfect 
causation. However, quantitative research aims to explain general patterns, in this case 
across countries – a temporary truth that  may be refuted when superior data are 
collected and new modelling techniques are developed. 
 
3.1.2 Adding Time to Modelling Policy Representation in a 
Cross-National Perspective 
 
 Certainly  the comparative method is not flawless. But if the claims made and 
analyses conducted are transparent, carried out correctly and follow the scientific code, 
cross-national designs are a superior and useful tool for investigating complex social 
and political phenomena. In order to get a more comprehensive image of reality it is up 
the researcher to back up their findings from a cross-sectional design with other 
methods. They  can do this for instance by using a mixed methods approach or by 
adding individual country  case studies (Lijphart, 1971: 690). Especially when dealing 
with countries, (comparative) case studies can help in gathering more information about 
a particular type of a political system and validating the findings from the cross-national 
statistical analysis. A mixed-methods design, however, is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, which is why I solely rely on empirical, comparative research. 
 In the social sciences, cross-sectional observations are the form of data most 
commonly used for assessing the determinants of political behaviour. Cross-national 
surveys are often conducted at one point in time and are not suited to the study  of social 
change (Coleman, 1981, Ruspini, 2003, Ruspini, 2002). In order to capture change, it is 
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common to record cross-sectional data at several points in time. Ideally the data are 
collected from the same people over time in the form of a panel study, which allows the 
tracking of individuals’ behaviour, as well as countries’ behaviour. However, this is 
cost-heavy and time consuming in a single country, let alone in a cross-national survey, 
which is why there is only  little panel data available over time and across countries. 
Another way to increase the time component is to conduct  the same survey, but ask a 
different representative sample over time. This is a common procedure that requires 
high levels of consistency in the wording of the questions so that it is possible to 
incorporate a time trend into the analysis (Ruspini, 2002). In addition, a precise 
translation of the surveys across countries is required in order to achieve consistent and 
comparable data across time and space. One example of cross-sectional time-series data 
are the Eurobarometer surveys, which I employ in Chapter 5.
 
Figure 5:  Arguments in Favour of Cross-Section Time-Series Research
(1) Social phenomena ideally need observation over time (and across countries)
(2) Permits diachronic analysis of the incidence of conditions and events (across countries)
(3) Allows analysing the duration of the phenomenon (across countries)
(4) Permits tracking differences and changes from time to time/over time (as well as across 
countries)
(5) Allows testing for time-variant and time-invariant explanatory factors (across countries) 
(6) Includes techniques to correct for issues related to time e.g. autoregression, moving 
average, integration and space e.g. spacial correlation
 I cannot solely rely  on a cross-sectional dimension, especially  when studying the 
conditions of policy  responsiveness, but it is also crucial to explore responsiveness over 
time. Dahl (1971) states that  one key characteristic of a representative democracy is the 
continuous  policy responsiveness of governments to their citizens’ preferences, which 
implies the necessity to conduct over-time analysis. Only if governments follow public 
opinion continuously over time can we conclude that  the quality  of representation is 
high. A time-series cross-sectional design accounts for issues concerning time and space 
such as auto-correlation, integration and moving average, as well as intercorrelations 
across countries.
 Over-time data also allow analysis of the duration of social phenomena, they 
permit measurement of differences or changes from one point in time to another, and 
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help  explain changes by looking at  time-variant as well as invariant independent 
variables (Van der Kamp and Bijefeld, 1998: 3). The three key characteristics of time-
series research discussed above apply to the research design that  I suggest for my 
dissertation. 
 Representation changes across space, but also across time. To account for 
dynamics it is essential to have measures across time, which is one reason why a time-
series component is important for the analyses. In addition, with the question about the 
conditions of responsiveness, I aim to track time-varying as well as time-invariant 
factors at the same time, which means not only  does representation change over time, 
but also the conditions that I explore. I elaborate on the contextual effects later in this 
chapter, but I would like to point out here that it  is important to look at time-varying 
explanations for different degrees in responsiveness across sections and time. It is not 
only fixed institutions and rules that cause variation in responsiveness but also attributes 
of the specific situation created by political institutions or the political game. For 
instance, it matters across time and space how many veto players are involved within as 
well as outside the  core executive.  
3.1.3 Modelling Policy Responsiveness using Multi-Level 
Survey Data 
 Finally, the nature and the structure of the data I employ cause additional 
challenges for modelling policy representation. Comparative survey data are 
characterised by their multi-level structure and nature. “Multilevel data are structures 
that consist of multiple units of analysis, one nested within the other” (Steenbergen and 
Jones, 2002). For instance, individual survey respondents are clustered within countries. 
In my dissertation, I deal with a two-level data structure and by adding a time 
component to my study I also add third dimension to my data. The survey  data I employ 
in the empirical chapters are not panel data, but repeated cross-sectional data, which 
means different people are asked the same questions in the same countries at several 
points in time. If I were dealing with cross-sectional panel data collected over time, I 
would deal with a three-level data structure, where time would be nested in individuals 
and individuals would be nested within countries. This is not the case. The repeated 
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cross-sectional data force me to decide which component I am more interested in, the 
micro-level (individual-level) behaviour in the cross-sectional units or the behaviour of 
the aggregate (the macro-level or country-level) across time. In answer to my research 
question about the conditions of policy responsiveness to citizens’ preferences, I argued, 
that a cross-sectional time-series design is the way forward. Intrinsically, the research 
question requires one to look at the macro-level over time. I am not interested in how 
governments respond to individual preferences. The specific nature of the data leads to 
the question of whether a multi-level data structure also requires multi-level modelling 
techniques or if it  is acceptable to rely  on one-step estimation methods. I discuss the 
(dis-)advantages of multi-level and regression approaches in the following with regard 
to policy representation.
 The main goal of multi-level modelling approaches is to better account for the 
variance in the dependent variable, which is measured at the lowest level (Steenbergen 
and Jones, 2002: 219). In essence, multi-level modelling means nothing but splitting the 
variance into level-1 and level-2 (level-3 etc.) variance in order to be able to account for 
any variation more precisely on each level of analysis, instead of minimising one 
compound error term. However, whether or not it makes sense to apply a multi-level 
approach depends on the data dimension and properties as well as the substantive 
research interests and goals of the analyst (Franzese, 2005: 431). From a technical point 
of view, multi-level models are superior because they  model the variance of each data 
level, which allows for the estimation of correct  standard errors and reduces the 
likelihood of a Type I error pitfall (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002: 218). However, as 
Franzese notes, “what  one can do in separate subsamples in two steps (multi-level 
approach) one can also do in one step with interactions (etc.), and vice versa, but some 
things are easier one way or the other” (Franzese, 2005: 443). Researchers should not 
blindly use multi-level models simply because they  deal with a multi-level data 
structure and the method is currently quite fashionable. After all, the aim of an empirical 
researcher is to keep the methods simple, transparent, powerful and accurate. By 
examining the conditions of policy representation I test  the impact of country-level 
characteristics on the opinion-policy linkage. This means I am explicitly interested in 
the effects and conditions of macro-level factors, but not so much in any individual 
level variation. The data I rely on are structured in a multi-level fashion, but modelling 
the phenomenon is possible using a simple regression, as well as using multi-level 
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techniques. Being predominantly interested in the higher level, the country level, a one 
step model seems like a rational choice. 
 Although the total variance and the estimates of a two-level model or a 1-step 
model are identical and either model handles context specific regressors equally easily 
(Franzese, 2005: 443), ignoring the multi-level structure of the data can lead to incorrect 
standard errors (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002: 219). However, this does not necessary 
turn out to be a problem if the sample is large enough, especially  in the macro-unit 
dimension (Franzese, 2005: 444). Multi-level techniques also require a sufficient 
number of higher level units. In addition, they require specifically valid and reliable 
measures to satisfy  a larger number of statistical assumptions and deliver reliable results 
(Steenbergen and Jones, 2002: 234). In addition, multi-level approaches yield 
“coefficient estimates for micro-level variables that are more robust to misspecification 
of macro-level effects than one-step linear-interaction models” (Franzese, 2005: 443). 
While there are a lot of benefits of multi-level analysis, the important characteristic is 
my research interest. Here, I deal with over 20 countries looked at  over time (Chapter 5) 
or at least at several points in time (Chapter 6), so I have a large enough sample to rely 
on simple modelling techniques without affecting the results of the analysis. In addition, 
my research interest is the country-level, so I do not want to model any  individual-level 
variation or characteristics. For these reasons I stay  away  from multi-level modelling 
strategies. After all, in a situation where the macro-level effects and their conditioning 
are at least as central as micro-level effects, one-step  estimation strategies seem the 
better option (Franzese, 2005: 445). In my dissertation the macro-level effects and their 
conditioning are the key  interest, which is why I abstain from using multi-level 
modelling and rely  on time-series cross-section analyses (Chapter 5) as well as Ordinary 
Least Square regressions with interactive terms (Chapter 6). 
 The use of a cross-sectional time-series design can ensure a more complete 
approach to empirical research and especially to studying policy responsiveness. This 
type of data clarifies the direction and the magnitude of change among the dependent 
and independent variables, it allows comparison across units and classification of 
similarities and differences between countries, and permits exploring changes within 
countries and across countries over time. This research combines cross-sectional and 
time-series analyses to explore policy  representation and its conditions in a comparative 
fashion. The emphasis is on the cross-sectional comparison. I am predominantly 
 
91
interested in the conditions that lead to more or less policy representation and less 
interested in whether representation occurs across time. There is a trade-off between 
time and space and I have decided to focus on space rather than time. 
3.2 Conceptualising Public Opinion and Public Policy 
Measures 
 
 Political representation in modern democracies is characterised by a linkage 
between the public and policy outputs. We have learned from political theory that the 
policy cycle requires a reciprocal and interactive relationship between citizens’ demands 
and policy  makers’ supplies (Easton, 1965, Powell, 2004, Deutsch, 1963). Thus the 
concept of policy representation means that policy  makers supply public policies that 
are in accordance with public wishes. While the idea of responsiveness is easy to grasp, 
it is a lot more difficult  to conceptualise its components: a) public opinion and b) public 
policy responsiveness. 
  
3.2.1 Measuring Public Opinion in Policy Responsiveness 
Research  
 One crucial aspect for policy  makers focussing on representation is to know 
what people think. In order to implement new or amend existing policies in 
correspondence with public demands, governments essentially  need to know what these 
demands are. To date scholars of public opinion have failed to universally define what 
public opinion means. The term public opinion has been 
loosely used, sometimes in reference to widespread beliefs,  climate of opinion, consensus, 
the mores and the more settled convictions of a group; at times to the process of developing 
opinions, as distinguished from the product; elsewhere, to statements which are the result of 
a reasoned, logical process as contrasted with those which have been arrived at by illogical 
means; and the like (Albig, 1956: 3).
 
At a very least, the concept ‘public opinion’ suggests “a collection of people who hold 
opinions on some issue” (Weissberg, 1976b: 9) or on a collection of issues, i.e. an 
ideology. Ideology is also a valuable conceptual tool (Albig, 1956: 15). Opinions 
towards an issue or ideology may  vary over time with the changing scope of 
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governmental action or across societies and in the intensity  with which they  are held 
(Key, 1961: 9). 
 As there seems to be no solution to the problem of the theoretical 
conceptualisation of public opinion, scholars look at opinion from an operationalist 
point of view. The notion is that  public opinion is indicated by public opinion polls 
(Blumer, 1948) and is measured by aggregating the responses of individuals reflected in 
surveys, elections or referenda (Brooks and Manza, 2006: 631). Following this notion it 
is crucial to debate how citizens’ preferences are contemplated in the study  of 
comparative policy representation. At this juncture I would like to note that this notion 
differs from the public opinion measure in single case studies or related subjects. 
Comparative representation research is limited in its tools to measure opinion, whereas 
in single-country studies many  measurements of public opinion exist and can be 
employed. In the comparative study of policy responsiveness, public preferences are 
captured by  measuring 1) citizens’ ideology and 2) citizens’ attitudes towards specific 
policy issues. 
The most common single dimension in modernized democracies is almost certainly the left-
right ideological continuum. The language of “left” and “right” creates a unidimensional 
discourse that can assimilate the various issues and alternatives that continuously appear 
before the electorate (Huber and Powell, 1994: 294).
 
There are no competing concepts for measuring public opinion on ideology. The survey 
item commonly employed in ideological or positional representation research (Jones 
and Baumgartner, 2004: 2) is the median citizen. That is the average (median) of all 
respondents who have placed themselves on a 10-point  left-right scale in a survey. 
Survey respondents are asked to place themselves on the left-right continuum, where 0 
indicates the left  and 10 the right. For example the CSES surveys, which I rely on in 
Chapter 6, ask: “In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you 
place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?” 
When aggregating up respondents’ answers, they are averaged by country and year. 
Usually scholars employ  the median: “if the median and the mean do not coincide, a 
majority  will always prefer the median to mean [...] since the mean minimizes the sum 
of the squared distances, it gives greater weight to cases more distant to the 
center” (Huber and Powell, 1994: 296). The mean should work equally well, however. 
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 Conceptualising citizens’ attitudes towards specific issues with regard to public 
opinion responsiveness is somewhat more problematic as there are competing notions of 
how to measure issue preferences best. This is particularly  a question of the survey item 
chosen. While spending preferences are a commonly used technique to indicate issue 
preferences (Soroka and Wlezien, 2010, Soroka and Wlezien, 2005, Soroka and 
Wlezien, 2004, Wlezien, 1995, Wlezien, 1996), an alternative measure, the most 
important problem, has recently been used to measure the issue demands of the public 
(Pickup and Hobolt, 2011, Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008, Hobolt and Klemmemsen, 
2005). According to Downs, the underlying assumption for using spending preferences 
is that  the public can be conceived of as a collection of individuals distributed along a 
dimension of preferences for spending (Downs, 1957). Spending preferences are viewed 
as the most direct and directional measure of citizens’ issue opinions as they ask 
respondents to indicate a direction of change, more or less. For example, the role of 
government surveys by the ISSP ask: “Listed below are various areas of government 
spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending 
in each area. Remember that if you say ”much more“, it might require a tax increase to 
pay for it.” The ordinal answer categories range from 1 “Spend much more” to 5 
“Spend much less”. Although it gives an indication of whether people want an increase 
or decrease in expenditure in an issue area, it  is yet not a perfect measure of issue 
preferences because it does not give us the quantity by which people want to increase/
decrease the budgets. Down’s assumption implies that  individuals do not have specific 
preferred levels of spending in mind, but it reflects the idea that some individuals want 
more or less spending than others (Wlezien, 1996: 84). In public responsiveness 
research it is not the raw spending preferences that are used, but a measure of net 
support for spending in the respective field is deduced from them, which is the 
difference between the percentage of people who say  “spend more” and “spend 
less” (Wlezien, 1995: 985). While there is no indicator of the quantity of the increase/
decrease of the budget, at least net support implies citizens’ preferred degree of 
spending (even over time). One major drawback of this measure is that data are not 
available for a comparative sample over time. For instance, the ISSP collected data in 
more than 35 countries, however it does not collect these data continuously but only in 
4 waves (1985, 1990, 1996 and 2006). In addition, many individual country  case studies 
do not ask about people’s spending preferences, which makes it hard to apply  this model 
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to comparative time-series research. Despite the criticism, spending preferences seem to 
be a straightforward indicator of what issues the public prefers. 
 Another measure indicative of public opinion is the most important problem or 
most important issue question.16  Using most important problems as an indicator for 
citizens’ issue preferences is a rather new concept. First and foremost, most important 
problems are used as a measure of issue salience. Large scale surveys provide cross-
sectional data over time. For instance, the Eurobarometer polls have asked the most 
important issue question in same format since 2002: “What do you think are the two 
most important issues facing [OUR COUNTRY] at the moment?” The most important 
problem/issue measures the relative importance of issues to citizens (Hobolt and 
Klemmemsen, 2005, Burden and Sanberg, 2003, Bara, 2001, Mackuen and Coombs, 
1981, McCombs and Shaw, 1972) and is considered as an appropriate measure of public 
opinion towards issues. However, this instrument of issue preferences has been 
criticised recently. Experimental research on the most important problem has come to 
the conclusion that the answers to the MIP question are enormously sensitive to 
question wording. For instance, it matters what time frame is given in the question – 
‘today’ or ‘within the last few years’ or ‘in the future’ – as well as how personalised the 
question is asked – ‘to you personally’ or ‘for your country’ or ‘for society’ or ‘for the 
world’ (Yeager et al., 2011). In a recent paper, Jennings and Wlezien (2012) argue that 
spending preferences and policy concerns correlate weakly with each other and 
conclude that the most important problem cannot serve as an alternative measure to 
spending preferences in issue responsiveness research.
 While on first  sight policy concerns seem to be the inferior measurement 
compared with the directional spending measure, I discuss and empirically test the 
relationship  between spending preferences and policy concerns in my first empirical 
chapter (Chapter 4) on individual-level and aggregate-level data. My conclusions are 
more positive and in favour of the policy concerns measure. Despite all criticism, one 
major benefit of the most important problems/issues question is that the data are 
publicly available over time and for large country sample. Looking at public opinion 
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16 Wlezien has criticised that the importance of issues and the degree to which issues are a problem point 
in a similar, yet slightly different direction (Wlezien 2005). However recent research by Jennings and 
Wlezien (2011) comes to the conclusion that they effectively measure the same concept. Survey 
respondents do not differ between issues and problems. The terms and measures are thus used 
interchangeably in the following. 
from an operationalist point  of view is not quite satisfying after all as public opinion has 
many facets and dimensions. Public opinion ranges from ideology  to specific attitudes 
on issues and to date scholars have not precisely explained the analogies and 
divergences of public preference measurements. In Chapter 4 I contribute at least to the 
debate around issue preferences measures. 
3.2.2. Measuring Public Policy Outputs in Policy 
Representation Research
 The second crucial concept underlying representation research is measures of 
public policy outputs. Schumaker (1975) identifies five criteria of policy makers’ 
responsiveness to citizens’ preferences that  point to a different measure of policy 
outputs: 1) access responsiveness, 2) agenda responsiveness, 3) policy responsiveness, 
4) output responsiveness, and 5) impact responsiveness. Indeed, his study focuses on 
responsiveness to protest group  demands, yet many of his theoretical ideas also apply to 
responsiveness towards the citizenry. 
 While access responsiveness – the degree to which interest or protest groups 
have access to policy makers – and impact responsiveness – the degree to which protest 
action succeeds in alleviating the grievances of the groups – apply  more specifically to 
activist groups, the other three dimensions outlined in Schumaker’s paper also apply to 
the broader study of responsiveness and representation. 
 Agenda responsiveness – whether policy makers’ agendas respond to public 
ones – is also a key concern of responsiveness research as looked at in this thesis. There 
is an increasing body of literature that is concerned with agenda setting and the scholars 
of the Comparative Agendas Project are conducting lead research here (Jennings et al., 
2011a, Jennings et  al., 2011b, John et al., 2011, Bevan and Jennings, 2010, Jones and 
Baumgartner, 2004). An extensive body  of literature is concerned with issue agenda 
responsiveness. First and foremost, the work of the Comparative Agendas Project 
(CAP) needs to mentioned here. The CAP codes speeches by political leaders such as 
prime ministers, queens, kings and presidents. The main interest lies in the emphasis 
that is given to specific policy issues. The issue priorities of a party  leader, head of 
government or state can then be modelled in a terms of policy responsiveness to 
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publics’ issue priorities (Jennings et al., 2011a, Jennings et al., 2011b, Bonafont and 
Palau, 2011, John et al., 2011, Bevan and Jennings, 2010, Jennings and John, 2009, 
Jones and Baumgartner, 2004).  This kind of responsiveness has also been describes as 
rhetorical responsiveness (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008) because it is entirely based 
on agenda setting from rhetoric. For instance, issues outlined in speeches by political 
leaders such as the head of government are measures, which by quantitative content 
analysis, indicate issue agenda setting. Another way of capturing agendas is by  looking 
at spending appropriations (Soroka et al., 2006, Wlezien and Soroka, 2003). In addition, 
there is also some positional agenda responsiveness research. For example, scholars 
study whether governments respond on a left-right continuum by  analysing (fiscal) 
speeches (Warwick, 2012, Hakhverdian, 2010) in left-right terms. Agendas do not give 
us information about the actual relationship between public preferences and public 
policy. The political agenda sets out  policy intentions and promises that policy makers 
may not necessarily meet when enacting bills. 
 The goal of this thesis is to explore policy  representation. According to 
Schumaker (1975: 494) policy responsiveness indicates the degree to which preferences 
in a country  are adopted by or are congruent with legislation, which is exactly what all 
models revised in the review of the literature aim to achieve. What is needed here is a 
measure of effective policy outputs. Something goes beyond the agenda-setting process. 
The only way to measure such policy outputs is by looking at regulative laws, 
implemented bills or budgets. 
 Output responsiveness (Schumaker, 1975: 494) goes further because it is not 
only interested in whether policy makers respond by introducing bills, but also in the 
degree to which decisions are actually  implemented and executed in daily political life. 
In order to measure this, a record would be needed that again looks at a particular issue 
and how it is handled after the implementation of a bill, for instance how it is dealt with 
in the administrative work of councils or other authorities. Questions of output 
responsiveness need to be addressed at a lower level, for instance by local authorities, 
where it is possible to see how an issue is dealt with in daily political life. However, this 
is less of an issue with regard to government responsiveness as governments are not the 
institutions that execute the laws they  implement. This dissertation focuses on agenda 
and policy  responsiveness only, as these are the two main concepts that are important 
and trackable on the macro (governmental) level. 
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 When discussing the concept of public policy representation, the questions of 
operationalisation and measurement are integral. However, how policy outputs are 
operationalised largely depends on the underlying concept dimension regarded. 
Following the argument above, this dissertation deals with policy responsiveness 
exclusively. The measurement of public policy  outputs is to a certain extent determined 
by the measure of public opinion. While public opinion on ideological beliefs requires a 
response in terms of ideology, issue preferences ask for a more precise response by 
governments to a particular issue. I have argued previously that  I consider the left-right 
continuum to be an underlying dimension of effective policy outputs. Public policy 
outputs in terms of policy responsiveness can be tested by  looking at ideology as well as 
policy issues. 
 The ideology strand of policy representation has developed three models of 
policy congruence and thus of public policy outputs: 1) the expert model, 2) the 
manifesto model, and the 3) perception model of ideological congruence. The expert 
model of ideological congruence employs expert surveys about the stance of the 
political parties on a left-right continuum to indicate policy outputs (Powell, 2006, 
Powell, 2000, Huber and Powell, 1994). From the position of the parties on the left-
right scale, this model deduces the government’s left-right position by averaging the 
stance of all government parties. If a single party-government is in office, this is simply 
the left-right position of the one governing party. If a multi-party government is in 
office, the average left-right score of all parties in the coalition indicates the coalition’s 
stance on the continuum.17  Expert surveys are a popular instrument for estimating 
parties’ position on political topics as well as on the left-right continuum in general. 
Several different expert surveys have been conducted in the past (Benoit and Laver, 
2006, Laver and Shepsle, 1996, Hunt and Laver, 1992, Castles and Mair, 1984). The 
drawback of these surveys is that they only provide us with an estimate of the parties’ 
positions at  the point in time when the survey was conducted. Expert surveys can also 
be criticised as subjective or even elitist points of view. The expert is usually a scholar 
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17 This is based on the underlying assumption is that all coalescing parties share powers equally, which in 
reality is not case. In reality, a larger mass party often enters a coalition with one or more smaller, junior 
partner(s). Yet it is common practice in ideological responsiveness research and across positional 
congruence models to assume that coalition partners share powers equally. Certainly, this is a matter of 
simplification and practicability. This is why I also follow this assumption in the dissertation. 
of political parties in the respective country who gives her subjective evaluation of that 
party, which is rarely cross-validated or cross-checked. 
 The Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) has coded parties’ manifestos since 
1948 and serves as the basis for the manifesto model of ideological congruence. Trained 
coders conduct a content analysis of party manifestos, where they code quasi-sentences 
into 56 policy categories and 7 policy domains (Klingemann et al., 2006, Budge et al., 
2001). The left-right-dimension can then be deduced from the party scores in each 
dimension. Similar to the expert model, the government’s stance on the left-right scale 
is either the single party’s left-right position on the scale or the average left-right  score 
of the coalescing parties (Golder and Stramski, 2010, Powell, 2009, McDonald et  al., 
2004). However, there are some concerns about the CMP data with regard to their 
validity  and reliability. Each manifesto is coded once and only  once by a single coder. 
Thus there are doubts about the stochastic nature of the test, the unreliability of the 
human unitisation and human coding as well as scaling (Mikhaylov et al., 2008). 
However, the CMP data largely  correlate with the experts’ estimates of parties’ left-right 
positions as Benoit  and Laver demonstrate in a comparative paper (Benoit and Laver, 
2007). It is still a commonly used method to indicate policy  outputs in ideological 
congruence research.   
 A new model of positional congruence is the perception model of representation. 
The perception model is linked to the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) 
data project. Amongst other things, the CSES collects the survey respondents’ left-right 
position on the ideological continuum as well as where respondents evaluate the 
respective parties on the same 10-point left-right scale. The benefit from this is that no 
re-scaling is necessary to compare citizens’ and parties’ (or governments’) ideology. The 
drawback however is that perceptions’ are very subjective and may not necessarily 
reflect the parties’ (governments’) actual left-right convictions. Blais and Bodet (2006) 
have shown however that the respondents’ perceptions of the positioning of the parties 
is coherent with the experts’ assessment as well as the CMP codings, which makes the 
CSES’s method and also the perceptions model a superior approach. Recent 
representation studies rely  on this technique of measuring public policy  outputs (Golder 
and Stramski, 2010, Powell, 2009, Blais and Bodet, 2006). It is a fairly  new project that 
is connected to the general election studies of the participating countries, which means 
that there is no neat time series of data available yet. 
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 There are two models of effective issue responsiveness that employ the same 
measure of public policy  responsiveness, but a different indicator of public 
responsiveness, as discussed earlier in this chapter: 1) the thermostatic model of 
representation (Wlezien, 1996, 1995) and 2) the salience model of responsiveness 
(Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008). Here, effective public policy  outputs are measured by 
looking at change in public expenditure or more precisely change in spending outlays 
by function. The data can be gathered from individual countries or governments, but 
comparative data has been collected by  the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) for its member states. While spending is not all there is to 
policies (Klingemann et al., 1994: 34), it is still one essential form of policymaking. 
Superior data on the content of passed bills and regulative laws have been collected for 
individual units (Franklin and Wlezien, 1997), however there is no larger comparative 
database available for analysis. 
 It appears that  conceptualising public policy  outputs is not very straightforward. 
While the theoretically public policy outputs can be defined clearly, the measurements 
are sketchy and vague. In fact, current research still lacks a comparative measure of 
effective policy outputs that also takes into account regulative acts. Here, I rely  on 
measures of public expenditure, which are available for a cross-country sample. 
3.3 Data
 
 In order to explore the measurement validity  of issue preferences as well as the 
conditions of policy representation of the public’s issue and ideological preferences 
superior data are required. For the empirical analyses I rely  on several data sources: 1) 
individual-level survey data, 2) aggregate-level survey  data and 3) country-level data on 
public expenditure and institutions. Survey data are characterised by their multi-level 
structure and nature. They  are “lower, micro-level data nested within higher, macro-
level units” (Franzese, 2005: 430). In other words, individual survey  respondents are 
nested or clustered within countries. This specific nature of the data leads to the 
question of whether a multi-level data structure also requires multi-level modelling 
techniques or whether it  is acceptable to rely on simple regression techniques. After all, 
I want to keep my methods simple, powerful and accurate. The modelling strategy  of 
multi-level data depends on the data dimension and properties as well as the substantive 
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research interests and goals of the researcher (Franzese, 2005: 431). In my first 
empirical chapter I am interested in the individual level properties; I explore whether 
wanting to increase spending in a policy domain means the same to respondents as 
considering an issue an important problem. The focus shifts in the other two empirical 
chapters from the individual to the aggregate level. Modelling the conditions of 
government responsiveness is about how the macro-level (country-level) characteristics 
affect the translation of public preferences into public policy. This relation is affected by 
context and it is not about how each individual’s preferences are turned in policy. 
Hence, the analyses deal in different ways with the multi-level data structure. While the 
measurement chapter is about the individual level and is based largely on the British 
case, so no higher level needs to be taken into account, the other two chapters focus on 
the macro-level. By aggregating up individuals to country level, the data are reduced to 
a single-level data structure. I will now introduce the data for each chapter in more 
detail. 
3.3.1 Measurement Validity of Opinion Measures
 The first empirical chapter tests the measurement validity  of issue preferences. 
To recap, I am interested in conducting dynamic, cross-sectional analyses of 
government responsiveness. This means that ideally I would want to explore the validity 
of my opinion measurements on a cross-national sample and over time. Spending 
preferences and issue salience measures of public opinion are not  available cross-
sectionally, which is why I have to rely on an individual case study for this chapter, and 
also on an aggregate, comparative sample that is weak on the time-series component. 
 To examine how spending preferences and measures of issue salience are related 
I collected original, individual data in Britain in March 2012. The survey was run on a 
monthly online public opinion tracker by  TNS BMRB, who are an independent research 
agency. I was able to place an open-ended most important problem question as well as a 
question about people’s spending preferences on four policy domains on the same 
survey. This enabled me to cross the two measures and empirically  test how they are 
related. 
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 Further, I am able to construct an aggregate data set from different sources that 
allows me to explore how spending preferences and most important problems are 
related in a cross-sectional sample. Four modules of the Role of Government survey 
conducted by  the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) have asked about 
respondents’ spending preferences. The survey includes most European countries and a 
larger number of countries outside the European Union. In addition, I can extract the 
most important issues from the Eurobaromter surveys. Both surveys were carried out in 
the year 2006, which is the only matching year with the ISSP data. By aggregating up 
the data, I am able to construct a new dataset, which incorporates both spending 
preferences and most important issues. Hence, I rely  on aggregate data for fourteen 
European countries in the year 2006. Moreover, I can access data on actual spending for 
these countries through the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), which allows me to run some bivariate tests on the predictive power of both 
kinds of opinion measures. In addition, to my individual level case study of British 
respondents, I can also look at the measurement validity cross-sectionally. 
3.3.2 Issue Responsiveness of Governments to Public 
Preferences
 The second empirical chapter examines the conditions of government 
responsiveness to citizens’ issue preferences across countries and over time. The survey 
data are individual-level, repeated, cross-sectional data regarded over a time period of 
eight years. The research question is entirely about the macro-level. By aggregating up 
the individual responses to the country  level, I lose information about the individuals. 
However I am not interested in micro properties, so this does not cause any problems. 
The survey data employed are collected by  the Eurobarometer project, which asks about 
citizens’ opinions on up-to-date political topics. Amongst other variables, it  regularly 
asks respondents about the most important  issues facing their country  at that moment. 
The question has been asked in the same format since 2002. I look at the time period 
between 2002 and 2010. To the aggregate opinion data I add information on annual 
public expenditure by function provided by the OECD for the same countries and years. 
The cross-sectional sample allows me to test  different institutional and situational 
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conditions in the European context. Moreover, it also enables me to explore 
responsiveness over time in an (admittedly) short time series of eight years.  
3.3.3 Positional Responsiveness of Governments to Public 
Ideological Preferences
 In the third empirical chapter the focus shifts to the conditions of positional 
policy congruence of governments and the mean citizen. The analysis is based on the 
perception model of ideological congruence and employs data collected by the 
Comparative Study  of Electoral Systems (CSES). The CSES conducts post-election 
surveys consisting of a set of regularly-asked questions, as well as a module on a topic 
of academic interest that  varies from module to module. By nature the data are multi-
level data, however, again I am solely interested in macro-level effects of political 
institutions on the opinion-policy linkage. This means by aggregating up  to the country 
level by  election, I eliminate the individual-level information. Three waves of the CSES 
are available that incorporate at least one election survey and at most four election 
surveys per country. Consequently, I have several data points for a larger number of 
countries. The CSES does not provide time-series data, however. The surveys are linked 
to presidential and parliamentary elections in a country, thus there are larger gaps 
between surveys. I rely on the data collected after parliamentary  elections only.  While I 
end up with a decent cross-sectional sample, the data do not allow a proper time-series 
analysis. As the aim of this thesis is to examine the conditions under which opinion 
representation occurs, it is more important to compare across units than over time. 
3.4 Conceptualising Contextual Effects on Policy 
Responsiveness 
 I test the conditions of policy responsiveness by looking at contextual effects of 
time-invariant (institutional) and time-variant (situational) veto players. For theoretical 
as well as structural reasons I distinguish between contextual the effects of alongside 
institutional and situational clarity. The former focuses on the static institutional set-up 
of a country, which does not vary over time, the latter looks at time-variant components 
 
such as cohesiveness of the government as well as time variant  characteristics of the 
legislature, e.g. the effective number of parties in parliament and government. I have 
discussed the theoretical distinction between institutional and situational clarity in more 
detail in the review of the literature (Chapter 2). Here, I describe how I empirically  test 
the impact of institutional and situational clarity on policy responsiveness. 
3.4.1 Operationalisation of Institutional and Situational 
Clarity
 Most comparative studies are led by  the notion that context affects the degree to 
which governments respond to or represent the preferences of the people. There are 
many ways in which scholars see that context can influence the responsiveness of 
governments to public preferences. While we get different answers how institutions 
affect the opinion policy  nexus, we know that political institutions shape and moderate 
the opinion-policy linkage in some way. In this section, I review the literature with 
special regard to contextual effects. There are some inconsistent findings about how 
institutions affect the translation of preferences into policies that may  be due to the lack 
of a systematic theory of institutions, as well as to the different methods applied. 
 The idea that institutions affect political representation has been long established 
(Lijphart, 1999, 1994, 1984, Downs, 1957, Duverger, 1954). There are different ways of 
operationalising institutions. Often scholars rely on a dichotomisation of institutions, 
where the institutional features only  take two categories: majoritarian versus 
proportional electoral rules, two- versus multiple-party systems, (semi-)presidential 
versus parliamentary  government, unitary versus federal states and so on. Others, use 
continuous measurements to measure institutions. For instance, Sartori (1976) develops 
a continuous measure of party fractionalisation and polarisation or Rodden (2002; 2004) 
suggest to capture levels of devolution and federalism in a continuous indexes. The 
problem with indexes is that  many different components are captured and often the 
creation of the measurement gets quite complex. Often scholars still fall back on one 
very specific component of a phenomenon. For example, Wlezien and Soroka (2012: 
1416) rely on Rodden’s continuous index of fiscal federalism, which, on the one had 
give a more differentiated picture, but after all only captures the financial component of 
federalism. 
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 Continuous measures certainly allow a larger differentiation of institutions, 
while dichotomous measures are criticised for not doing justice to the complexity of 
institutions (Golder 2005). For instance, an increasing number of countries uses mixed 
electoral rules, which scholars are unable to account for by creating dummy variables. 
However, one benefit  of dichotomisation is that it allows two groups of countries. The 
measure is simple and easy to interpret, especially in interactive terms. As this is initial 
research, I justify my decision to use dichotomous items by its practicability and 
simplicity. The research interest  here is to give a very first insight to how institutions 
affect policy representation. Many  scholars in the field have conceded to this notion 
previously  (see for instance, Powell 2000). Although I acknowledge that a more 
differentiated picture may be more desirable, for this initial research a dichotomisation 
of institutions some institutions is sufficient.
 Some previous studies have developed indexes to model the impact of 
institutional and situational characteristics with regard to the clarity of policymaking 
(Hobolt et al., 2012, Whitten and Palmer, 1999, Powell and Whitten, 1993). I abstain 
from using an index to model the institutional and situational impact on the opinion-
policy relationship. I am interested in disentangling the effect of each individual, fixed 
institutional and time-varying situation. I can achieve this by interacting the different 
attributes with my measure of public opinion. 
3.4.2. Modelling Institutional and Situational Clarity
 Interactive terms are increasingly common in political science, in particularly 
when exploring the importance of context or context conditionality (Franzese, 2003). 
By interacting public opinion with the contextual variable of interest, I assume a 
particular condition under which opinion is influencing policy. In more technical terms, 
an increase in X is associated with an increase in Y when the condition Z is met, but not 
when the condition is absent (Brambor et al., 2006: 2). Most of the contextual factors 
are dummy variables, which assume an opposing context. For instance, the regime type 
is coded 0 if it is a presidential system and 1 if it is a parliamentary one. In the analysis, 
the interaction coefficient gives me the condition of public opinion in parliamentary 
systems, whereas the coefficient for public opinion represents the counterfactual, the 
effect of opinion in presidential countries. To avoid some common pitfalls when using 
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interaction terms, it is important to include all constitutive terms the interactive terms 
consist of as well as check the marginal effects of the conditional impact using plots, for 
example (Brambor et al., 2006). While the coefficient may  indicate a significant impact 
of X under the condition Z on Y, the marginal effect does not necessarily need to be 
significant. A condition Z has a statistically significant effect whenever the upper and 
lower bounds of the confidence intervals are either above or below 0 (Brambor et al., 
2006: 14). In order to come up with a classification by country, I rely  on secondary  data 
collected by  the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al., 2001), the ParlGov 
(Döring and Manow, 2011) and Parline data sets (IPU, 1996-2012), as well as the 
Gallagher index (Gallagher and Mitchell, 2008). According to the argument set out in 
Chapter 2, I distinguish between fixed institutions and time-varying situations created 
by the political game (see Figure 2, page 40).
3.5 Conclusion
 In this chapter I have set out my research design. I have discussed and justified 
why I have chosen the comparative method and why I look at policy representation 
across an extensive country sample and across time. In addition, I have introduced the 
concepts and measures of public opinion and public policy responsiveness. While the 
concept of public opinion is also the subject matter of the first empirical chapter, the 
choices regarding public policy responsiveness have been extensively discussed here. In 
order to get a more comprehensive view of policy  representation and the related 
measurement issues, I have argued that I need to rely  on original as well as secondary 
data and have to conduct analyses on both the individual level as well as on the 
aggregate. The combination of superior data that I have introduced here allows me to 
overcome some challenges with regard to data availability. Last but not least, I have 
established a classification of characteristics that influence whether governments 
perform better or worse with regard to their representation function. I have argued that 
these characteristics divide fixed institutional attributes and time-varying political 
situations create by the political game. The clearer policymaking structures are, the 
higher the likelihood is that governments are able to respond to citizens’ demands. 
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 In the following three empirical chapters I test whether there is measurement 
equivalence across public opinion measures (Chapter 4), which is essential for the 
second empirical chapter on issue responsiveness (Chapter 5). The third empirical 
chapter tests whether the conditions of issue responsiveness and ideological congruence 
are the same or different (Chapter 6). I summarise my findings and discuss incentives 
for future research in the concluding chapter (Chapter 7).
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Appendix A
Table A1: Codes for Independent Variables - Institutional Clarity 
Data Source Variable Code
Database of Political 
Institutions (Beck, Clarke, 
Groff, Keefer, Walsh 2012)
Regime Type (semi-)presidentialism = 0; 
parliamentarianism = 1
IPU Parline Database (IPU 
2012)
Electoral Rules Single Member District = 0;
Proportional Rules = 1
IPU Parline Database (IPU 
2012)
Party System Two-and-a-half-parties = 0;
Multipartyism = 1
Database of Political 
Institutions (Beck, Clarke, 
Groff, Keefer, Walsh 2012)
Federalism Unitary state = 0;
federal state = 1
Database of Political 
Institutions (Beck, Clarke, 
Groff, Keefer, Walsh 2012)
Bicameralism Unicameral = 0;
bicameral = 1
Table A2: Codes for Independent Variables - Situational Clarity 
Data Source Variable Code
Election Indices Dataset 
(Gallagher 2013)
Effective Number of 
Parliamentary Parties 
Ranges from 1.94 to 9.05 
parliamentary parties 
ParlGov database (Döring 
and Manow 2012)
Number of Parties in 
Government 
Ranges from 1 to 7 parties in 
the government
ParlGov database (Döring 
and Manow 2012)
Government Type I Single Party Government = 0;
Coalition Government  = 1
ParlGov database (Döring 
and Manow 2012)
Government Type II Minimum-winning 
Government = 0; 
Over-/undersized 
Government = 1
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IV. Measurement Validity of Public Opinion 
Measures 
 In the previous chapters I have discussed the different  approaches to examining 
policy representation and introduced my research design. One conclusion of the review 
of the literature is that issue responsiveness approaches, the thermostatic and salience 
model of representation, are the ways forward to test effective responsiveness to public 
preferences. Both models examine the same concept, namely the responsiveness of 
government towards citizens’ issue preferences. While they  employ  the same effective 
indicator of public policy, i.e. public expenditure, the models rely on different measures 
of public opinion. 
 The thermostatic model of representation (Soroka and Wlezien, forthcoming, 
Soroka and Wlezien, 2010, Soroka and Wlezien, 2005, Soroka and Wlezien, 2004, 
Wlezien, 1996, Wlezien, 1995) specifically asks respondents about their spending 
preferences – whether they want more, less or about the same amount of spending on a 
specific policy area. The aggregated net preferences (the difference between those who 
prefer more spending and those who want less spending) indicate what people want. 
 The salience model of representation (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008) employs 
the so-called most important problem (MIP) question as its measure of public opinion. 
The MIP asks survey respondents to name the most important problems facing their 
country  at any given time. The model employs the aggregate of answers, which gives 
the most salient  problem amongst the public. The MIP is a measure of the relative 
salience of an issue, which is why I call the model the salience model of representation.  
 Both models investigate responsiveness in a dynamic way  and to find the same 
causal relationship, i.e. that policy follows opinion. They come to inconsistent 
conclusions with regard to context effects on the opinion-policy linkage, however. For 
instance, while thermostatic representation shows increased responsiveness in 
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majoritarian systems (Soroka and Wlezien, forthcoming), the salience model finds 
enhanced responsiveness under proportional rules (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008). 
One explanation for the inconsistent results is that  the measurements of public opinion 
used in the extant literature do not reflect the same underlying concept of public 
preferences. While no one explicitly claims that the public opinion measurement 
employed captures the same idea of public opinion, I argue that it  is important  to 
investigate whether there is a common denominator, some similarity or commonality 
across these indicators. First of all it is a valid question to ask why we rely on different 
measures of public preferences?
 One answer to this question is data availability. The thermostatic model has been 
developed in a strong survey environment. Questions about people’s spending 
preferences have been asked consistently since the early twentieth century in the United 
States, Canada and a few other countries. Hence, long time series on public preferences 
are available to track thermostatic representation over time. In other contexts, for 
instance in Europe, there is not such a vast survey  research environment and data on 
public opinion are significantly  thinner. Many surveys have not asked the same question 
about people’s spending preferences over time, let alone cross-sectionally, which may 
be the reason why researchers fall back on alternative measures such as the MIP. 
 Another answer is that the research interest in issue responsiveness studies is 
shifting more and more towards exploring under what conditions government 
responsiveness occurs. Investigations into the conditions of political representation 
focus in particular on institutional conditions, which are best examined in a cross-
sectional research design. While time wins in the trade-off between time and space 
when it  comes to thermostatic representation – there are long time series on the public’s 
spending preferences for a few countries – it is space that  triumphs the trade-off for the 
salience model – cross-sectional data are available, but for shorter time series. 
 In a recent paper, Jennings and Wlezien (2012) raise the problem of 
measurement validity. They point out that spending preferences and the MIP tap very 
different things and that they  are only modestly related over time. Further, they 
conclude that the MIP misrepresents the relationship between opinion and policy. 
However, they still find moderate correlations, which in particular in the social sciences 
indicate that the measures are related in some way. In this chapter I also address the 
measurement validity issue, but I start from a different angle. I am interested in whether 
on the individual level thinking something is an important problem also means that 
people want to increase spending on that issue. In addition, I test how important 
problems and spending preferences are related on the aggregate level using comparative 
data. The results suggest different conclusions from those Jennings and Wlezien draw. 
 My first empirical chapter looks at the measurement validity  of public opinion 
measurements, i.e. “whether or not, under different conditions of observing and 
studying [the same] phenomena, measurement operations yield measures of the same 
attribute” (Horn and McArdle, 1992: 117). In order to examine the measurement 
validity  or measurement equivalence of public opinion measurements in issue 
responsiveness research, I conduct a three step analysis: I explore the 1) content, 2) 
discriminant, and 3) predictive validity  of spending preferences and the MIP. In 
investigating the content validity  I am limited to a discussion about the concepts of 
public opinion and how the previous literature treats and discusses the use of spending 
preferences and the MIP. In discriminant and predictive validity I am able to empirically 
test whether measurements are valid. Discriminant validity asks whether public opinion 
measures correlate with each other. Predictive validity is tested in a two ways. Firstly, it 
examines whether the same demographics predict preferences in the same way. 
Secondly, it looks at whether both measures of preferences predict government 
spending in the same way. The chapter is structured as follows: I start by  discussing the 
linkages between public opinion responsiveness and effective policy  responsiveness. 
Next, I set out the possible scenarios of how spending preferences and the MIP may be 
related. I then introduce the ideas of content, construct and predictive validity in more 
detail. Subsequently, the methodology  and data are presented. Next, I conduct the 
empirical analyses and I close with some concluding remarks and implications for 
future research.
4.1 Public Opinion and Effective Policy Outcome 
Responsiveness
 Political representation in modern democracies is characterised by a linkage 
between public opinion and policy outputs. David Easton (1965) has taught us that the 
relationship  between citizens’ demands and policy  makers’ supplies in the policy cycle 
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is a reciprocal and interactive one. What scholars commonly describe as ‘policy 
responsiveness’ means that policy makers supply public policies that are in accordance 
with public wishes. Democratic responsiveness is what occurs “when the democratic 
process induces the government to form and implement policies that the citizens 
want.” (Powell 2004: 91). Powell views responsiveness as a chain of events, which are 
moderated by structuring conditions. However, Powell’s ‘Chain of Responsiveness’ 
does not consider that policy  outcomes feed back into what people want from 
governments, as Easton has established in his theory  of political system (Easton, 1965). 
If people are satisfied with the policy outcomes, they may express new preferences for 
policies and start the policy cycle anew. If they are dissatisfied, the same preferences go 
back into the system. Democratic responsiveness is ongoing and dynamic. Although 
Powell admits that the responsiveness of governments to preferences is not entirely up 
to the good will of the policy makers (Powell, 2004: 92), he does not take into account 
public opinion responsiveness (see, Figure 1 in Chapter 2). If no public preferences are 
expressed, government cannot respond to anything. Consequently, the two crucial 
prerequisites for successful government responsiveness are public opinion and policy 
outcome responsiveness, which I discuss in more detail in the following. 
4.1.1 Public Opinion Responsiveness 
 In order to account for public preferences, it is important  for policy makers to 
know what it is people think. To date, scholars of public opinion have failed to fully 
define what public opinion means. The term public opinion has been 
loosely used, sometimes in reference to widespread beliefs,  climate of opinion, consensus, 
the mores and the more settled convictions of a group; at times to the process of developing 
opinions, as distinguished from the product; elsewhere, to statements which are the result of 
a reasoned, logical process as contrasted with those which have been arrived at by 
ideological means; and the like (Albig, 1956: 3).
A minimum definition is that public opinion stands for “a collection of people who hold 
opinions on some issue” (Weissberg, 1976b: 9) or a collection of opinions on several 
issues, i.e. ideology  (Albig, 1956: 15). While some opinions can be fixed, for example, 
underlying morals in the form of ideology, others vary over time with the changing 
scope of governmental action, or across societies and in the intensity with which they 
are held (Key, 1961: 9).
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 As there is no universal definition of what exactly public opinion stands for, 
empirical research relies on an operationalist definition, where public opinion is 
indicated by  public opinion polls (Blumer, 1948). More precisely, opinion is viewed as 
the aggregated responses of individuals reflected in surveys (Brooks and Manza, 2006: 
631) and expressed in elections or referenda. Following this notion it is important to 
assess how citizens’ preferences are measured. Here, I discuss the measurements of 
public opinion in the context of comparative issue responsiveness research, which 
requires a certain degree of comparability across countries. That is, it must be ensured 
that the same concept is measured across countries.18  Further, comparative issue 
responsiveness research looks at the correspondence of the public’s issue preferences 
and public policies dynamically, implying a sequence inherently  structured in time 
(Stimson et al., 1995: 543). This means that public responsiveness to policy outcomes 
occurs immediately  and can be captured at any time through opinion polls, while policy 
responsiveness happens with a delay in time. 
4.1.2 Effective Policy Outcome Responsiveness
 Exploring the effective responsiveness of government towards public 
preferences is an ambitious task. Measuring public policy  outcomes effectively means 
capturing the content of implemented legislation. In an ideal world, effective outcomes 
include regulative policies as well as spending. Yet data on regulative legislation are 
sparse, which is why scholars employ  spending outlays to indicate public policy 
outcomes. The two widely  used models of public policy responsiveness are the 
thermostatic model (Soroka and Wlezien, forthcoming, Soroka and Wlezien, 2010, 
Soroka and Wlezien, 2005, Soroka and Wlezien, 2004, Wlezien, 1996, Wlezien, 1995) 
and the salience model of responsiveness (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008). Both 
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18 Indeed, there are many ways to measure what the public thinks. One could study specific attitudes 
towards moral (Wlezien and Goggin 1993) or environmental issues (Johnson et al. 2005) in individual 
cases. For example, Wlezien and Goggin use a statement question about abortion to indicate public 
opinion: “Please tell me whether you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal 
abortion: (1) If the woman’s health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy. (2) If she became pregnant 
as a results of rape. (3) If there is a strong chance of a serious defect in the baby. (4) If she has a very low 
income and cannot afford any more children. (5) If she is not married and does not want to marry the 
man. (6) If she is married and does not want any more children. (7) For any reason.” Johnson, Brace and 
Arceneaux also employ a statement question in a different format that measures environmental attitudes: 
“I support pollution standards even if it means shutting down some factories. – Definitely agree, generally 
agree, moderately agree, moderately disagree, generally disagree, definitely disagree.”
models employ  spending outlays as the outcome indicator, but rely on different public 
opinion measures. While none of these authors claims that  they test the same aspect of 
public opinion, it  may yet be important to test whether spending preferences and salient 
issues have a common denominator. If this is the case, it may enable scholars to study 
the conditions of institutions on effective representation in broader country samples. 
Even if there is a much thinner survey environment scholarship  may be able to rely on 
salient opinion, which is captured by surveys more frequently than spending 
preferences. 
 The thermostatic model of representation suggests a reciprocal relationship 
between public preferences for spending and public expenditure. Public opinion is 
operationalised as citizens’ preferences for spending in a policy  area X. Downs (1957) 
assumes that the public can be conceived of as a collection of individuals distributed 
along a dimension of preference for spending. While this does imply  that individuals 
have specific preferred levels of spending in mind, the measure intends to reflect the 
fact that some individuals want more or less spending than others (Wlezien, 1996: 84). 
The survey item issued to capture the spending preferences of the people is: 'Are we 
spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on policy  area X? Remember if 
you say "more" it could require a tax increase, and if you say  "less" it  could require a 
reduction in those services.' The difference between preferences for less spending and 
support for more spending, i.e. the net support for spending, indicates the relative 
preferences of the public. Policy makers follow the public’s relative preferences by 
increasing/decreasing expenditure and the induced spending change feeds back into 
public preferences (inter alia Wlezien, 2004, Wlezien, 1995, Wlezien, 1996). 
Thermostatic representation does not work equally  well across countries and issue 
areas, however, but is moderated by a country’s political institutions. Federalism, for 
instance, constrains the responsiveness of the public to policy change, while 
presidentialism and majoritarianism increase political representation (Soroka and 
Wlezien, forthcoming, Soroka and Wlezien, 2010, Soroka and Wlezien, 2005, Soroka 
and Wlezien, 2004). 
 The salience model of responsiveness employs the open-ended MIP question to 
measure public opinion: “What is the most important  problem facing [YOUR] country 
today?” The MIP is a measure of issue salience and measures the relative importance of 
issues to citizens (Hobolt and Klemmemsen, 2005, Burden and Sanberg, 2003, Bara, 
114
2001, Mackuen and Coombs, 1981, McCombs and Shaw, 1972). This is why  I call the 
model employing this measure the salience model of representation. Responsiveness to 
salient issues posits that policy makers follow what people think is the most important 
problem by increasing budgets in the respective issue area and this change feeds back 
into public preferences (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008). Just like thermostatic 
representation, the responsiveness to salient  issues varies across countries and issue 
domains. Political institutions seem to be the main driver of those differences. However, 
in contrast  to the thermostat, some of the results point in a different direction. While 
both models find consistent results with regard to the regime type – presidential 
governments are more responsive than parliamentary ones – the salience model suggests 
that representation is more pronounced in proportional systems than majoritarian 
systems (Hobolt and Klemmemsen, 2005, Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008, Pickup and 
Hobolt, 2011). In addition, it proposes that representation is affected by the political 
game, for example, minority and unpopular governments represent public preferences 
more successfully than their counterparts (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008, Pickup and 
Hobolt, 2011). Now, these scholars do not claim to capture exactly  the same aspect or 
dimension of public opinion. However, it would be valuable to know whether both 
measures are related and thus something else explains different results of contextual 
effects or whether the measures are not related. In the latter case, the different results 
may not be so surprising, but it may be worth to disentangle further what dimension of 
public preferences salient opinion and spending preferences are capturing. 
 While it is largely accepted that spending preferences are a good indicator of 
what people want (Soroka and Wlezien, 2010, Canes-Wrone and Shotts, 2004, Wlezien, 
1996, Wlezien, 1995, Page and Shapiro, 1983, Downs, 1957), issue salience is for being 
a non-directional measure of public priorities (Jennings and Wlezien 2012) and may not 
be the best indicator for public opinion when matching opinion with spending outlays19. 
Further, experimental research suggests that responses to the MIP question are 
extremely volatile and susceptible to change depending on question wording. For 
instance, the indicated time period and (de-)personalisation matter to the answers given 
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19 In contrast to public preferences, public priorities only indicate what issues are important in comparison 
to other ones, but they do not induce a preferred direction, e.g. for more or less policy in an area. Thus, 
priorities only tell us about how much emphasis someone is giving to a topic or an issue. 
by survey respondents (Yeager et al., 2011).20 A recent paper by Jennings and Wlezien 
(2012) criticises that the MIP captures something completely different from spending 
preferences. By crossing the two measures over time for the US and the UK, they 
conclude that they are, if at all, only moderately correlated and that indicating opinion 
using the MIP misrepresents the relationship between public opinion and public policy. 
Moderate correlations in the social sciences do suggest however that there is at least 
something going on between the MIP and spending preferences. It is important to 
investigate the moderate relationship in more detail. The MIP is an important indicator 
that is comparable across countries, while spending preferences are only collected in a 
handful of countries. Let me emphasise again, that by no means I claim that  any of these 
scholars mentioned above suggests that  the measures capture exactly  the same 
dimension or aspect  of public opinion. Until recently, there has not even been a 
discussion about the validity of spending preferences and the MIP (see Jennings and 
Wlezien 2012). However, it also has not  been emphasised that the models of 
government responsiveness and especially  the measures of public opinion do not 
capture the same dimension or the same aspect of public preferences. For the above 
reasons it is important, however, to investigate in how far these public opinion measures 
- spending preferences and the MIP - are related (or not).  
4.2 Possible Linkages between Spending Preferences and 
the Most Important Problems 
 Whether or not there is a relationship could be incredibly  important for 
comparative research. Spending preferences have previously  been used in single-
country  case studies or comparative case studies, e.g. of the US, the UK and Canada. 
While there has been no concern about the general comparability  of this measure, there 
is a trade-off between the quality of the measure and its cross-sectional availability. 
Most individual country studies and cross-sectional surveys do not ask respondents 
about their spending preferences on specific policy  issues. By  contrast, the MIP is 
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20 Related research on the equivalence of most important issues and problems indicates that there is a 
difference between the importance of an issue and the degree to which an issue is a problem (Wlezien 
2005). To survey respondents, salient issues and problems are similar enough to use them interchangeably 
(Jennings and Wlezien 2011). Here I only focus on the most important problem as a measurement in 
comparative responsiveness research. 
commonly asked in individual-country surveys as well as in large scale cross-national 
surveys. It is easily translated and a valuable, comparable and available measure. While 
only one study explores whether both measure are related (Jennings and Wlezien, 
2012), the MIP is accused of being a weak measure of public opinion and at best 
captures people’s issues priorities (Jennings and Wlezien, 2012, Jennings and Wlezien, 
2011, Yeager et al., 2011, Wlezien, 2005). The trade-off between the ability to conduct 
cross-sectional research and the quality (perhaps non-directionality) of the public 
opinion measurement leads this research. Although recent research indicates that the 
two measures tap into completely different aspects of public opinion(Jennings and 
Wlezien, 2012), the same results lend some confidence that there is at  least some 
relationship  between spending preferences and the MIP. This is suggested by the 
moderate correlations Jennings and Wleizen report. I see three conceivable scenarios of 
how spending preference and the MIP may be related: 
1) Measurements’ equivalence
2) Measurements related depending on the policy area 
3) Measurements’ dissimilarity
 Spending preferences and the MIP might be equivalent (1). That means, under 
different conditions of observing and studying the same phenomena, measurement 
operations yield measures of the same attribute (Horn and McArdle, 1992: 117). In 
other words, spending preferences and the MIP capture the same concept of public 
opinion and can be used interchangeably. This would mean that although the MIP does 
not give a direction of preferred change, respondents want to increase spending if they 
think something is a problem. This is unlikely  as previous empirical research already 
suggests they are not exactly the same and after all the survey questions ask for different 
things: Spending preferences and issues or problem that are considered important. 
 Spending preferences and the MIP might be related, but the relationship only in 
some policy domains, not in others (2). It might be that, particularly  in the social 
domains, thinking something is an important problem is related to wanting more 
spending on the social issues. Why the social issues? Social domains are redistributive. 
If governments spend money, the expenses will eventually be redistributed, so that the 
people benefit from it. For instance, healthcare or welfare.  It is likely that, in thinking 
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of an redistributive area as a problem, people believe that less is spent on the issue by 
the incumbent government. Spending on non-redistributive issues such as defence and 
law and order do not affect people directly, so it is likely  that thinking of such areas as a 
problem is less or not at all related to wanting more spending on the issue. Should this 
be the case, we know that can use the MIP as an indicator to test  government 
responsiveness on social issues, but not on other issues. This would allow comparative 
research using the MIP to study social policy  responsiveness, which would still be a 
great implication of this research. 
 Finally, spending preferences and the MIP could be completely unrelated and 
dissimilar (3). Both measures would be asymmetric in this scenario. This would imply 
that indeed the conclusions we can draw from the MIP, which as a measure may be so 
valuable for comparativists, are limited. As a consequence, the assumptions that the 
salience model is build upon, may have to be reconsidered. Perhaps all salient opinion 
can tell us to in terms of policy responsiveness research is whenever a problem is 
important, there will be change in spending. This would be a simpler, non-directional 
test of responsiveness. Responsiveness occurs when there is change in spending in the 
policy domain regarded, but  it would unable to explain why there has been more (or 
less) spending relying on salient opinion. Further research would be required to 
disentangle this. 
 I expect to find evidence for the second scenario. Empirical evidence on the US 
and the UK shows that the measurements are not equivalent (Jennings and Wlezien, 
2012), which is something we may expect. Why would questions on spending means 
exactly  the same to people than questions on important problems? However, the 
empirics of the same paper also indicate that both measure are not completely unrelated. 
Perhaps if an issue is salient people are inclined to want more/or less spending 
depending on the issue domain. Whatever the outcome of the following individual-level 
investigation is, previous research shows that there is also a relationship between the 
MIP and spending (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008). 
 Spending preferences and salient opinion are likely to differ by policy domain, 
however. People feel strongly about some areas that directly affect them such as 
redistributive issues like health care, education, and welfare. Issues concerned with 
higher policy, such as defence or foreign policy, which do not affect citizens directly, 
may have less of an impact on their preferences for spending in these domains.
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4.3 Assessing the Content, Discriminant and Predictive 
Validity of Public Opinion Measures 
 To test  the measurement validity of public issue demands I explore the content, 
discriminant and predictive validity of spending preferences and the MIP. Content 
validity  describes an imprecise assessment of validity. “Fundamentally, content validity 
depends on the extent to which an empirical measurement reflects a specific domain of 
content” (Camines and Zeller, 1979: 21). In order to examine whether the issue 
preferences achieve content validity, I have to rely  on a discussion about these 
measurements in the respective literature. There is no other “agreed upon criterion for 
determining the extent to which a measure has attained content validity” (Camines and 
Zeller, 1979: 23) than the discussion in the research literature. In the absence of well-
defined, objective criteria “inevitably content validity rests mainly on appeals to reason 
regarding the adequacy  with which important content has been sampled and on the 
adequacy with which the content has been cast in the form of test items” (Nunnally, 
1978: 93). The review of the relevant literature in the previous sections (Chapter 4.1 and 
Chapter 4.2) shows that there is only  little debate about the measurement validity of 
spending preferences and the MIP. 
 Discriminant “validity  must be investigated whenever no criterion or universe of 
content is accepted as entirely adequate to define the quality to be measured” (Cronbach 
and Meehl, 1955: 282). In order to test the discriminant validity, measures can be 
crossed to test whether they correlate with each other. While weak correlations between 
the MIP and spending preferences are found over time in the UK and US (Jennings and 
Wlezien, 2012), it  is important to further explore whether the measures correlate with 
each other on the individual level as well as across countries. 
 Moreover, it  is also helpful to examine the predictive validity of the MIP and 
spending preferences. While correlations already give an indication “that our measures 
can correctly predict something that we theoretically  think it should be able to 
predict” (Trochim, 2006), further tests are needed to see whether they predict the same 
outcome of a dependent variable. I examine the predictive validity of public opinion 
measures in two steps. Firstly, I am interested in whether or not the two measures are 
predicted in the same way by the demographic characteristics of survey respondents, in 
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other words, whether the same attributes predict the public’s issue preferences in the 
same way. Secondly, I test whether both measures predict spending in the bivariate 
relationship  in the same way.  To adjudicate whether spending preferences and MIP are 
related, I ask four questions: 
Figure 6:  Adjudicating the Relationship between Spending Preferences and MIP
(1) Is there a relationship between the measures? 
(2) Is the relationship strong enough to suggest that they are the same?
(3) Are both measures predicted in the same way by a set of demographic attributes? 
(4) Are the findings comparable across policy areas? 
 Moderate or strong, positive (and ideally statistically significant) correlations 
and bivariate relationships suggest that discriminant  validity is achieved. In terms of 
predictive validity, I hope to find that coefficients for the demographic characteristics 
point at least in the same direction, and at best that they also display significant results. 
In the aggregate data, I hope to find positive relationships between the MIP and 
spending outlays in the following year as well as a positive relationship  between 
spending preferences and spending outlays in the following year. If the strengths and 
direction of the coefficients are the same or similar, I conclude that predictive validity  is 
achieved. 
4.4 Data and Methodology
 In order to empirically test the validity  of public opinion measures in issue 
responsiveness research, superior data are required that incorporate the different 
measures, preferably for a large number of countries and over time. Such a data set does 
not exist, however. Most of the available data sources include either spending 
preferences or the MIP. These are usually  individual case studies and not surveys that 
collect cross-sectional time-series data. I rely  on original, individual-level data as well 
as secondary, aggregate-level data. I discuss my data and methodology in the following.
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4.4.1 Individual-Level Data  
 The individual-level survey data on people’s spending preferences and MIPs are 
provided by TNS BMRB. TNS BMRB is an independent  research agency  that  conducts 
a monthly web-based public opinion monitor on politically  relevant topics in Britain. I 
was able to place some questions on the public’s issue preferences on the March 2012 
monitor: (1) a verbatim coded MIP question and (2) four questions about people’s 
spending preferences on health care, education, the environment and national security/
defence. The MIP is asked as an open-ended question: “What do you think is the most 
important problem facing Britain today?” In order to ensure that respondents answer 
this question without bias produced by other questions asked in the survey, the MIP 
question is placed at  the very beginning of the online questionnaire. The verbatim 
answers were hand-coded into eight issue areas (inflation/rising prices, unemployment, 
the National Health Service, education, national security/defence, level of taxation, 
crime/law & order, and the environment). If respondents typed in more than one 
problem the first mentioned topic was coded. Problems that did not match any category 
were dropped as missing values. 
 Due to the limited space on the questionnaire I had to choose four policy 
domains of interest to ask about in regard to respondents’ spending preferences. The 
selection of the four policy areas is not random. “National security/ defence”, “the 
National Health Service”, “education”, and “the environment” were relevant topics in 
Britain at the time and have been studied previously  in responsiveness research. TNS 
BRMB asked: 
For the next questions, please say whether there should be more or less public spending in 
each of the following areas. Remember if you say ‘more’ it could require a tax increase, and 
if you say ‘less’ it could require a reduction in those services. Thinking about public 
spending on [National Security/Defence/ The National Health Service/ Education/ the 
Environment], should there be much more than now, somewhat more than now, the same as 
now, somewhat less than now, or much less than now?
In order to ensure that respondents would not say “much more spending” per se for 
every  question, the reminder “Remember if you say ‘more’ it could require a tax 
increase, and if you say ‘less’ it could require a reduction in those services” has been 
added. The issue areas were randomised on the online questionnaire to avoid bias and 
fatigue. TNS BRMB placed the spending preferences question at the very end of the 
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survey to ensure that respondents do not make any connection between the MIP and the 
spending preferences asked. 
 From prior research on issue responsiveness we have learned that the net  support  
for spending is one straightforward way to measure the public’s issue preferences. For 
instance, Downs (1957) notes that the public can be conceived of as a collection of 
individuals distributed along a dimension of preference for spending. Spending 
preferences “serve to indicate the degree to which the public want more (less) 
spending” (Wlezien, 1995: 985) and can be measured over time. The measure has been 
frequently used in previous responsiveness research as a placeholder for public opinion 
(Soroka and Wlezien, 2010, Soroka and Wlezien, 2005, Soroka and Wlezien, 2004, 
Canes-Wrone and Shotts, 2004, Wlezien, 1996, Wlezien, 1995, Page and Shapiro, 1983) 
and is well explored in terms of what predicts spending preferences (Welch, 1985, 
Ferris, 1983, Eismeier, 1982). 
 For the above reasons I treat  spending preferences as the dependent variable in 
the analyses. Citizens’ preferences for spending were measured on an ordinal scale 
ranging originally  from 1 to 5, where 5 means people want a lot less spending on an 
area and 1 indicates they want a lot more spending on an area. For the purpose of the 
analyses I have reversed the coding, so that higher numbers indicate preferences for 
more spending and low numbers preferences for less spending. The MIP serves as the 
independent variable. I coded the MIP into dummy variables for health care, education, 
defence and the environment, where 1 indicates the topic was mentioned and 0 if it  was 
not mentioned. I begin my analysis by  examining the simple correlations and bivariate 
ordered logistic relationships between spending preferences and the MIP: 
    ologit SPENDPREF = α + β*MIP  + ε,   (1)
where SPENDPREF are the spending preferences by policy area and serve as a 
dependent variable and the MIP as the explanatory variable. α gives the coefficient for 
the constant and β gives the relationship coefficient for the MIP. The error term is 
indicated by ε.
 To examine the predictive validity of spending preferences and the MIP, here 
whether or not the same demographics predict spending preferences and the MIP 
similarly, I run similar models. I rely on an ordered logistic regression to explore what 
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predicts spending preference. Instead of using the MIP as a predictor I use the MIP and 
spending preferences as dependent variables and include age, gender, education and 
vote choice as predictors:
  ologit SPENDPREF = α + β * [AGE/GENDER/EDU/VOTE] + ε, (2)
α gives the coefficient for the constant and β gives the relationship  coefficient for the 
predictors. The error term is indicated by ε. To explore whether the same predictors 
have the same or at least  a similar effect on the MIP, I rely on a simple logistic 
regression for dependent dummy variables:
  logit MIP = α + β * [AGE/GENDER/EDU/VOTE] + ε,  (3)
α gives the coefficient for the constant and β gives the relationship  coefficient for the 
predictors. The error term is indicated by ε.
4.4.2 Comparative, Aggregate Data 
 In order to examine whether or not spending preferences and the Most Important 
Issue (MII) predict spending outlays in the same way, I have generated a comparative, 
aggregate data set from three different data sources. I aggregated up  and pooled data on 
the public’s spending preferences collected by the International Social Survey Program 
(ISSP) as well as data on public’s policy  concerns collected by Eurobarometer and 
added country-level data on government spending, GDP and inflation rates provided by 
the OECD. 
 The ISSP asked respondents about their spending preferences on eight policy 
domains, but I only look at the same four policy domains that I have analysed in 
Chapter 4.4.1: health care, education, the environment and defence. The question 
wording deviates slightly from the questions I ran on TNS BMRB’s online survey: 
Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would 
like to see more or less government spending in each area.  Remember that if you say ‘much 
more’,  it might require a tax increase to pay for it. Government should spend [SPEND 
MUCH MORE/ SPEND MORE/ SPEND THE SAME AS NOW/ SPEND LESS/ SPEND 
MUCH LESS] money on [HEALTH/ EDUCATION/ THE ENVIRONMENT/ DEFENCE].
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The code is ordinal and ranges from 1 to 5, where 5 indicates much less spending and 1 
much more spending. When aggregating up the data and for ease of the analysis, I 
collapse the categories “spend much more” and “spend more” as well as “spend much 
less” and “spend less”. I also drop the middle category – those people who want 
spending to stay the same. Further, I generate a measure of net spending, which is the 
proportion of people who prefer more spending minus the proportion of people who 
want less spending.
 Salient opinion is collected by the Eurobaromter surveys. Instead of asking what 
respondents think is an important problem, they  ask about the most important issue 
(MII). While there are theoretically  differences between issues and to what extent an 
issue is a problem (Wlezien, 2005), crossing the MIP and MII measure has shown that 
people think of both measures as the same thing (Jennings and Wlezien, 2011). 
Eurobarometer asks: “What do you think are the two most important issues facing 
[OUR COUNTRY] today?” Note that the survey does not differentiate between first and 
second mentioned issues, so in the aggregate the proportion of people who named an 
issue either as the most or second most important problem is captured. 
 Finally, my combined data incorporates information about spending outlays by 
function provided by  the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). Amongst other country information the OECD collects data on how much the 
respective government has spent in the last fiscal year (spending outlays). In addition, 
spending outlays are broken down by their function into ten spending categories. These 
also cover my four policy domains: health, education, the environment and defence. The 
outcome variable is spending in a policy domain measured as the proportion of the 
overall expenditure. 
 While the ISSP and Eurobaromter surveys only overlap in 2006, I am able to 
add spending data for 2006 and 2007 in order to test whether there is overall congruence 
between measures of opinion and spending in 2006 and whether spending in 2007 is 
predicted by public opinion captured in 2006.21  After matching the data sources by 
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21 Please note that I work with levels of opinion here. The ISSP did not run these questions in 2005, so I 
am unable to calculate change in opinion from the previous year. 
country  and year, I end up with a comparative country  sample for 14 European 
countries22.  
 To get an initial indication of whether or not spending preferences and the MII 
are related on the aggregate, I begin by  crossing the measures with actual spending in 
the area. I then assess the predictive validity. Here, this means whether spending 
preferences and the MII predict spending in the same way. I capture the responsiveness 
of government spending in year t+1 towards public opinion in year t. In order to 
investigate responsiveness, I run simple Ordinary Least Square regressions with panel-
corrected standard errors that correct for clustering by country 23:
  [EXP t+1] = α + β * [MIIt/ MSPENDt/ MSPENDt] + ε,  (4)
where EXPt+1 is the proportion of the overall expenditure in year 2007 in the four issue 
domains. α is the constant, and β indicates the relationship coefficient for the MIIt (the 
proportion of people who thought the issue was important in 2006), MSPENDt 
(preferences for more spending in the domain) and LSPENDt (preferences for less 
spending in 2006). If the MII and MSPEND measures predict positive coefficients and 
the LSPEND produces negative results, preferably at the standard significance level, I 
can accept predictive validity. 
4.5 Spending Preferences and MIPs in Britain
 In this section I rely on the individual-level data collected in Britain and explore 
the validity of spending preferences and the MIP. The models and underlying 
assumptions have been discussed in the methodology section. I begin by  presenting 
some descriptive results indicating that there is some relationship between the 
measurements. I then investigate the construct validity  of spending preferences and 
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22 Eurobarometer only includes countries within the European Union and served as the basis for adding 
other information. The ISSP provides data for over 30 countries, but only 14 of them are European. 
Spending outlay data is available for all 14 EU members sampled in the ISSP and Eurobarometer. The 
countries I look at are the Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
23 I also run analyses on the stacked data set. I reshape the data from wide to long format in order to 
increase the number of observation for analysis. While I lose information on the specific policy domain, 
this allows me to increase the reliability of my results. I correct standard errors for the analyses on the 
stacked data for clustering by policy field.
important problems. The results suggest that  there is a somewhat weak relationship 
between the measurements. Finally, I examine how well demographic characteristics 
predict spending preferences and the MIP. Indeed, the analyses show that most 
coefficients consistently point in the same direction, but that there is some variation 
across policy domains. 
4.5.1 The Relationship between MIP & Spending 
Preferences: Descriptive Results
! I begin by presenting some descriptive statistics. Figure 7 exhibits the 
relationship  between mean spending preferences on the four policy areas and the MIP. 
The sample has been divided by responses to the MIP question. In order to evaluate how 
spending preferences vary across the four policy areas by  the MIP, I give the mean 
value on spending preferences for each policy area. If the MIP is tapping into spending 
preferences, I would expect that preferences for spending in a given policy area are 
highest for those who identified that policy area as the most important problem. 
Furthermore, I am also able to explore how spending preferences on my four policy 
areas are related to any other issue outside the four areas. I may expect that if a 
respondent identifies a social issue such as education as the MIP, preferences for 
spending on other social issues such as health care might also be high.
 The graph below (Figure 7) suggests that there is a relationship between the MIP 
and preferences for more spending on the same issues. I observe similar patterns for the 
social domains, health care and education as well as for the environment, where the 
highest column (preferences for more spending) coincides with the largest share 
considering the issue an important problem. For instance, the graph on health care 
indicates that people who think health care is an important problem also prefer more 
spending on health in comparison to those who have identified another MIP. The bar for 
health care stands out as the highest  peak, which means that on average people want a 
lot more spending in this area. Furthermore, for those who have identified health as the 
MIP, preferences for more spending are highest on health care when compared to the 
other four policy  areas. Overall, taking all MIPs and comparing across policy  areas, the 
figure also suggests that respondents generally  prefer more spending on health care. 
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This is the general pattern for the other policy areas. For example, those who identified 
the environment as the MIP also have highest average preference for more spending. 
Notably, people who stated that education is most important want a lot more spending 
on the education. The graph also displays that people want more spending on education 
in general; all MIP categories are beyond the middle category on the y axis, which 
indicates support for more spending. There is less variation across problems in 
comparison to health care. Preferences on environmental issues are similarly related. 
Those who believe the environment is the most important problem prefer more 
spending on environmental issues. Here, education stands out as being the second 
highest peak, which means, that respondents who think education is the MIP also want 
more spending on the environmental issues. There is little variation across the other 
problems. They range around the middle category for spending preferences, indicating 
that respondents prefer spending to stay about the same.
Figure 7: Mean Spending Preferences by Most Important Problem
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Spending Preferences on Defence by MIP
Data source: Monthly Public Opinion Monitor, March 2012, TNS BMRB
 The one exception from the general pattern is defence as those who identify this 
as the MIP have, on average, a lower preference for increased spending than for any of 
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the other MIPs. While people who think national security/ defence is the MIP also want 
more spending on the issue, there are two other problems that are more salient and seem 
to be better related to preferences for more defence spending: the environment and 
crime. Those respondents who believe that the environment and crime are the MIP 
prefer more defence spending than those who explicitly named defence as the MIP. 
There seems to be a lot more variation between preferences on defence spending and 
the MIP in comparison to the other three policy areas suggesting that defence is 
somewhat special. For example, those who recall education as an important problem 
support less spending on defence, while people who name another problem as the most 
important one want defence spending to stay about the same. Given that defence is not a 
social policy like the other policy  spending areas, I suspect this may be driving the 
different result. The type of the issue seems to matter. 
4.5.2 Issue Importance and Spending Preferences in 
Britain: Discriminant Validity
 The discriminant measurement validity of important problems and spending 
preferences is explored in two steps. I begin by correlating both measures with each 
other in the four issue areas: health care, education, the environment and national 
security/defence. Next, I explore whether spending preferences are predicted by the 
MIP in ordered logistic regressions. 
! Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for all policy areas. The top of the table 
presents the correlation between all spending preference questions and the bottom of the 
table presents the correlations between MIP and spending preferences. Given the nature 
of the variables, I present Spearman Rank Order correlations. I find the strongest 
correlations between education and health care spending preferences and a strong 
correlation also between education and the environment. Defence spending preferences 
stand out as lacking any  relationship  to the other issues in terms of spending 
preferences. Consistent with Figure 7, there seems to be some similarity between the 
social issues in terms of how they behave alongside the other issues, with defence 
standing on its own. When examining the correlations between spending preferences 
and the MIP, the results suggest weak, positive, but statistically significant relationships 
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across the social policy areas. Defence as an important problem and spending 
preferences also display a weak, positive, but insignificant correlation. Again, this is 
consistent with the earlier findings that distinguish defence as a special policy  area. It is 
difficult to draw any firm conclusions from the bivariate correlations as the results are 
not consistent.
Table 3: Correlation Matrix of Spending Preferences and MIP
Spending Preferences Most Important Problem
Health 
Care 
Educati
on
Environ
ment
Defenc
e
Health 
Care 
Educati
on
Environ
ment
Defenc
e
Spending 
Preferences 
Health Care 1.00
Education 0.44*** 1.00
Environment 0.19*** 0.27*** 1.00
Defence 0.15*** 0.09*** 0.01 1.00
Most 
Important 
Problem
Health Care 0.05* -0.02 -0.02 0.01 1.00
Education -0.05* 0.08*** 0.03 -0.09*** -0.01 1.00
Environment -0.01 -0.01 0.09*** 0.05* -0.01 -0.01 1.00
Defence -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 1.00
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
! As a next step in my analysis, I employ the MIP to predict spending preferences. 
While I expect to find similar results, this step allows a more appropriate test given the 
ordinal nature of the dependent variable. Table 4 displays the results of these ordered 
logits. The overall picture is that whenever people consider something an important 
problem, they also prefer more spending on the issue. The coefficients are positive 
throughout, but not all of them are statistically significant. For instance, the strongest 
relationships are between spending preferences and the MIP on education (+1.76, 
Pearson’s p < 0.01) and the environment (+1.6, Pearson’s p < 0.01). I also observe a 
considerably strong correspondence between measures on health care issues (+0.96). 
This latter coefficient does not reach the traditional 0.05 level of statistical significance 
but nevertheless indicates a strong relationship. With a Pearson’s p of 0.056 it is more 
than close to being significant at 95% confidence level. The weakest linkage is between 
measures on defence (+0.46). It is positive, but is not statistically significant. This is not 
surprising as I expected priorities on this issue to be non-linear and different from the 
social issues.
 Although measures only weakly correlate with each other, there is a linkage 
between spending preferences and the MIP. Salient problems seem to predict spending 
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preferences to some extent. There are differences across domains, however. While 
health care, education and the environment reach the traditional levels of statistical 
significance, defence seems to be different from these social domains. With regard to 
the discriminant validity, the small correlation indicates that they are not equivalent 
measures, but that they are related in some way depending on the policy  area. Whenever 
a social problem is important, people do prefer more spending on the domain.
Table 4: Relationship between Spending Preferences Most Important Problems
Spending Preferences on
Health Education Environment Defence
MIP: Health 0.96*
(-0.5)
MIP: Education 1.76***
(-0.65)
MIP: Environment 1.6***
(-0.56)
MIP: Defence 0.46
(-0.34)
Cut 1 -4.08*** -3.88*** -1.96*** -2.05***
(-0.23) (-0.21) (-0.09) (-0.1)
Cut 2 -2.5*** -2.5*** -0.76*** -0.91***
(-0.11) (-0.11) (-0.06) (-0.07)
Cut 3 -0.49*** 0.13** 1.16*** 0.8***
(-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.07) (-0.07)
Cut 4 1.48*** 2.13*** 2.63*** 2.4***
(-0.08) (-0.1) (-0.12) (-0.11)
Observations 1,153 1,146 1,131 1,117
Standard error in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 
4.5.3 Spending Preferences and MIP in Britain: Predictive 
Validity 
 In predictive validity with regard to the individual-level character of the data 
used here, I examine whether the likelihood of identifying an important problem and 
spending preferences on that issue is predicted by the same demographic attributes. The 
data allow me to investigate the impact of a respondent’s age, gender, education and 
vote choice. If the MIP and spending preferences are similar indicators of policy 
preferences, I expect the demographic coefficients to point in the same direction. 
Instead of reporting the results in a table, I indicate the size of the coefficients and their 
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statistical significance in the text. The reported coefficients are based on the bivariate 
relationships. 
 Age generally appears to be good predictor for problem importance and 
spending. In all four policy domains, it works in the expected direction. For instance, 
the older people are, the more likely they are to prefer more spending on health care 
(+0.003) and to name health care as the MIP (+0.02).24  This is also true for issue 
preferences on defence. Older respondents prefer more defence spending (+0.01***); 
the issue is also more salient to them (+0.02). Age has a consistent, negative impact on 
preferences on education and environmental issues. The older people are, the less likely 
they  are to prefer a spending increase on education (-0.01***) and to name education as 
an important problem (-0.03*). In addition, older respondents are the less likely to 
prefer more spending on the environment (-0.01***) and to name it as the MIP 
(-0.05**). 
! The results are not as clear on how gender predicts the MIP and spending 
preferences. I observe a consistent pattern for preferences on health care and the 
environment. In comparison to women, men are less likely  to support more spending on 
health care issues (-0.6***) or to name health care as the MIP (-1.08*). Men are also 
less likely  to prefer spending on the environment (-0.12) or to consider the environment 
an important problem (-0.31). On educational and defence issues the results are 
inconsistent. While men prefer less spending on education when compared to women 
(-0.47***), they  are more likely to name educational issues as a most important problem 
(+0.26). The same pattern shows for preferences on defence. Men are less likely to 
prefer an increase in defence spending than women (-0.17), but they are more likely to 
think of defence as an important problem (+0.58).
 I observe consistent patterns in the respondents’ education on issues concerned 
with health care, education and defence. Well-educated respondents are more likely to 
prefer spending on education (+0.07) and to name education as the most  important 
problem (+2.16**) when compared with less well-educated respondents. Similarly, they 
are less likely to prefer a spending increase on health care (-0.29***) or defence 
(-0.79***), or to name health (-0.39) or defence (-0.28) as important problems. It is 
ambiguous how education predicts preferences on the environment, however. While 
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24 Asterisks indicated with the coefficients stand for significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
well-educated people prefer more spending on the environment (+0.38***), they are 
less likely  to think of the environment as an important problem (-1.08) compared to less 
well-educated respondents.
! Lastly, I explore vote choice as a predictor for issue preferences. For practical 
reasons, I only consider the catch-all parties, i.e. Labour and the Conservatives25. Vote 
choice seems to be a good predictor for issue priorities. It shows consistent patterns 
across all issue domains.  As expected, Conservative voters, in comparison to Labour 
affiliates, are less likely to prefer an increase in spending on health care (-0.59***), 
education (-0.7***) and the environment (-0.8***); consistently they are also less likely 
to think of these areas as important  problems (health care: -0.69; education: -1.1; the 
environment: -1.79*). On defence the coefficients for Conservative supporters are 
throughout positive, which is not surprising. Conservative partisans are more likely to 
prefer an increase in defence spending (+0.53***) and at the same time they  are more 
likely to name defence as an important problem (+0.42) when compared to Labour 
voters. This is in accordance with the expectation for those on the left and those on the 
right. Labour partisans are expected to want an increase spending on social issues, 
whereas Conservative voters are believed to prefer a spending increase on issues 
concerned with law and order and defence. 
! In conclusion, the empirical tests for discriminant and predictive validity suggest  
support for the second scenario. Few inconsistencies can be explained by the issue 
domain looked at. I find consistent results throughout for health care and education with 
regard to discriminant validity and predictive validity. The only exceptions are defence 
and environmental preferences predicted by  gender, as well as environmental 
preferences predicted by education. The relation between spending preferences and the 
MIP seems to depend on the issue domain regarded. In the following, I explore another 
dimension of predictive measurement validity  and test whether spending preferences 
and salient issues also predict public expenditure similarly. To do this, I rely on a 
different data set that I have constructed from different data sources. I look at aggregate 
data in a comparative setting. In addition, I also discuss the implications of these 
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25 Most people report to have voted for one of the mass parties, while there are few respondents in our 
sample who state they have voted for a niche party or not voted at all. It made sense to dummy the vote 
choice variable into Labour and Conservatives. 
findings for policy responsiveness research and how future analyses might incorporate 
those results in a concluding section.
4.6 Spending Preferences, Salient Opinion & Public 
Expenditure across Space: Predictive Validity
 In predictive validity I do not only test whether the same demographics predict  
spending preferences and the MIP in the same way, I also examine whether spending 
preferences and most important  issues (MII) predict actual spending similarly  on an the 
aggregate using cross-sectional data. I begin by investigating the correlations between 
public expenditure in year t+1 and spending preferences for more spending, less 
spending, and net spending preferences26, as well as the MII measured in year t. This 
way I test responsiveness of budgets to measures of issue preferences assuming that 
responsiveness occurs with a delay of one year (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008, Hobolt 
and Klemmemsen, 2005, Soroka and Wlezien, 2005, Brooks, 1990, Page and Shapiro, 
1983). In order to increase the explanatory  power, I have reshaped the data from wide to 
long format by policy field, which increases the number of observations to 56 (14 
countries times 4 policy domains). While I lose the information about the policy field, I 
do get an indication of how opinion and policy are related when all domains are taken 
together. Table 5 displays the correlation matrix for public expenditure and the three 
measures of public preferences taken all issue domains together. I present Spearman 
Rank Order correlations. All three measures of preferences are strongly correlated with 
public expenditure and are also highly  statistically significant with a Pearson’s p < 0.01. 
The strongest correlations are between public expenditure and preferences for more 
spending (+0.68), as well as for public expenditure and net preferences for spending 
(+0.63). Spending outlays and the MII also show a fair level of correspondence that is a 
little weaker (+0.54). Not surprisingly, expenditure and preferences for less spending 
are negatively correlated (-0.52). 
 In addition to this, the matrix also displays correlations between the MII and 
preferences for more spending – with a correlation coefficient of +0.34 (Pearson’s p < 
0.01) – as well as with net spending preferences (+0.29, Pearson’s p < 0.05). This 
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26 To recap, this is the difference between those who said they prefer more spending on an issue and those 
who stated that they prefer less spending on the same issue. 
supports the findings from the individual-level data and indicates that people who prefer 
more spending also think the issue is important. It also shows that the net spending 
measure used in the thermostatic model correlates to some extent with the MII.
Table 5: Correlations between Public Spending and Public Preferences
Public 
Expenditure 
Preferences 
for More 
Spending
Preferences 
for Less 
Spending
Net 
Spending 
Preferences 
MII
Public                    
Expenditure (OECD)
1.00
Preferences for more 
spending (ISSP)
0.68*** 1.00
Preferences for less 
spending (ISSP)
-0.52*** -0.9*** 1.00
Net Spending        
Preferences (ISSP)
0.63*** 0.98*** -0.96*** 1.00
MII (Eurobarometer) 0.54*** 0.34*** -0.18 0.29** 1.00
Observations 56 56 56 56 56
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 When examining the correlation by  policy domain these patterns do not hold, 
nor do the findings show statistically significant results. I present the correlation 
matrices for the four policy domains in Tables A1–A4 in Appendix A. In accordance 
with the overall pattern, preferences for education and defence work in the expected 
direction. That  is, support for more spending (education: 0.09; defence 0.11), net 
spending (education: 0.14; defence: 0.08) and the MII (education: 0.02; defence: 0.5) 
are positively correlated, while support for less spending is negatively correlated with 
actual spending in these domains (education: -0.42; defence : -0.06). The picture for 
health care and the environment is less clear, however. While expenditure on 
environmental issues is positively correlated with both support  for more environmental 
spending (0.06) as well as the MII (0.1), it is also positively  correlated with support for 
less spending (0.3), but negatively  correlated with the measure of net preferences for 
environmental spending (-0.01). Even less clear is the relationship between health 
spending and public opinion measures. While the coefficient points in the expected 
direction for the MII – health spending is positively  correlated (0.25) with the 
proportion of people who think health care is an important issue – the correlation 
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displays negative coefficients for support for more health spending (-0.26) and net 
preferences for spending (-0.25), but indicates positive correlations for support for less 
spending on health care (0.17).
 Once again these results suggest that the policy  domain plays an important role 
in public opinion measures in responsiveness research. Contrary to the individual level 
results, the policy domains ‘health care’ and ‘the environment’ seem to be different. I do 
not find evidence for thermostatic representation. The relationship between preferences 
for more spending on health care, the net measurement and spending outlays are 
negative, while preferences for less spending results in more spending on health care 
issues. On environmental issues, support  for more/less spending is mirrored in more/
less expenditure on environmental issues in the next year; the net preferences measure 
displays a negative relationship, however. The results for the MII are consistent and 
promising with regard to its performance as a predictor for an increase in government 
spending in the following year. In all issue areas, the MII is positively related to public 
spending: When people think an issue is important, spending in the next year increases, 
which is what the salience model posits.
Table 6: Responsiveness of Public Expenditure towards Public Opinion
Responsiveness
Proportion of Overall Spending (year t+1)
Preferences for More Spending 0.15**
(-0.03)
Preferences for Less Spending -0.17*
(-0.08)
Net Spending Preferences 0.08**
-0.03
MII 0.2**
(-0.05)
Constant -0.45 10.03* 4.16* 3.533
(-2.00) (-3.55) -1.82 (-3.22)
Observations 56 56 56 56
R-squared 0.46 0.27 0.4 0.3
Standard error in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
So far I have only  explored whether public spending is related to the measures of public 
opinion. Next, I explore whether the opinion measures predict public expenditure in the 
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same way. Therefore, I run simple bivariate OLS regressions with public expenditure 
(year t+1) as the dependent variable and measures of opinion (year t) as the independent 
variables. I begin by examining the responsiveness of policy to the different opinion 
measures, taking all issue together. By stacking the data by the policy domains, I 
increase the number of observations but lose the specific domain information (an 
analysis by policy domain is presented later in this chapter, however). 
 The results suggest that spending preferences and the MII predict  levels of 
public spending in the expected directions, taking all issues together.27 Table 6 presents 
the results. The level of support for more spending in year t  leads to a +0.15 unit 
increase in spending in the next year. The effect of net  spending preferences in year t 
has less of an impact on spending in the upcoming year. The coefficient is about half the 
size of the one indicating support  for more spending with a value of 0.08. The 
relationship  between public opinion and spending in the next year is a little stronger for 
the MII (+0.2) and negative for support for less spending (-0.17). While the results for 
the relationship between expenditure and support for more spending, net spending 
preferences and the MII are statistically  significant on the 0.05 level, the coefficient for 
support for less spending is only approaching significance with a p of 0.11.28  The 
findings indicate predictive validity  of preferences for more spending, net preferences 
and the MII. These measures predict public expenditure in the same direction, taking all 
issues together. Support for more spending, net spending preferences and the MII in 
2006 predicts an increase in spending in 2007. Support for less spending predicts a 
decrease in spending in the upcoming year. 
 In the following, I investigate whether these relationships hold when I look more 
specifically at the individual policy domains with errors corrected for clustering by 
country.29 The results give an inconsistent picture. In accordance with the correlations 
presented earlier in this chapter, the direction of coefficients works in the expected 
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27 The thermostatic and salience models suggest that change in spending follows change in public opinion 
in the previous year. The data do not allow for calculating change in opinion, however they do allow me 
to explore whether change in public policy follows the levels of public opinion in the previous year, 
which is one step in the direction of dynamic models. While the coefficients for all measures of levels in 
preferences still point in the expected direction, the explanatory power and statistical significance of the 
coefficients drop largely.
28 I also ran the same relationship controlling for GDP and the inflation rate and the results and statistical 
significance of the coefficients did not change. Controlling for a lagged dependent variable affects the 
statistical significance. It also diminishes the effect of the public opinion measures on expenditure. 
29 Results by issue domains are reported in the Appendix B in Tables B5-B8. 
direction for education and defence. The coefficients deviate from the expected 
direction for health care and environmental issues. The results do not display traditional 
levels of statistical significance. Support for more spending (0.01), net preferences 
(0.01) and the MII (0.004) on education predict more spending on the issue, while 
support for less spending decreases spending by -0.32 units. The effect size is 
admittedly small. A similar pattern applies to defence. Support for more defence 
spending (0.01), net preferences (0.003) and the MII (0.03) on education predict more 
spending on the issue, while support for less spending decreases actual spending by 
-0.004 units. 
 The conclusions from the above analysis are limited. While the results indicate 
that spending preferences and the MII predict spending in the expected direction, taking 
all issues together, these patterns do not  hold for the specific issue areas. Education and 
defence stand out as domains where my expectations hold. Surprisingly, health care, 
which has shown to be fairly  robust in the individual level analyses, and the 
environment seem to be problematic issue areas. The expectations do not hold for these 
domains and coefficients point in different directions. However, with regard to the MII 
measure and the idea of the salience model of responsiveness, the findings are 
consistent and promising. Taking all issues together, the MII displays a moderate 
correlation with spending outlays, which is only  insignificantly weaker than the 
correlation with the measure for support for more spending. In addition, the coefficient 
from the bivariate relationship between the MII and spending is strongest in comparison 
to spending preferences. Once again, it is important to emphasise that in the bivariate 
regressions by policy domain the expectations for the MII hold throughout. People who 
think health care, education, the environment and defence are important problems get 
more spending on the issue domain. 
4.7 Conclusion
 In this chapter I explored whether or not the commonly used measures of the 
public’s issue preferences in comparative responsiveness research capture the same 
dimension of public opinion and can be used interchangeably. While research has tested 
the responsiveness of government towards its citizens’ preferences, no one has 
explicitly validated whether it is responsiveness to the same kind of preferences. While 
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the two commonly  used models – the thermostatic representation and the representation 
of salient issues – find responsiveness takes place, there come to different conclusions 
about the conditioning effect of institutions. One reason for this might be 
responsiveness to a different dimension has been tested and that consequently 
institutions shape these aspects of opinion in a different way. . Hence, it is important to 
know how spending preferences and the MIP are related. While some over-time 
research has suggested that there is no relationship  between important problems and 
spending preferences (Jennings and Wlezien, 2012), this analysis suggests otherwise.
 I outlined three scenarios of the relationship between the opinion measures. 
Spending preferences and the MIP might be exactly  the same (1), they  might be related 
depending on the policy domain regarded (2), or completely unrelated (3). My results 
point in the direction that the two indicators are related to each other and this 
relationship  depends on the policy domain. While across social issues the indicators are 
linked, in other areas such as defence we need to be more cautious in using the 
indicators interchangeably. This is what I take from the individual level analysis 
conducted in this chapter. 
 Analysis on aggregate data looking at 14 European countries indicates that there 
is also a global relationship between measures in predicting spending in the next year. 
Support for more spending and important  problems successfully  predicted spending. 
However, these relationships did not show constantly on the issue domains. However, 
important issues seemed to perform relatively well also looking at specific issues. They 
consistently predicted  spending, i.e. whenever people think something is an important 
issue, they actually get more spending on the issue. 
 The analyses conducted here are limited and contradict pioneering research 
conducted on time-series data in the US and UK (Jennings and Wlezien, 2012). We 
need to account for cross-sectional differences. Perhaps measures are related in one 
country  but not in another. In this connection I would like to note that it is important to 
know what people are thinking. We need to be aware that correct  measurements are 
employed to indicate public opinion on issues, not only  for responsiveness research, but 
also for related areas – including in practice. This early research gives an indication that 
preferences for increases in spending do reflect the importance of the issue to an 
individual, yet preferences on spending are related to importance specifically in the 
domain of social issues. My results provide evidence for those who employ these 
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measures. It is often the case that those wishing to analyse responsiveness over time, 
often going back 20 or more years, or wishing to compare across a large number of 
countries, must rely on existing data. The existing data on public preferences gathered 
through mass surveys most consistently asks about issue importance and it  is therefore a 
useful measure for responsiveness researchers. Conceptually, one may question whether 
issue importance is equal to a desire for increased spending on that  issue and my results 
for issues outside the social domain suggest that this concern may be warranted. 
However, the findings lend some confidence to the use of the MIP/MII, at  least  for 
social issues. 
! I acknowledge that my results also suggest that a link between the two concepts 
depends on sub-group membership and self-interested motives, which has been 
demonstrated in the individual level analysis of predictive validity. Because the 
indicators I evaluate in the analysis tend to be aggregated to form an expression of 
public preferences, perhaps these subgroup differences do not present  such a concern to 
researchers. However, it does point  to the need to pay attention to sub-group  differences 
in responsiveness research.
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Appendix B
Table B1: Correlation Matrix Expenditure on Health – Public Opinion on Health Care
Expenditure 
on Health 
Care      
(year t+1)
Preferences 
for More 
Spending on 
Health   
(year t)
Preferences 
for less 
Spending on 
Health   
(year t)
Net 
Spending 
Preferences 
on health 
(year t)
MII: Health 
(year t)
Expenditure on 
Health Care     
(year t+1)
1.0000
Preferences for 
More Spending on 
Health              
(year t)
-0.2563 1.0000
Preferences for 
less Spending on 
Health               
(year t)
0.1710 -0.8901*** 1.0000
Net Spending 
Preferences on 
health               
(year t)
-0.2459 0.997*** -0.9226*** 1.0000
MII: Health       
(year t)
0.2508 0.2126 -0.1181 0.1999 1.0000
Observations 14 14 14 14 14
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B2: Correlation Matrix Expenditure on Health – Public Opinion on Education
Expenditure 
on 
Education 
(year t+1)
Preferences 
for More 
Spending 
on 
Education 
(year t)
Preferences 
for Less 
Spending 
on 
Education 
(year t)
Net 
Spending 
Preferences 
on 
Education 
(year t)
MII: 
Education 
(year t)
Expenditure on 
Education              
(year t+1)
1.0000
Preferences for More 
Spending on 
Education              
(year t)
0.0853 1.0000
Preferences for Less 
Spending on 
Education              
(year t)
-0.4223 -0.6804*** 1.0000
Net Spending 
Preferences on 
Education              
(year t)
0.1357 0.9947*** -0.7518*** 1.0000
MII: Education       
(year t)
0.0225 -0.0459 0.0953 -0.0546 1.0000
Observations 14 14 14 14 14
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B3: Correlation Matrix Expenditure on Health – Public Opinion on the Environment
Expenditure 
on the 
Environmen
t           
(year t+1)
Preferences 
for More 
Spending on 
the 
Environmen
t           (year 
t)
Preferences 
for Less 
Spending on 
the 
Environmen
t           (year 
t)
Net 
Spending 
Preferences 
on the 
Environment 
(year t) 
MII: The 
Environ-
ment      
(year t)
Expenditure on the 
Environment                
(year t+1)
1.0000
Preferences for More 
Spending on the 
Environment                
(year t)
0.0670 1.0000
Preferences for Less 
Spending on the 
Environment                
(year t)
0.2992 -0.8224*** 1.0000
Net Spending 
Preferences on the 
Environment           
(year t)
-0.0122 0.992*** -0.8877*** 1.0000
MII: The 
Environment (year t)
0.1037 -0.2392 0.0838 -0.2122 1.0000
Observations 14 14 14 14 14
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B4: Correlation Matrix Expenditure on Health – Public Opinion on Defence
Expenditure 
on Defence 
(year t+1)
Preferences 
for More 
Spending 
on Defence 
(year t)
Preferences 
for Less 
Spending 
on Defence 
(year t)
Preferences 
for Less 
Spending 
on Defence 
(year t)
MII: Defence 
(year t)
Expenditure on 
Defence              
(year t+1)
1.0000
Preferences for 
More Spending on 
Defence              
(year t)
0.1078 1.0000
Preferences for 
Less Spending on 
Defence              
(year t)
-0.0622 -0.9146*** 1.0000
Preferences for 
Less Spending on 
Defence              
(year t)
0.0845 0.9738*** -0.9826*** 1.0000
MII: Defence       
(year t)
0.4975 -0.1102 0.2171 -0.1727 1.0000
Observations 14 14 14 14 14
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B5: Responsiveness towards the Public’s Issue Preference on Health Care
Health Spending (year t+1)
Preferences for More Health Spending -0.06
(-0.07)
Preferences for Less Health Spending 0.19
(-0.23)
Net Health Spending Preferences -0.05
(-0.06)
MII: Health 0.04
(-0.04)
Constant 18.97*** 14.09*** 18.03*** 13.15***
(-5.02) (-1.06) (-3.91) (-1.08)
Observations 14 14 14 14
R-squared 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.06
Standard error in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B6: Responsiveness towards the Public’s Issue Preference on Education
Education Spending (year t+1)
Preferences for More Education Spending 0.01
(-0.03)
Preferences for Less Education Spending -0.32***
(-0.1)
Net Education Spending Preferences 0.01
(-0.03)
MII: Education 0.004
(-0.04)
Constant 11.51*** 12.99*** 11.23*** 12.15***
(-1.81) (-0.56) (-1.58) (-0.73)
Observations 14 14 14 14
R-squared 0.007 0.18 0.018 0.001
Standard error in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B7: Responsiveness towards the Public’s Issue Preference on the Environment
Environmental Spending (year t+1)
Preferences for More Environmental Spending 0.01
(-0.03)
Preferences for Less Environmental Spending 0.08
(-0.09)
Net Environmental Preferences -0.001
(-0.02)
MII: Environment 0.01
(-0.03)
Constant 1.51 1.31** 1.81 1.62***
(-1.60) (-0.49) (-1.24) (-0.43)
Observations 14 14 14 14
R-squared 0.004 0.090 0.000 0.011
Standard error in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B8: Responsiveness towards the Public’s Issue Preference for Health Care
Defence Spending (year t+1)
Preferences for More Defence Spending 0.008
(-0.02)
Preferences for Less Defence Spending -0.004
(-0.02)
Net Preferences for Defence Spending 0.003
(-0.01)
MII: Defence 0.03
(-0.02)
Constant 2.84*** 3.14*** 3.05*** 2.45***
(-0.22) (-0.9) (-0.43) (-0.35)
Observations 14 14 14 14
R-squared 0.012 0.004 0.007 0.248
Standard error in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 
147
V. The Conditions of Issue Responsiveness 
 The previous chapters have established a new theory of contextual effects on the 
opinion-policy  relationship. Therefore I have borrowed the main argument of the veto 
player theory and linked it to the clarity of responsibility hypothesis from the economic 
voting literature. In a nutshell, I argue that the more veto players are involved in the 
decision-making process of government, the less clearly responsibilities are allocated, 
which decreases government ability to respond to the preferences of its citizens. I have 
also introduced and discussed the empirical models of policy representation. From the 
review of literature I conclude that issue responsiveness and positional congruence are 
the models that  best test how public opinion and effective policy  outputs are linked. 
Although the latter is no dynamic model of political representation, it is the only model 
that tests the ideological correspondence between government and the public. Issue 
responsiveness relies on two models to test how policy responds to issue preferences in 
a dynamic fashion. While the thermostatic model tests the responsiveness of budgets to 
spending preferences in directional way, the salience model assumes a relationship 
between salient issues and budget increase. Studies come to inconsistent conclusion 
about how context affects the opinion-policy relationship. As both models employ 
spending as the outcome variable, one explanation for the inconsistent findings is that 
the measurement of public opinion does not capture the same concept. 
 The research design of my empirical chapters is laid out in Chapter 3. I rely on 
cross-sectional analysis as this the best way to explore context effects. In addition, I 
introduce a time-series element as political representation is something that needs to be 
look at continuously over time.  
 In the first empirical chapter (Chapter 4) I have picked up on this possibility and 
tested empirically  how spending preferences and salient opinion indicated by  the MIP 
are related. I have conducted a two-step analysis. First, in original, individual level data 
collected in Britain in March 2012, I explored whether people who think a problem is 
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important also want to increase spending in this issue domain. Indeed, the results 
indicate that this is the case at least for the social issues regarded (health care, education 
and the environment), while defence seems to be different. Further, I examined whether 
both measures of preferences are predicted by the same demographic characteristics. 
While age and vote choice seem to be good predictors of both kinds of preferences, 
gender and education give an inconsistent picture, which once again indicates that the 
issue domain matters. Secondly, I have built  a comparative, aggregate data set from 
different data sources in order to test whether spending preferences and important issues 
predict spending in the same way in a bivariate setup. There is no comparative data set 
that incorporates both measures of preferences, which is why I had to build a new data 
base from different resources. The analysis shows that, taking all domains together, 
preferences for more spending as well as net spending and the MII performed fairly 
well in predicting spending in the following year. In fact, the relationship was strongest 
for the MII. When looking at the specific issue domains, this pattern did not show 
consistently and did not reach the conventional levels of statistical significance. Once 
again, the MII measure seemed to perform quite well in the specific issue areas. It 
consistently predicted an increase in spending. Whenever people think an issue is 
important, they actually  get more spending on the issue domain in the following year. 
Although spending preferences are a more direct measure of the public’s issue 
preferences, one major drawback is that these are only  measured in a handful of 
countries with a thick survey environment. The MIP/MII measure is available cross-
sectionally and over time even in a much thinner survey environment. While until 
recently  (Jennings and Wlezien 2012) it has been unclear if measures tap into the 
concept of public opinion, my analyses in the first  empirical chapter lend some 
confidence in the use of MIP/MII as a measurement of the public’s issue preferences. 
While researchers need to be wary about the issue domain regarded, the MIP/MII 
performs well enough to be a fall-back measure of opinion in a thin survey environment 
and for cross-national research. 
 In this chapter, I move on to testing the conditions of issue responsiveness, 
employing the salience model of policy representation. I am interested in how 
institutions affect the opinion-policy  linkage. In order to be able to generalise I need to 
conduct a comparative study. My results from the previous chapter indicate that the 
MIP/MII performs well enough to be used in comparative responsiveness research. 
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There are no data that allow for conducting comparative research relying on the 
thermostatic model using spending preferences. This chapter is structured as follows: I 
firstly  discuss the benefits and drawbacks of the salience model of issue responsiveness 
(Section 5.1). I then set  out my hypothesis about the impact of institutions on issue 
responsiveness (Chapter 5.2). This includes a recap of the veto player theory and clarity 
of responsibility hypothesis, as well as the distinction between time-invariant 
institutions and time-variant political situations created by the political game. Thirdly, I 
discuss my data and methodology in more detail (Chapter 5.3). The descriptive results 
are presented in sections 5.4, followed by the discussion of the analytical results in 
section 5.5. Chapter 5.5 looks at situations and institutions separately. I conclude and 
discuss my findings in section 5.6.
5.1 The Issue Responsiveness Model
 A growing body of literature explores the effective responsiveness of 
governments towards citizens issue preferences (Soroka and Wlezien, 2010, Hobolt and 
Klemmemsen, 2008, Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2005, Soroka and Wlezien, 2004, 
Wlezien, 1996,  Wlezien, 1995, Klingemann et al., 1994). The issue responsiveness 
model is based on the assumption that political representation is a dynamic 
phenomenon. Government and citizens react towards each other’s behaviour; while 
government follows citizens’ issue preferences, the induced change in policy  leads to a 
change in preferences, and so on. 
 The literature distinguishes between three models of issue responsiveness: 1) 
The thermostatic model (Soroka and Wlezien, 2010, Wlezien, 1995), 2) the salience 
model (Hobolt and Klemmemsen, 2005, Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008, Pickup and 
Hobolt, 2011) and 3) the party  model of responsiveness (Klingemann et al., 1994). All 
models employ  the same measure of policy outputs, i.e. public expenditure, but 
different indications of public opinion. The thermostatic model uses public net spending 
preferences for a policy area, the salience model applies the aggregate of what people 
think is the most important  problem facing their country today, and the party model 
deduces the public’s issue preferences from party  manifestos as the proportion of the 
most mentioned issues. 
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 The main criticism of the party model of responsiveness is that  parties’ most 
salient issues are no valid indicator of public preferences. After all, parties serve their 
partisans and not necessarily the citizenry  as a whole. While parties transport public 
opinion and act as a mediator, the most salient issues in party manifestos are no direct 
measure of public opinion. 
 The thermostatic model is the most prominent model of political representation. 
It matches lagged net spending preferences – i.e. the difference between those who 
prefer more spending and those who want less spending on an issue area X in year t-1 – 
with change in expenditure in the same area in year t. A series of studies demonstrates 
that thermostatic representation works in the US, Canada and Britain (Soroka and 
Wlezien, 2010, Soroka and Wlezien, 2005, Soroka and Wlezien, 2004), and provides 
some support for the idea that the model also works in different contexts (Soroka and 
Wlezien, forthcoming). One drawback of thermostatic representation is that the model is 
enormously  data-intensive. In order to track political representation, a long time series 
of public opinion and output data is required. In addition, to enable researchers to 
conduct comparative research and draw general conclusions about contextual effects, 
the data need to be available for a large country sample. While spending outlays can be 
accessed through various international organisations (e.g. the OECD or World Bank), 
this is not the case for the public opinion side. The only  cross-sectional study providing 
public opinion data on public spending preferences is the International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP), but  it only incorporates the question in four separate modules with 
large gaps in between and delivers no time series of data, which is needed to model 
thermostatic representation properly.
 The salience model of responsiveness employs the proportion of people who 
think a problem is important as the public opinion indicator. It  argues that government 
represents salient opinion by increasing spending in the respective policy  domain; in 
turn, the proportion of people considering that area a problem decreases (Pickup and 
Hobolt, 2011, Hobolt  and Klemmensen, 2008). Critics argue that the salience model is 
inferior to the thermostatic approach because thinking something is a problem does not 
indicate the preferred direction of change. For instance, to some people the environment 
is a problem because environmental protection keeps them from fox hunting. To others, 
the environment is a problem, because they care about the environment and 
environmental protection. The most we learn from the salience model, critics argue, is 
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whenever people think something is a problem, there may be change in spending, but it 
is not necessarily an increase in budgets. 
 In some policy domains, the assumed relationship between issue salience and 
spending preferences, and thus between issue salience and actual spending, works. In 
Chapter 4, I have demonstrated that, in the social domains, wanting more spending is 
highly  correlated with thinking the domain is a problem, e.g. in health care and 
education. For domains such as defence, the assumed relationship was not necessarily 
expected to hold. Indeed, the analysis has not shown any statistically significant 
correlations between defence spending preferences and people thinking defence is a 
problem. However, the coefficients point into a similar direction suggesting that there is 
a positive relation between both measures. 
 One main advantage of the salience model of responsiveness is that the MIP 
question is asked in a similar format in individual case studies and in cross-sectional 
surveys over time. This is important for comparativists who are interested in capturing 
the similarities and differences of political institutions, situations and other contexts. 
Further, the thermostatic and the salience model of responsiveness come to different 
conclusions about the impact of institutions on political representation. For instance, 
while thermostatic representation shows increased responsiveness in majoritarian 
systems (Soroka and Wlezien, forthcoming), the salience model finds enhanced 
responsiveness under proportional rules (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008). One 
explanation for the inconsistent findings is that the different measurements affect the 
results of the analysis. I have showed previously  that the measures are related, so it  is 
unlikely that it is the measurement of public opinion leads to differing results. Another 
explanation is found in an underdeveloped theory of contextual effects in 
responsiveness research. While thermostatic representation assumes that clear 
institutional rules enhance opinion formation, increase input and policy responsiveness, 
rules that lead to a more diverse representation in salience models enhance 
responsiveness as everyone gets bits of what they want. 
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5.2 Veto Players and the Clarity of Responsibilities 
Hypotheses 
 What is needed is a theory of institutional context that is consistent across 
countries. The foundation for such a conceptual framework is found in the veto player 
theory  and ties in with the clarity  of responsibilities hypothesis (Hobolt et al., 2012, 
Whitten and Palmer, 1999, Powell and Whitten, 1993). While fewer veto players are 
believed to enhance representation, the mechanism by which this is achieved with 
regard to responsiveness is clarity of responsibility. In a nutshell, the fewer veto players 
are involved in the policy process, the clearer responsibilities are allocated, and the 
more likely  it  is that government responds to public preferences. Therefore, clarity 
depends on two features: fixed institutions and time varying situations created by the 
political game. While those veto players created by time invariant institutions always 
take part in the decision-making process and constantly  influence responsiveness, veto 
players produced by the political game change and may enter or leave the political arena 
frequently. The latter affects policymaking and representation in the short term, while 
the former affects long-term responsiveness. 
 This chapter asks under what conditions issue responsiveness occurs. I have set 
out a novel theory  about the contextual impact of institutions and situations on policy 
responsiveness. Issue responsiveness is about people’s positions on political issues. 
Issue positions30  are volatile and can change as a result of both short- or mid-term 
events, as well as long-established morals or ideology. Zaller (1992) presumes that 
opinion formation on political issues and change in issue positions is largely due to a 
person’s lifetime experience, but also depends on the social, economic and political 
environment. Issue preferences can be affected by time-varying situational 
characteristics created by the political game. They are can also be affected by  political 
elites and institutions that never or rarely change. By contrast, long-standing political 
predispositions, such as ideological beliefs, are not influenced by elites and their 
institutions in the short term, but it is more likely that they are affected in the long run 
(Zaller, 1992: 23) and by institutions that rarely change and are well-established. Most 
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30 One special kind of extremely volatile issue is valence issues. These are issues which carry emotion 
and image, but less policy content, e.g. the economy, participation in an interstate war (Stimson 1991, 
Stokes 1963).
notably, issue positions change when an unforeseeable event takes place, such as the 
participation in a war or an economic crisis. Thus, whether or not responsiveness of 
government towards public issue preferences occurs is believed to be affected by  both 
short-term changes and long-standing time-invariant institutions. With regard to the 
clarity of responsibility idea, I hypothesise:
Issue Responsiveness Hypothesis
Issue responsiveness is increased when institutional and situational clarity 
is high, i.e. the number of institutional and situational veto players is low.   
This is because issue positions are volatile and can change as a result  of short-term 
events, as well as long-standing institutional continuity. I explore the institutional and 
situational clarity hypotheses separately on a set of sub-hypothesis discussed in the 
following.  
5.2.1 The Institutional Clarity Hypothesis
 The institutional clarity hypothesis assumes that  the more veto players are created 
by time-invariant or rarely changing institutions, the less clearly  responsibilities are 
allocated and government responsiveness is decreased. I test  institutional clarity  in a 
subset of five hypotheses, which examine the impact of five fixed institutional features: 
the regime type, the party system, bicameralism, federalism, and the electoral system. 
See hypotheses H1a to H5a in Chapter 2.4.2.1. Those institutions that foster the creation 
of more veto players (bicameral and federal structures, parliamentarianism, 
proportionality and multipartyism) are expected to lead to less clarity  of responsibility 
and, hence, decreased responsiveness of governments. The impact of time-invariant 
factors is less important for issue responsiveness, however. Issue responsiveness is more 
subject to change as a result of time-varying situations than long-established political 
institutions. While I expect to find the coefficients for these institutions to point in the 
expected direction (be negative), I expect to find marginal and insignificant effects. I do 
not set out individual sub-hypothesis as I expect to find no significant  effects for any 
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institutional factor on issue responsiveness. The hypothesised effect is summarised in 
the rows 6–10 of Table 7. I accept the Institutional Clarity  Hypothesis if I find results 
for all sub-hypothesis pointing in the expected directions. 
5.2.2 The Situational Clarity Hypothesis
 Issue positions, I have argued, are more volatile and more subject  to change as a 
result of short- and mid-term events than as a result of long-standing institutional 
characteristics. People’s position on an issue also changes more easily than moral or 
ideological stances. General policy issues are certainly driven by  an underlying 
ideology, yet these ideologies are not deeply  anchored in people’s issue positions as 
much. Admittedly, they  are not entirely  free of ideological predispositions, but still 
detached enough to be affected only a little by ideological convictions. After all, the 
issue domains regarded in this thesis do not strongly divide according to moral beliefs.
When the political game leads to changing situations, the new situation may  have more 
of an impact on issue responsiveness than the fixed institutional framework. Firstly I 
expect time-varying situations to affect  the number of veto players involved in decisions 
in the short term and, secondly, I expect this short-term clarity or complexity to affect 
the issue responsiveness of governments. The more clarity political situations create, i.e. 
the fewer veto players enter the policymaking arena, the more likely it is that 
governments respond to public issue preferences. 
 I test  the situational clarity hypothesis as a set of four sub-hypotheses regarding 
one legislative situation – effective number of parties in the legislature – and three 
executive conditions – single-party versus coalition governments, the effective number 
of parties in government and minimum-winning versus over/-undersized governments. 
H1b:  The larger the number of effective parliamentary parties is, the less 
 likely government is to respond to public opinion.  
 How many parties are represented in the legislature changes frequently with 
parliamentary  elections. The ENPP affects the coalition formation process as well as 
citizens’ perceptions of the clarity of responsibility. Having a large number of parties in 
parliamentary  democracies usually leads to the formation of coalition government 
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(Downs, 1957: 144), which is believed to be less flexible when it comes to taking policy 
decisions. In addition, the existence of multiple parties in the legislature and in the 
executive may confuse citizens. They are less clear about the differences between 
parties and who to hold accountable for policy decision. A larger number of veto players 
in the form of a high number of political parties in the legislature affects issue 
responsiveness from two sides. It confuses preference expression and constrains 
policymaking. 
H2b:  The larger the number of parties in government, the less likely it is 
 that government responsiveness to citizens’ preferences occurs.  
 The rationale behind this hypothesis is obvious. The more parties that share 
responsibilities within the government, the larger the potential for intra-party conflict is. 
Who has the final say in the decision-making process is unclear. If a single party  is in 
charge, the responsibilities are clearly  allocated; the single party  is accountable for 
policy outcome. In addition to this is it more flexible to act according to public 
demands. Fewer parties reach compromises on policies or policy  directions more easily 
than many parties. 
H3b: Coalition governments are less likely to respond to the public’s issue 
 demands than a single-party governments. 
 Coalition government means that two or more parties are directly involved 
in the decision-making process. The number of veto players is increased in comparison 
to single-party governments with no internal competitors. The coalescing parties 
negotiate policy  content, while single-party governments can implement without 
bargaining over policies. The clarity of responsibilities in coalition governments is 
decreased, with an increased number of veto players. Further, whether a coalition or a 
single-party government is in charge can change regularly, at least with each election. 
H4b:  Minimum-winning governments are more likely to respond to public 
 opinion.
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 One can even push the previous argument further and be more precise about the 
effect of government characteristics on issue responsiveness. Separate from the idea of 
whether a government consists of one or more parties, it  may matter more on what basis 
the government is founded. Minimum-winning governments that include only  as many 
parties in the government needed to achieve a majority  may  be more successful in 
responding to preferences, independent of being a coalition or single party executive. 
Oversized governments, whose cabinets include more parties than necessary to maintain 
a parliamentary majority, or undersized governments, whose cabinets rule on the basis 
of minority rules, are less successful in responding to public opinion. Both kinds have to 
deal with an increased number of veto players, internally  or externally, that constrain 
policymaking and decrease the clarity of responsibility. 
Table 7: Hypothesised Effect of Situational and Institutional Clarity on Issue Responsiveness
Number of 
Veto Players
Clarity of 
Responsibility
Effect on Issue 
Responsiveness
Situational Overall Negative Effect
     High number Parliamentary Parties High Low -
     High number Government Parties High Low -
     Coalition Government High Low -
     Over-/Undersized Government High Low -
Institutional Overall Negative Effect 
     Bicameralism High Low -
     Federalism High Low -
     Parliamentarianism High Low -
     Multipartyism High Low -
Note: The negative sign indicates a constraining impact of situations and institutions on responsiveness
 Whenever more veto players are involved, i.e. when situations are less clear, I 
expect issue responsiveness to be decreased. In reverse, if fewer veto players are created 
by the political game, i.e. responsibilities are clearly  allocated, I expect issue 
responsiveness to be enhanced.  I assume the Situational Clarity Hypothesis to be 
confirmed if I find coefficients for the indicators of situational clarity pointing in the 
expected direction. Rows 2-4 of Table 7 summarise the hypothesised effects of 
situations created by  the political game on issue responsiveness. The coding of the 
explanatory  variables is reflected in Table 7. The situational as well as institutional 
design that creates more veto players are coded as 1, whereas low veto players are 
coded as 0. If the variable is continuous, e.g. ENPP, higher values indicate a larger 
number of veto players.
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5.3 Data and Methodology
 Superior data and a straightforward methodology are required to model the issue 
responsiveness of a government towards its citizens’ preferences employing the salience 
model of representation cross-sectionally. This chapter disentangles the contextual 
effects of political situations and institutions on how well a government reflects the 
public’s policy concerns in spending. Effective government responsiveness is examined 
as a dynamic phenomenon in a comparative framework across 21 countries employing 
the salience model of political representation. 
5.3.1 Measuring Public Opinion and Policy Outputs 
 In order to explore the institutional and situational conditions of issue 
responsiveness employing the salience model of representation, superior data are 
required that allow cross-sectional comparison and account for dynamics. I rely on 
opinion data collected by  the Eurobarometer (EB) project as well as spending outlays 
provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
 The EB is a continuous survey project that asks European citizens about their 
opinions and attitudes towards Europe as well as national political and societal issues. 
The standard EB survey  is carried out (at least) twice a year in a spring and an autumn 
wave. Since 2002 the surveys regularly include a question about the most salient issues 
facing a country: “What do you think are the two most important issues facing [OUR 
COUNTRY] at the moment?” The question wording deviates slightly  from the one used 
in the original salience model, which employs the single most important  problem facing 
the country today. 
 The criticism that salient opinion captures a different concept than spending 
preferences (Jennings and Wlezien, 2012) has been challenged by  my analysis in 
Chapter 4. I demonstrate that spending preferences and salient opinion are related in 
some way. In fact, the MIP has shown to be fairly  consistent throughout and to predict 
actual spending reliably  and even better than spending preferences itself. Whether what 
people think is the most important issue or the most important problem facing their 
country  today  may  also matter. Wlezien (2005) argues that while the MIP tells us the 
prominence of a particular topic, we do not know the extent to which that topic is also a 
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problem. While there are conceptual doubts about the equivalence of issues and 
problems, in survey practice both questions capture the same thing. Most important 
issue responses are strikingly similar to responses given to the most important problem 
question (Jennings and Wlezien, 2011). Hence, using most important  issues instead of 
most important problems does not significantly change the measurement or model. 
 There is also some more general criticism about the validity of the most 
important problem question, which applies equally  well to the most important issues. 
Larson, Yeager et al. (2011) have shown that the most important problem question is 
very sensitive to question wording. In an experimental setup they find that answers vary 
across two dimensions: association of time and personalisation.  Whether the question 
includes a specification of time “today”, “within the next few years” or “in the future” 
affects how people answer. For example, in the long run respondents think more about 
environmental issues, while the economy worries them most in the short term. 
Secondly, the (de-)personalisation of the question (‘personally’, ‘the country’, ‘the 
society’ or ‘the world’) matters to respondents’ answers. For instance, “What is the most 
important problem facing the world today?” makes respondents think about war and 
environmental issues rather than personal economic situations. 
 After all, the most important problem question “provides an adequate estimate of 
the public’s relative concerns with different policy areas and it allows us to measure 
variations in publicly perceived issue salience between countries and over time” (Hobolt 
and Klemmensen, 2008: 386). It is a good and valid measure of public issue preferences 
and in the redistributive domains is also correlated with another direction measure, i.e. 
peoples’ spending preferences. If a redistributive issue is believed to be an important 
problem, respondents want more spending on the issue. 
 Further, the format of the EB most important issue might cause some problems. 
The original model employs an aggregate of an open ended answer catalogue. The most 
important issues asked in the EB surveys are captured as a battery of fourteen issue 
areas in the form of dummy variables, where 1 means the issue is important and 0 
indicates that the respondent has not mentioned the issue. The first two mentioned 
important issues are coded in the EB data matrix. There is no indicator which answer 
was given first  and which was given second. Although the original model employs an 
open ended list and the EB survey employs a closed list, this does not seem to be much 
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of a problem. The EB surveys account for spontaneously  given answers that can be 
coded back into the original issue domains. 
Table 8: Country Matches and Availability of EB and OECD Data
EBa OECDb
Austria 2002–2010 1995–2009
Belgium 2002–2010 1990–2008
Bulgaria MIP not available not available
Cyprus 2004–2010 not available
Czech Republic 2004–2010 1995–2008
Denmark 2002–2010 1990–2009
Estonia 2004–2010 1995–2008
Finland 2002–2010 1990–2008
France 2002-2010 1995-2009
Germanyc 2002–2010 1991–2009
Greece 2002–2010 2000–2008
Hungary 2004–2010 1995–2008
Ireland 2002–2010 1990–2008
Italy 2002–2010 1990–2008
Latvia MIP not available not available
Lithuania MIP not available not available
Luxembourg 2002–2010 1990–2009
Malta MIP not available not available
Netherlands 2002–2010 1995–2009
Poland 2004–2010 2002–2008
Portugal 2002–2010 1995–2009
Romania MIP not available not available
Slovakia 2004–2010 1995–2008
Slovenia 2004–2010 1999–2009
Spain 2002–2010 1995–2008
Sweden 2002–2010 1995–2008
United Kingdom 2002–2010 1990–2008
a. Question asked in EU countries is: “What do you think are the two most important issues facing [OUR 
COUNTRY] at the moment?”  
b. OECD national accounts Government Expenditure by function and year
c. Data for East and West Germany
 Before aggregating up the proportion of people who stated that issue X is an 
important issue, I recode all issue categories into ten issue domains, which correspond 
to OECD spending by function data (more on this momentarily). I also generate a 
change variable that captures how opinion – the proportion of people who think 
something is an issue – changes from year t-1 to year t. I employ the spring wave of the 
EB surveys only, which enables me to add two additional time points to the series.31 My 
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31 I have to employ an annual measure of opinion because spending outlays are available annually. As the 
most important issue question is asked in the 2002 spring wave only, I chose to employ only data from the 
spring wave. By the time the analysis was conducted, data for 2010 was only available for spring as well, 
when this thesis was written and submitted. By choosing the EB spring wave, I am able to add two years 
to the analysis. In addition, I avoid dealing with averaging problems or weights. I do not expect the 
analysis to be affected by my choice.  
policy output measure is spending outlays32 by function provided by the OECD. The 
OECD collects continuous data on the economic development of its member states. 
While I would ideally  like to employ data that captures regulative policies, which are 
not available, I can rely on consistent, comparative information about budgets broken 
down into ten policy functions (General public service, defense and foreign policy , 
public order and safety, economic affairs, environmental issues, housing and community 
amenities, health care, culture, religion and recreation, education and social problems). 
back to 1989. Data are reported in the national currency. This is challenge for 
comparison. There are two strategies to deal with this. Firstly, the OECD provides 
purchasing power parity (PPP) tables for all years. The PPP is nothing but a multiplier 
that allows national currencies to be converted into a comparable unit, namely the US 
Dollar. Secondly, the original salience model captures outputs as the percentage of the 
overall expenditure in each policy domain regarded. No conversion into a coherent unit 
is required to capture the proportion of spending per domain as a function of the overall 
spending. I follow the latter strategy and employ  spending per domain as the percentage 
of the overall budget. Although spending data is available back to 1989, the time series 
employed in the analysis is shorter. Matching the accessible years of the EB surveys 
with OECD spending outlays provides a much shorter time series of only eight years 
between 2002 and 2010. Table 8 exhibits the countries and years attainable. I end up 
with a sample of 21 European countries over a time period of six to nine years. Opinion 
data for some of the newer European democracies is only provided from 2004 onwards. 
5.3.2 Data structure
 I have constructed a data set that incorporate the data from the resources 
mentioned in Chapter 5.3.1, the Eurobarometer, the OECD as well as several 
institutional data sets (see Appendix A, Chapter 3 for information on the institutional 
resources). The individual-level survey  data collected by Eurobarometer have been 
aggregated up  by country and year. Each case represents the country, a year and a policy 
domain. I have linked public spending for each country, year and domain collected by 
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32 There is a crucial difference between spending appropriations and spending outlays. Whereas spending 
appropriations describe what governments would like to spend and thus can only be interpreted as a 
rhetorical measure of policy outputs, spending outlays are what governments have actually spent in a 
fiscal year and indicate an effective measure of policy outputs (Wlezien and Soroka 2003). This is not a 
problem here as the OECD reports spending outlays by function. 
the OECD as well as the institutional variables. While the fixed institutions do not 
change for each country and year, the situational characteristics vary. The institutional 
and situational characteristics are the same for each policy domain and spending entry.
   As I am dealing with a limited number of countries (21) as well as very short  
time-series (6-9 years), data analysis with so few cases may be problematic and give 
biased and unreliable results. The data are stacked by  policy area such that each you 
have country panel data within each policy domain. I have used Stata’s reshape 
command to change the data formate from wide to long. After restructuring the data, it 
is still sorted by country  and year, however another component is added. A new variable 
‘policy field’ is created that ranges from 1 to 10, where each number corresponds with a 
particular policy domain.33 In accordance with this new variable, two other variables are 
created ‘policy’ and ‘opinion’. While the policy  variable captures change in public 
spending, the opinion variable captures information on change in public opinion. The 
information of these two variables correspond with the policy field factor by  country 
and year. The stacked data allow me to investigate policy effects in a single model and 
one of its benefits is that  I deal with a larger sample size form initially  210 observations 
to over 1400 observations clustered in 10 policy fields and 21 countries. The trade-off is 
that I loose the more specific information about the policy domains. I argue in Chapter 
3.1.3 that I do not rely on a classical multi-level data structure when dealing with cross-
sectional surveys, that is, individuals are nested in countries and/or years. However, by 
stacking the data I technically create a multi-level data structure: country and year are 
nested within policy areas. 
5.3.3 Modelling Issue Responsiveness 
 To investigate government responsiveness I employ the salience model of 
representation, which combines cross-sectional, time-series measures of issue salience 
and public expenditure to model dynamic representation. However, the availability of 
data affects how efficiently I am able to model issue responsiveness across space and 
time. I deal with a larger N than T sample (21 countries over six to eight years). This 
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33 General public service (1), defense and foreign policy (2), public order and safety (3), economic affairs 
(4), environmental issues (5), housing and community amenities (6), health care (7), culture, religion and 
recreation (8), education (9) and social problems (10).
means the focus lies on the cross-sectional units and not on dynamics. From a more 
theoretical perspective this can be a problem as responsiveness is best explored in a 
dynamic fashion over a longer time period, as I argued earlier. The emphasis of this 
thesis is the cross-sectional comparison, however. Only comparative research allows 
generalisations about the effect of political institutions and situations on the opinion-
policy relationship. This does not mean I ignore dynamics completely. 
	
 While the original model examines each country in the sample individually, I 
rely  on a pooled model as I deal with a significantly larger number of countries and I am 
interested in the similarities and differences of the moderators. I conduct two kinds of 
analyses. Firstly, I am interested in the overall responsiveness taking all issues together. 
In order to do this I work on a reshaped data set in long format (see Chapter 5.3.2 for a 
discussion about  the data structure and reshaping). Secondly, I go back to initial data set 
in wide format and look at the conditions of government responsiveness in particular 
issue domains. I expect change in salient opinion in the year t (ΔSt) to predict change in 
public spending in the year t+1 (∆Pt+1), when an individual institutional condition Zk 
applies. I run a random effects model using Stata’s xtreg command with the re option, 
where the random effects are specified as my countries. The expectations can be 
summarised as follows: 
 ∆Pjt+1 = αj + β1∆Sjt + β2Zk + β3∆SjtZk +Ɛj,   (1)
where αj and Ɛj represent the intercept  and the error term and Zk represents a distinct 
institutional feature that is either coded 1 or 0. I include an interaction between Zk and 
St as well as both constitutive terms. If policy responsiveness occurs under both distinct 
institutional features, β1 and β3 are positive and suggest  that an increase in spending 
from year t to t+1 is predicted by  an increase in opinion saliency in the year t given the 
institutional condition Zk. Many studies have explored the lag structure of government 
responsiveness and find that a lag of one year fits best (Soroka and Wlezien, 2010, 
Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008, Hobolt and Klemmemsen, 2005, Wlezien, 1995, Page 
and Shapiro, 1983). This is also in accordance with the theoretical assumptions about 
the relationship between public opinion and policy laid out in the same literature. 
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5.4 Policy Concerns and Public Expenditure 
 Before modelling the situational and institutional conditions of issue 
responsiveness, I present  some descriptive statistics. Table 9 exhibits public concerns 
and public expenditure pooled across all countries and years.34  The economy (51%) 
stands out as the most important policy  concern, followed by  social services  issues 
(46.8%) and law and order (25.3%). The domains with the highest percentage of 
spending are social services (37.5%), health care (14.5%) and education (12.3%). The 
three least mentioned policy  issues are the environment (6.3%), housing (7.1%) and 
education (9.1%). This partially coincides with public spending. Governments on 
average spend least on environmental issues (1.8%), housing (1.9%) and defence 
(3.1%).
Table 9: Policy Concerns and Public Expenditure in Percentages
Policy Concerns Public Expenditure
Defence 9.7 3.1
Law & Order 25.3 4.0
Economy 51.0 10.6
The Environment 6.3 1.8
Housing 7.1 1.9
Health Care 23.2 14.5
Education 9.1 12.3
Social Services 46.8 37.5
n (NxT) 170 170
Note: Policy concerns are the proportion of people stating that a policy issue is a most or second most 
important. Public expenditure is the percentage of the overall spending. 
 There is some cross-country variation, however. On average, the publics in 9 out 
of 21 countries (Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Poland and Sweden) are more concerned with social problems than the 
economy. The Spanish are most concerned with defence, while the British think law and 
order is the most important issue. In 7 out of 21 countries, housing (Austria, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Sweden) or the environment (France, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Britain) are the least important issues. Five publics 
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34 Note that I have averaged across country and year if data has been complete for both the MII and 
spending. There is complete data for 15 countries over 9 years. Six new democracies had some missing 
data for the 3 years before they entered the European Union. One country misses spending data for 2010. 
Thus I end up with an n of 170 (15*9+6*6-1).
are least concerned with defence (Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Slovakia) and two with education (Belgium and Italy). Consistently  across countries the 
largest spending domain is social problems, followed by health care and education. In a 
handful of countries the third highest amount of spending is invested on economic 
issues (Czech Republic, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Poland). On average, the least is 
spent on housing and the environment, with the exception of Ireland and Luxembourg, 
where defence spending stands out as the smallest spending category. More detailed 
information on policy concerns and public expenditure by country and function can be 
found in Tables B1 to B21 in Appendix B. 
 Although some of the policy concerns coincide with the proportion of spending, 
the tables presented above do not imply that there is a relationship between the MII and 
public spending per se. It is important to look at whether the MII and public spending 
are related and if thinking something is an issue predicts spending in a bivariate setup. 
In order to get an indication of the overall relationship, I begin by working on a 
reshaped data matrix in long format and explore the link between policy concerns and 
spending, taking all issues together. Reshaping the data from wide to long format 
increases the number of cases by  the eight policy domains with the trade-off of losing 
the specific issue domain information. I generally deal with a relatively small n (21 
countries over six to nine years). Stacking the data increases the explanatory power of 
my analysis and increases the number of observations for each country and year by  the 
eight policy  domains (21 countries times six to nine years times eight policy  domains). 
 As an initial test I check whether public expenditure and policy concerns 
correlate with each other. I report the Spearman Rank Order correlation. It suggests a 
moderate level of correspondence between spending and the MII (0.52), which is 
statistically  significant at the 0.01 level. Next, I am interested in whether the MII 
predicts spending in the same year. Figure 8 presents the relationship graphically.35 The 
plot indicates a positive relationship between expenditure and policy concerns. For one 
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35 Note, in order to ensure that my data are normally distributed, I took the log of my public opinion and 
spending data. Thus, the scale is expanded to negative and positive values. The clustering is due to the 
nature of the spending data. The largest percentages are by far expenditure on social issues and the 
economy, which is reflected in the two clusters at the top of the graph. The clustering only marginally 
affects the relationship. If I take out these domains, assuming that there is a not a lot of flexibility in 
spending in these areas, the relationship between spending and the MII is a little bit smaller at 0.42, but 
stays significant at the 0.01 level. 
unit change in the level of policy  concerns, public expenditure increases by 0.52 units. 
The relationship is statistically significant (Pearson’s p < 0.01). 
Figure 8: Overall Congruence between Public Spending and MII in year t
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
stri
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
AustriaAustria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
tri
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
stri
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
tri
Austria
i
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
BelgiumBelgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
BelgiumBelgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
elgiu
Belgium
l iBelgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgi m
Belgium
Belgium
BelgiumBelgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
BelgiumBelgiu
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belg um
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
l i
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
l i
l i
Belgium
elgium
l i
Belgium
l i
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
elgiu
e g u
CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ
CZCZ
Z
CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ
C
CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ CZ
CZ
CZ
CZ
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmarken ark
DenmarkDenmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
DenmarkDenmark
DenmarkDenmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
r
DenmarkDenmark
DenmarkDen ark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmarken k
rkDenmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
DenmarkDenmark
Denmarken ark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
DenmarkDenmark
Denmarkr
Denmark
Denm k
Denmark
Denmark
DenmarkDenmark
Denmarkr
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
en arken ark
DenmarkDenmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
rk
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
E tonia
Estoni
Estonia
Estoni
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
t i
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Estonia
Finland Finl nd
Finland
Finland
Finland
Finl ndFinland
Fi l d
Finland Finland
Finland
Fi l ndFinland
FinlandFinla d
Finl nd
Finland Finla d
Finland
FinlandFinland
Fi landFinland
Fi land
Finland Finla d
i l
FinlandFinland
FinlandFinland
l
Finland Finland
Finland
Finla dFinland
Finl ndF nland
a
Finland Fi l nd
FinlandFinland
i lFinland
Finl d
Fi land Finland
Fi land
Finland
Fi land
i l ndFinla d
Finland
Finland Finland
Finland
Fi land
Finland
Fi landFinland
an
Finland Fi la d
Finla d
Finland
Finland
Finlandi l
i l
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
France France
France
France
France
France
France
France F a ce
France
France
France
Fr nce
France
Fr nce
France F nc
France
r
France
Franc
France
France
Franc Fr nce
r
France
France
Fra ce
France
F ance
France F ance
Fra ce
France
rance
France
France
r
France Fra c
France
France
France
ra ce
France
Fr ce
France France
r c
France
France
Franc
F ce
France
r
Fr nce
France
ce
Germany
G r any
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germ y
Germany
G any
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
G rmany
Germany
Germany
Ger ny
Ger any
G rmany
Germany
Germ ny
G rmany
G r ny
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
r y
Germa y
Germany
Germany
Germ ny
Germany
Ge ny
G rman
r
G r any
Germany
Germa y
Germany
G rmany
Germany
G rmany
Germany
GermanyGermany
Germany
er any
Ger y
Germany
Germany
GermanyGermany
er a y
Ger a y
r y
Greece
Greece
Greec
Greece
Greece
Greece
Greece
Greece
Greec
Gr ce
Greece
Greece
Greece
Greece
Greece
Greece
Greece
re ce
Greece
re ce
Greece
Gre ce
Greece
Greece
Greece
Gr c
Greece
Greece
Greece
Gr ece
Greece
r
Greec
Gr c
Greece
Greec
Greece
Gr ce
Greec
Greece
Greece
Greece
Gre ce
Gre c
Greece
Gre c
Gr ece
Gre c
Greece
re c
Greece
Gr ce
Greece
re ce
Gr ce
Greec
Greece
Greece
G e ce
Greece
reec
Greece
ec
Greece
Greece
Greece
Greece
Greece
Gr ce
Hu gary
Hungary
Hunga y
H ngary
Hung ry
HungaryHungary
Hu gary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
HungaryHung ry
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
H ng ry
Hungary
H g ryHung ry
Hun ary
Hungary
Hungary
r
Hungary r
HungaryHungary
r
Hungary
Hungary
H ngary
Hungary
Hungary
HungaryHungary
H ngary
Hungary
Hu gary
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
HungaryHun ry
H ngary
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Irela d
Irela d
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Irel
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ir l
Ireland
l
Ireland
Irela d
Ireland
Ireland
I l
Irel d
Ir l
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ire
Irel nd
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ir la d
Ir l nd
Ireland
Ireland
I la d
Ireland
I land
l
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ir l
Ireland
l
Ireland
Ire
I l
Ireland
Ireland
Irel
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Irel nd
Irela d
I l nd
Ireland
I el d
Ir l nd
Ireland
Irel nd
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Italy
Italy
Italy
Italy
Italy
Italy
Italy
Italy
It ly
Ital
Italy
ItalyItaly
Italy
Italy
Italy
Italy
It ly
It ly
Italy
Italy
It ly
Italy
Italy
Italy
It ly
Italy
Italy
Italy
It ly
Italy
Italy
Italy
Italy
ItalyIt ly
It ly
Italy
Italy
Italy
Ital
Italy
ItalyItaly
Italy
Italy
Italy
It ly
It l
Italy
Italy
Italy
Italy
It ly
Italy
Italy
ItalyItaly
Italy
Italy
It ly
Italy
al
It ly
ItalyItaly
Ital
Italy
Italy
Luxe bourg
Luxembourg
Luxembou g
LuxembourgLuxembourg
Luxembo rLux mbo rg
L xe bou g
Luxembourg
Luxe bourg
Lux bourg
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
Lux bourLux mbourg
L x bourg
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
Lux mbou
Luxembourg
Lux bourg
Lux mbourLux mbou g
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
Luxe bourg
Lux bo
r
Luxembourg
Luxembourg x
Luxe bourg
L xe bourg
Lux mbourg
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
L x mb urgL x mbo rg
Lux mbourg
Luxembourg
x m r
e r
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
Luxe bourg L xe bou g
Lux mbourg
Lux mbour
Lux bourg
Luxe bourg
Luxembourg
L xembourg
Lux mbo g
L xembourg
Lux bourg
L x bourg
Luxembourg
Lux mbourg
Luxembo rgLuxembourg
x r
Luxembou g
Luxe bourg
L x bourg
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
L xembo rgLuxe bourg
u m r
Luxembourg
x r
Lux bourg
L x mbourg
Luxembourg
Luxe bourgLuxe bo rg
Lux bo rg
NL NL
NL
NL
NL
NN
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NLNL
NL
NL
L
L
NL
NL
N
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NLNL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
N
L
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
L
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
Poland
Pol nd
Poland
Poland
Poland
Pol nd
Poland
Poland
Poland
Poland
Poland
Poland
Poland
Poland
Pola d
Poland
Poland
Poland
Pola d
l
oland
Poland
Poland
Poland
l
Poland
P land
Pola d
Poland
ll
Poland
Poland
Poland
Pol d
Pol nd
Pol
P landPoland
l
Poland
Poland
Poland
Poland
Poland
nPoland
Pola d
Portugal
rtug l
Port al
Portugal
Port gal
Po tug lPortugal
Portugal
Port gal
Portugal
Portugal
Portugal Portuga
Portug lPortugal
Portugal
Port g l
ortug l
Portugal
PortugalPortuga
Portugalrt l
Portugal
Portugal
Portugal
Portugal
Portugal Portug l
PortugalPortugal
Port gal
Portugal
Portugal
Portugal
Por ugalPortugal
Po tugaPortug l
Port gal
P rtugal
Port l
t l
Portugal Portug l
rt lPortug l
Port l
P rtugal
Portug l
Portug l
Portug l ortugal
Portugal
Port gal
Portug l
rtug
Portugal
rt l
Portugal
Port gal
Portugal
Portug l
Portugal
Port gal
Port gal
Port g lPortug l
Port al
Slovakia
Slov kia
Slovakia
SlovakiaSlovakia
Slovaki
Slovakia
Slov kia
Slov ki Slovakia
Slov kia
SlovakiaSlova ia
Slovaki
Slovaki
Slov kia
Sl vakia
Slov kia
Sl vakia
Slovaki
Slovakia
Slovakia
Slovakia
Slovakia
Slovakia
Slovakia
Slovakia
Slovakia Slovakia
Slovakia
Slovakia
Slovakia
Slovakia
Slovaki
Slovakia
Slovaki S ovaki
Slovakia
Slovakia
Slovakia
Sl vakia
Slovakia
S v ki
SlovakiaSlovakia
Slovakia
Slovaki
Slovakia
Slovenia
Slove i
Slovenia
Sloveni
Slov nia
Slove iSlov ni
Slov ia
Slove ia l i
l veni
Slovenia
Sloveni
Slov il v i
Sl v ni
Slove ialove ia
Sl veni
Slovenia
Slove ia
Slo enSlov i
Sl v i
Slovenia Slov nia
venia
loveniaSlov ni
Slov niaSlov ia
Sloveni
Sl veniSlovenia
Sl veni
l veniaSlovenia
Slov il ve i
ov i
Sl ve ial i
Slov ni
SloveniaSlovenia
Slov niaS oveni
Spain
Spain
Spain
Spain Sp in
Sp inSp
Spain
Spain
Spain
Spai
Sp in Sp in
SpainSpain
Spain
pain
pain
Spai
Spain Spain
i
Spain
Spai
Spain
Spain
Spai
Spain Spain
Sp in
i
Spain
Spain
Spain
Spa
Sp i pain
pai
Sp in
Spain
Spain
Spain
Spain Spain
Sp in
Spain
Spain
Spain
i
Sp i
Spain Sp i
Sp in
Sp in
Spain
Spain
S i
Sp in
Sp in
Spain
Spain
Spain
p in
Spain
pain
Sp in
Spain
Sp in
Spai
i
Spai
Sweden
weden
Sweden
Swed n
Sweden
Swedweden
Sw den
Swed
Sw den
Swede
Swed n
Sweden
Sw den
d
Sw d n
Sw den
n
Sw en
Sweden
Swed nSweden
Sw d
Sw de
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
SwSweden
Swe
Swed n
Sw d n
Sweden
Sweden
eSwed
Sw en
Swede
Sweden
S eden
Swed n
Sw n
e
wede Sw n
Sw den
Sweden
Swed
Sw n
Swede
Swe n Swede
Sw de
Sweden
Swe e
Sw denw den
n
Swede Swede
Swede
Sweden
Sw d n
den
Sw den
B itain BritainBritain
BritainB it in
Bri inB t i
Britain
B itainit i
Britain
rit i
Br tain
Bri iitain
Britain
Brit inrit iBritain
Britain
Brit i
Brit inBrit in
Britain
BritainB ita nBritain
Britain
Brit in
Br t int i
i i
Br taiBrit inBritain
BritainBritai
BritainB itai
Britai
BritainBritain
Britain
ritaiBritain
Brit inBri in
Britain
B itai Brit n
Brit i
Britain
Br t in
BritainB it i
Britain
Britain
Brit in
Britain
Brit in
Britainrit in
rit i
Britain it i Brit in
B itain
Britai
Britainritain
Brit i
-2
0
2
4
-2 0 2 4 6
Policy Concerns
Public Spending Fitted values
 This pattern is reflected, but less pronounced, looking at the specific issue 
domains. The strongest correlation is between spending and policy concerns on 
economic issues (0.32), housing (0.29) and social problems (0.24), which are 
statistically  significant with a Pearson’s p < 0.01. The weakest correspondence is on 
health care (0.05) and educational issues (0.02). This is also mirrored in the bivariate 
predictions. Concerns about the economy (0.23), housing (0.14) and social problems 
(0.07) predict spending in these areas significantly. There seems to be only a very  small 
relationship  between spending and policy concerns on health care, education and 
environmental issues as the effect sizes of the coefficients are close to 0. 
 To recap, the above tests indicate the congruence of the expenditure and 
important issues, taking all domains together. I look at both spending and important 
issues at the same point in time. Dynamic representation focuses on change, however, or 
more specifically whether policy makers act as a consequence of changes in public 
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sentiment, which implies a sequence inherently structured in time (Stimson et al. 1995: 
543). As levels of preferences and spending correspond in the year t, I expect to find a 
relationship  between them in a dynamic setup as well. To examine the dynamic 
relationship  I repeat my test using change in MII in year t  and change in spending in the 
upcoming year t+1. Although it is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, the Spearman 
Rank Order correlation suggests a much weaker correspondence between opinion 
change measured in year t and expenditure change measured in year t+1 (0.08). This is 
deflating, because it indicates that there is no relationship between the change measures.
 A better way  to explore this would be to predict  change in spending in year t+1 
using change in policy concerns in a bivariate regression model. Indeed, the bivariate 
relationship  suggests that change in opinion predicts spending, even though the effect 
size is fairly small. One unit change in opinion in year t  leads to a 0.14 increase in 
spending in the next year. The results are statistically significant on the 0.01 level. 
These patterns do not  hold when looking at the specific policy domains. While 
coefficients indicate responsiveness on issues concerned with law and order, the 
environment, housing and education, they are negative on defence, the economy, health 
care and social problems. None of the results by policy domain is statistically 
significant.
5.5 Analysing the Conditions of Government Issue 
Responsiveness
 Next, I investigate the conditions of responsive government to the public’s issue 
preferences. The results are presented in two steps. I begin exploring the impact of time 
invariant political institutions on the opinion-policy  relationship, testing the institutional 
clarity  hypothesis. Secondly, I examine what impact the time varying  situations have on 
the issue responsiveness of government towards citizens’ policy  concerns, testing the 
situational clarity hypothesis. I follow the same procedure as for the bivariate results. 
First, I look at all issues taken together on a reshape data matrix in long format, then I 
examine how the relationship behaves in the specific issue domains. 
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5.5.1 The Impact of Institutional Clarity on Issue 
Responsiveness
 To recap, the institutional clarity hypothesis with regard to the issue 
responsiveness of government to public demands assumes that the more veto players are 
created by  fixed political institutions, the less clearly  responsibilities are allocated and 
the less successful government is in responding to issue preferences. In order to test this 
I rely on a set of sub-hypothesis, which I test using cross-sectional time-series methods 
with random effects.  The institutional hypotheses are tested in interaction terms.36 The 
data are reshaped in order to increase the number of cases and the explanatory power of 
the analysis. The impact of bicameralism, federalism, regime type and party system are 
reported in Table 12. The baseline models, which are reported in the first  row of the 
table labelled “Change in Opinion”, indicate the relationship between change in public 
opinion (year t) and public expenditure (year t+1) in unicameral, centralist, presidential 
and three-party systems. I deal with a very short time series of 6 to 9 data points, thus 
autocorrelation may be of no great concern (Birchfield and Crepaz 1998: 188; Stimson 
1985).37
 Hypothesis 1 states that a bicameral state-structure increases the number of veto 
players involved in decision making, leads to less clear allocation of responsibilities and 
depresses government responsiveness. Indeed this is what the results display. While 
responsiveness occurs under the condition of a unicameral state – spending increases by 
0.23 units following opinion in the previous year – bicameralism decreases 
responsiveness by -0.2 units. The effect of opinion on spending is significantly lower 
and falls towards no responsiveness (+0.03). Results are statistically  significant on the 
0.5 level. The results for federalism give a similar picture, however the effect size is a 
lot smaller. Federal countries have an increased number of veto players taking part in 
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36 I have to rely on a random effects model because fixed effects would drop at least the fixed institutional 
constitutive term as it cannot deal with time-invariant variables. The interactive term itself would still be 
included and it is interacted with the time-varying indicator of public opinion, the MII. The random 
effects are the countries. 
37 However, especially spending data is prone to be autocorrelated. When calculating first order 
autocorrelations of my dependent variable there seems to be some autocorrelation, however. By using 
change in spending and change in public opinion the data already correct for some of this. In addition, I 
run two variants of my models. Firstly, I introduce some more economic variables such as GDP and the 
inflation rate to correct for factual economic inconsistencies. Finally, I run an error correction model 
(ECM) where I introduce the lagged dependent variable to correct for autoregression. The results of the 
ECM are reported in footnotes in the respective section. 
decision making, hence responsibilities are less clearly  allocated and responsiveness is 
dampened. The results indicate that this is the case. The base model suggests that 
government in a unitary  state responds to the MII with an increase in spending (0.12) in 
the next year. The coefficient is significant with a Pearson’s p < 0.05. Under federal 
conditions, responsiveness decreases. The effect (-0.001) is marginal, however, and not 
statistically significant.
Table 10: The Impact of Institutional Clarity on Issue Responsiveness
Public Expenditure                        
(year t+1)
Change in Opinion 0.23*** 0.12** 0.2** 0.40***
(-0.07) (-0.05) (-0.08) (-0.13)
Change in Opinion*Bicameralism -0.20**
(-0.09)
Bicameralism -0.13
(-0.14)
Change in Opinion*Federalism -0.001
(-0.12)
Federalism -0.19
(-0.17)
Change in Opinion*Multipartyism -0.09
(-0.1)
Multipartyism -0.03
(-0.11)
Change in Opinion*Parliamentarianism -0.33**
(-0.14)
Parliamentarianism 0.07
(-0.2)
Constant -0.53*** -0.57*** -0.6*** -0.67***
(-0.11) (-0.08) (-0.09) (-0.18)
Observations 1,320 1,320 1,320 1,320
Number of Countries 21 21 21 21
Rho 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05
Standard error in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 This picture is similar for the impact of two-party versus multi-party  systems. 
While government in three-party-systems is responsive to the public’s issue demands 
and it increases spending by 0.20 (Pearson’s p < 0.05) units following salient opinion in 
the previous year, multi-partyism decreases responsiveness by -0.09 units. The 
interaction coefficient  does not reach statistical significance. The results support 
previous research on the effect of the party system, however, which suggests that here 
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are only marginal differences between few-party and multi-party  systems. The results 
for the effect of the regime type are also consistent with earlier findings. Presidential 
governments respond to citizens’ preferences in the upcoming fiscal year with a 
spending increase of 0.4 units (Pearson’s p < 0.01). Parliamentary  executives seem to be 
less responsive. Government responsiveness decreases by -0.33 units (Pearson’s p < 
0.05) if a parliamentary system is concerned.38
Figure 9: Marginal Effects of Change in Salient Opinion (year t) on Change in Spending (year t+1) 
under Institutional Conditions
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38 The controls included in the analysis, namely GDP per capita and inflation rate, did not alter the main 
results of the model. When I run an error correction model (ECM) including a lagged dependent variable 
to control for autoregression across time, the results do not hold. I get different results for the same 
indicators across the different specifications. While some results loose significance, but the directions of 
the effect stays the same, other coefficients also change direction. The direction of the effect of opinion as 
well as the interaction term stays the same for the regime type and structure of the legislature into uni- 
versus bicameral assemblies. Yet, the statistical significance vanished for the regime type. These results 
seem to be largely robust in a sense that the direction of the effect does not change. The significance does,  
however, which may be due to the limited number of cases in the analysis. For the conditional impact of 
federalism and the party system, the results also change direction. In unitary states governments respond 
to public opinion in the previous year, but the effect is insignificant. The sign of the interaction term 
reverses and suggests that federalism enhances government responsiveness, however. The statistical 
significance vanishes. Few-party systems show to have an insignificant negative effect on spending in the 
next year, while multipartyism has positive, yet insignificant, effect on government responsiveness. I 
conclude that the initial results reported are not not robust. 
 As an additional check for the significance of the interaction terms, I have 
plotted the marginal effects of change in salient opinion (year t) on public expenditure 
(year t+1) under my institutional conditions as Brambor et al. suggest (2006). However, 
I cannot rely on Stata’s grinter function here. Grinter is suitable to plot the marginal 
effects for interaction with continuous variables, my interactions are between an 
institutional dummy variable and opinion change. Thus, I cannot calculate any 
meaningful averages that allow me to plot lines. Instead I create marginal effects using 
whisker’s plots presented in Figure 9. All graphs suggest that  where there is extreme 
institutional clarity, i.e. the number of institutional veto players is low, salient opinion 
has a significant impact on public spending in the upcoming year. This is shown by the 
left hand side of the graphs, the dot is higher on y-axis, which suggests that the effect is 
stronger. Where there is less institutional clarity and the number of veto players is 
higher, the effect is lower. This is displayed by the situation on the right hand side of 
each graph. The conditional impact of federalism versus unitary states seems to be 
special. The effect seems to be very similar, however, the variation and error for unitary 
states is much larger than for federal states, which might be related to a limited variation 
in the sample. 
Table 11: Issue Responsiveness under the Conditions of Time-Invariant Institutions 
Time-Invariant Institutions
Bicameralism Federalism 3+ Party System Parliamentarianism
Defence o o - -
Law & Order - - - -
Economy o o o o
Environment - + - -
Housing - + + -
Heath Care - - + -
Education - - - -
Social Problems o o + o
Note, A negative sign means responsiveness is decreased, a positive sign indicates responsiveness is 
enhanced, o means that institutions have no conditioning effect on responsiveness in the baseline model 
or the interaction term
 When I look at the specific issue domains the results are not consistent across 
policy domains. I present an overview in Table 11. It  displays the effect of time-
invariant institutions that lead to an increased number of veto players. Once again, two 
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issue domains display  consistent results that point in the hypothesised direction. 
Government responsiveness to preferences on education and law and order is decreased 
by bicameralism, federalism, multiparty  systems and parliamentarianism. The veto 
player theory also seems to apply fairly  well to the domains of health care and 
environment. While bicameral and federal structures, as well as parliamentarianism, 
seem to decrease responsiveness towards health care preferences, multipartyism seems 
to enhance responsiveness in this issue domain. A similar pattern is displayed looking at 
environmental issues. The results indicate that  bicameralism, multipartyism and 
parliamentarianism decrease responsiveness towards environmental preferences, while 
federalism appears to enhance the responsiveness of government towards environmental 
preferences. With regard to defence issues, multiparty  systems and parliamentarianism 
seem to decrease responsiveness, which is coherent with the expectations. Government 
does not respond to defence preferences in bicameral or federal states. The results 
indicate that no responsiveness towards preferences on social problems occurs under 
bicameral, federal and parliamentary conditions, whereas government responsiveness 
seems to be enhanced under multiparty conditions. Economic issues seem to be special. 
Government does not seem to respond to these issues at all, whatever institutional 
design applies. When correcting for autoregression the results do not hold. 
5.5.2 The Impact of Situational Clarity on Issue 
Responsiveness
 I start exploring the situational clarity hypotheses, testing four time-varying 
situations (effective numbers of parliamentary  parties and government parties, coalition 
versus single party  government, as well as minimum-winning versus over-/undersized 
governments) and their impact on the opinion-policy  relationship. To recap, the 
situational clarity hypothesis assumes that the more veto players are created by time 
varying political situations, the less clearly responsibilities are allocated and the less 
successful government is in responding to issue preferences. I test the impact of 
situations on responsiveness using cross-sectional time-series methods with random 
effects. The situational hypotheses are tested in interaction terms. Data are reshaped in 
order to increase the number of cases and the explanatory power of the analysis.
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 The indicators for the effective number of parliamentary and governmental 
parties are continuous variables. Thus, the interaction coefficient is the important one to 
look at. It indicates the impact of public opinion under the condition of a large number 
of parties in the legislature or executive. Whether government is a coalition or single 
party  government, as well as whether it is minimum-winning or over-/undersized one, is 
captured by  dummy variables. The baseline model labelled “change in opinion” 
assumes the political situations of single party and minimum-winning governments, the 
interactive terms describe a situation of coalition and over-/undersized governments. 
Table 12: The Impact of Situational Clarity on Issue Responsiveness
Public Expenditure                  
(year t+1)
Change in Opinion 0.35** 0.25** 0.26** 0.18***
(-0.14) (-0.1) (-0.11) (-0.06)
Change in Opinion*ENPP -0.06*
(-0.04)
ENPP -0.01
(-0.04)
Change in Opinion*ENPG -0.06
(-0.04)
ENPG -0.04
(-0.04)
Change in Opinion*Coalition -0.17
(-0.12)
Coalition 0.21
(-0.14)
Change in Opinion*Over-/Undersized Government -0.19**
(-0.1)
Over-/Undersized Government -0.17**
(-0.08)
Constant -0.58*** -0.51*** -0.79*** -0.53***
(-0.17) (-0.12) (-0.13) (-0.07)
Observations 1,320 1,320 1,320 1,320
Number of Countries 21 21 21 21
Rho 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
Standard error in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 The results indicate that the higher the effective number of parliamentary parties 
is, the less responsive government is to salient opinion in the previous year. A higher 
number of effective parliamentary parties decreases responsiveness by  -0.06 units. The 
coefficient is approaching statistical significance. A similar image is drawn for the 
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number of government parties. The higher the number of government parties is, the less 
responsive government is towards salient  opinion. A higher number of government 
parties decreases responsiveness by -0.06 units. Looking at the time varying dummy 
variables, a clearer pattern is shown for whether a government is a coalition or single-
party  government and a minimum-winning coalition or over-/undersized government. 
Single-party governments seem to respond to salient opinion.  Government spending 
increases by 0.26 units in response to salient opinion in the previous year. The 
relationship  is significant at the 0.05 level. Coalition government is less responsive to 
salient opinion (0.09). The coefficient is not quite significant, however. With regard to 
minimum-winning government versus over-/undersized executives, I find a similar 
pattern. Minimum-winning government responds to salient opinion with an increase in 
spending in the following year by 0.18 units (Pearson’s p < 0.01). Over- and undersized 
governments do not respond to salient public opinion. The baseline coefficient 
decreases by -0.19 units under the condition of an over- or undersized government. 
Hence, the relationship reverses and turns weakly negative (-0.01; Pearson’s p < 0.05).39
 When I plot the marginal effects of change in salient  opinion on spending in the 
following year under the conditions of political situations as Brambor et al. (2006) 
suggest, I find support at least for one part of the veto player theory. Figure 10 displays 
the graphs created with Stata’s grinter function for the continuous moderators. For 
emphasis, the graphs indicates the conditional impact of policy  concerns on spending 
given a certain number of situational veto players. It indicates where the significant 
effect of the interaction terms comes from. Grinter suggests that whenever there is 
extreme situational clarity, the impact of policy  concerns on public spending matters 
most. This is true for low numbers of effective parliamentary parties as well as for low 
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39 The controls included in the analysis, namely GDP per capita and inflation rate, did not alter the main 
results of the model. When I run an error correction model (ECM) including a lagged dependent variable 
to control for autoregression across time, the results do not hold. I get different results for the same 
situational indicators across the specifications. The results I get are even less consistent than for 
institutional clarity.  Only for minimum-winning governments the direction of the effects stays the same, 
but the results loose significance. The ECM model does not change the direction of the effect in the 
baseline coefficient or the interaction effect. For the effective number of parties in the legislature and 
government the interaction effect changes the sign. This suggest that more veto players lead to increased 
responsiveness, and the significance of the effects vanishes completely. For the dichotomous moderator 
single party versus coalition governments, the ECM model shows the opposite effect of the baseline and 
interaction. Change in opinion has no influence on spending in the next year under single party 
governments - this is suggested by the negative baseline coefficient. The interaction term is positive and 
suggests that in coalition ruled countries, salient opinion indeed has an impact on spending in the 
upcoming year. However, none of these effects reaches the conventional level of statistical significance.  
The results are not robust when correcting for autocorrelation in the dependent variable. 
numbers of governmental parties. Both dashed lines are above zero where few veto 
players are involved in decision making and situational clarity is increased. The image 
is less clear for an increased number of veto players and decreased situational clarity, 
however. The interactive terms are not significant for the cases where a higher number 
of situational veto players is involved in the decision-making process. As rule of thumb 
the graphs show that  the conditional impact of small numbers of situational veto 
players, those below the mean, drives significance.
Figure 10: Marginal Effects of Change in Salient Opinion (year t) on Change in Spending (year t+1) 
under Situational Conditions (continuous moderators)
 When I plot the marginal effects of change in salient  opinion on spending in the 
following year under the conditions of political situations as Brambor et al. (2006) 
suggest, I find support at least for one part of the veto player theory. Figure 9 displays 
the graphs created ith Stata’s grinter function. 
Figure 9: Marginal Effects of Change in Salient Opinion (year t) on Spending (year t+1) under 
Situational Conditions
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
M
ar
gin
al 
Ef
fe
ct 
of
 C
ha
ng
e 
in 
Sa
lie
nt
 O
pin
ion
(y
ea
r t
) o
n 
Ch
an
ge
 in
 S
pe
nd
ing
 (y
ea
r t
+1
)
2 4 6 8
Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
0 2 4 6 8
Number of Government Parties
-2
-1
0
1
2
M
ar
gin
al 
Ef
fe
ct 
of
 C
ha
ng
e 
in 
Sa
lie
nt
 O
pin
ion
(y
ea
r t
) o
n 
Ch
an
ge
 in
 S
pe
nd
ing
 (y
ea
r t
+1
)
10
Coalition
Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
0 1
Minimum Winning Coaltion
Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
Note: The graphs are created with Stata’s grinter function.
 For emphasis, the graph indicates the conditional impact of policy concerns on 
spending given a certain number of situational veto players. It indicates where the 
significant effect of the interaction terms comes from. Grinter suggests that whenever 
there is extreme situational clarity, the impact  of policy concerns on public spending 
matters most. This is true for low numbers of effective parliamentary parties, for low 
numbers of governmental parties and for minimum-winning coalitions. Both dashed 
lines are above zero where few veto players are involved in decision making and 
situational clarity is increased. The image is less clear for an increased number of veto 
players and decreased situational clarity, however. The interactive terms are not 
significant for the cases where a higher number of situational veto players is involved in 
the decision-making process. Further, the interaction for single party  versus coalition 
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Note: The graphs are created with Stata’s grinter function.
 In order to plot the marginal effects of change in salient  opinion (year t) on 
change in spending (year t+1) for my dichotomous moderators, I have to rely on a 
different type of visualisation. I have created whisker’s charts that show the marginal 
effects when the treatment is present - the dummy variable equals 1 - as well as when 
the treatment is not present - the dummy variable equals 0. 
Figure 11: Marginal Effects of  Change in Salient Opinion (year t) on Change in Spending (year t+1) 
under Situational Conditions (dichotomous moderators)
!
!"
!#$"
!#%"
!#&"
!#'"
!#("
Single Party 
Government 
Coalition Government  
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ffe
ct
 o
f C
ha
ng
e 
in
 O
pi
ni
on
 (y
ea
r 
t) 
on
 C
ha
ng
e 
in
 S
pe
nd
in
g 
(y
ea
r t
+1
) 
)!#$"
!"
!#$"
!#%"
!#&"
!#'"
!#("
Minimum Winning 
Government  
Over-/Undersized 
Government 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ffe
ct
 o
f C
ha
ng
e 
in
 O
pi
ni
on
 (y
ea
r 
t) 
on
 C
ha
ng
e 
in
 S
pe
nd
in
g 
(y
ea
r t
+1
) 
 
175
 Figure 11 displays the effects for my two government characteristics: coalition 
versus single party governments as well as minimum winning versus over-/undersized 
governments. The graphs show a similar image. The effect of salient opinion on change 
in government spending is higher when there is more situational clarity (single party 
government as well as minimum winning government). The effect is smaller for an 
increased number of veto players and less situational clarity (coalition government as 
well as over-/undersized government).
 The picture is largely not consistent looking at the conditions of responsiveness 
by issue domain. Responsiveness, I have argued and shown, depends on the issue 
domain regarded. Indeed, this is mirrored in the analysis of the conditions of 
responsiveness as well. Here I investigate the time-variant political situations and how 
they  affect the representation of salient opinion. The n for the individual issue domains 
is admittedly small (21*6 (9)). The coefficients do not reach statistical significance, yet 
indicate whether or responsiveness in terms of budget increase in the issue domain 
occurs.
Table 13: Issue Responsiveness under the Conditions of Time-Variant Situations 
Time-Variant Situations
High ENPP High ENPG Coalition
Over-/
Undersized 
Government
Defence - o - o
Law & Order - + - -
Economy - o - o
Environment - - - -
Housing o - - -
Heath Care - o + -
Education - - - -
Social Problems o o o +
Note: A negative sign means responsiveness is decreased, a positive sign indicates responsiveness is 
enhanced, o means that institutions have no conditioning effect on responsiveness in the baseline model 
or the interaction term
  Table 13 summarises the results of the statistical analysis. It displays the affect  
of a high number of parliamentary parties and government parties, coalitions and over-/
undersized governments on responsiveness by  policy domain. When the table indicates 
no responsiveness, the baseline model suggests that  no responsiveness occurs, nor does 
responsiveness occur when the treatment is given (interaction). Decreased 
responsiveness means that responsiveness occurs in the baseline model, but introducing 
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the context effect captured by the interaction decreases responsiveness. Enhanced 
responsiveness means that either the baseline model suggests that budget 
responsiveness and the introduced treatment in the interaction had a positive effect on 
this, or that the baseline model suggested no responsiveness, but that the interaction 
term reversed the sign in front of the coefficient, so that responsiveness occurs. The 
results are inconsistent. In two issue domains, the effect of time-variant situations works 
consistently in the expected direction. Responsiveness to environmental issue 
preferences and salient opinion on education decreases the more veto players enter the 
political decision-making arena. That is the case in countries with a high number of 
parliamentary and government parties, coalitions and over- and undersized 
governments. This coincides with the findings in the first empirical chapter. Education 
and environmental issue have been shown to be domains where spending preferences 
and salient opinion are related. Veto player theory  only gives clear results for some 
institutions looking at issue preferences on law and order and housing. While 
government responsiveness towards issues of public law and order is decreased by a 
higher number of parliamentary parties, coalition government and surplus coalitions or 
minority government, the results indicate that a higher number of government parties 
enhances responsiveness to these issues. Government responsiveness to salient opinion 
on housing is decreased when there are a larger number of parties in government, a 
coalition is formed or an over-/undersized government is in power. There appears to be 
no responsiveness towards these issue preferences in countries with a large number of 
parliamentary  parties. Defence and the economy show similar but even less clear 
patterns. The results indicate that a high number of parliamentary parties and coalition 
governments decrease responsiveness in these areas. Governments in countries with a 
larger number of parties in government and over- or undersized governments show no 
responsiveness to citizens’ defence and economic preferences, however. Health care 
gives an unclear picture. A higher number of parliamentary parties and over-/undersized 
governments lead to decreased responsiveness, as expected. Higher numbers of 
government parties indicate that no government responsiveness occurs. Coalition 
government enhances the responsiveness towards health care preferences. The least 
promising results are displayed for social problems. While the results indicate that no 
responsiveness occurs in situations where the number of veto players is high, surplus 
coalitions and minority governments seem to enhance the responsiveness of government 
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towards preferences on social issues. When correcting for autoregression in the ECM 
model specifications, the results do not hold. 
5.6 Conclusion
 This chapter examines the conditions of issue responsiveness employing a 
salience model of political representation. I have demonstrated in Chapter 4 that salient 
opinion can serve as an indicator for public preferences, but that we need to be wary 
about the issue domain regarded. Chapter 4 shows that the MIP performs well, taking all 
issues together, and it seems to be a good indicator for spending, looking at  specific 
issues. The survey environment on spending preferences is very thin in the European 
context and so I need to rely on salient opinion as an alternative measure of public 
policy preferences. I focus on the comparison to study context, but not so much on the 
time-series component in Chapter 5. Only through a comparison across countries am I 
able to draw more general conclusions about how context affects the opinion-policy 
relationship. I rely on the veto player theory linked with the clarity of responsibility 
argument. 
 My findings can be summarised as follows: Taking all issue domains together, I 
find that budgets respond to what people think is an important issue concerning their 
country  today. This relationship  is equally moderated by situational and institutional 
veto players in the expected direction, i.e. the more veto players are involved, the less 
clearly  the responsibilities are allocated and the less successful government is in 
responding to people’s issue demands. Both fixed and time-varying veto players affect 
short-term policy responsiveness. An increased number of situational veto players 
(number of parties in parliament and government, coalition and over- as well as 
undersized government) seem to decrease government’s ability to respond to salient 
opinion. This is also indicated in the results for institutional veto players, where extreme 
clarity  – a low number of institutional veto players– leads to increased responsiveness. 
Unfortunately, the results do not consistently  hold, when I run an ECM  model with a 
lagged dependent variable to correct for autoregression. 
 Looking at the specific policy domains, I observe variation and do not find a 
clear picture of how situational and institutional veto players affect the responsiveness 
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of governments. While education and law and order stand out  as those domains where I 
find some support for the veto player theory – the coefficients point in the expected 
direction, but are not statistically  significant – the other areas give an inconsistent 
picture of how context affects the opinion-policy relationship in these domains. Some 
areas display at least some consistent results, while in other domains no responsiveness 
at all is observed. These are the broader categories, the economy and social problems, 
which may incorporate many answers that could not be included in a more specific 
code. The data do not allow this to be tracked, however. Once again the results suggest 
that issue domains matter for the opinion-policy relationship. The inconsistent results 
may be due to the data employed. Although my data are strong on the cross-sectional 
side, the time-series component is limited to a few years. There is more leeway to test 
this new theory of institutions with regard to political representation on superior data. 
 While issue salience seemed to perform well in the measurement cross-
validation (Chapter 4), it may not be the best way  to test the responsiveness of 
government to issue preferences after all. However, it is important to investigate 
alternative models of responsiveness. The thermostatic model relies heavily  on a thick 
data environment, which in most countries does not exist. Outside the US, Canadian and 
British context, we do not have such data and we need to develop alternative measures 
and models to test how public opinion and public policy are related.
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Appendix C
Table C1: Policy Concerns and Spending in Austria
Policy Concerns Expenditure
Defence 8.7 1.7
Law & Order 21.8 2.9
Economy 55.6 10.8
Environment 7.8 1.0
Housing 4.6 1.3
Health Care 15.0 15.1
Education 10.0 10.7
Social Problems 49.0 40.9
Note: Policy concerns are the proportion of people stating that a policy issue is the most or the second-
most important. Public expenditure is the percentage of overall spending. 
Table C2: Policy Concerns and Spending in Belgium
Policy Concerns Expenditure
Defence 7.8 2.1
Law & Order 30.0 3.4
Economy 55.0 10.4
Environment 7.7 1.3
Housing 7.8 0.7
Health Care 5.8 14.2
Education 4.9 11.8
Social Problems 48.9 35.7
Note: Policy concerns are the proportion of people stating that a policy issue is the most or the second-
most important. Public expenditure is the percentage of overall spending.
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Table C3: Policy Concerns and Spending in Czech Republic
Policy Concerns Expenditure
Defence 4.1 2.6
Law & Order 29.3 4.8
Economy 54.5 16.0
Environment 6.2 2.2
Housing 9.7 2.6
Health Care 39.0 17.0
Education 5.5 11.0
Social Problems 41.2 30.4
Note: Policy concerns are the proportion of people stating that a policy issue is the most or the second-
most important. Public expenditure is the percentage of overall spending.
Table C4: Policy Concerns and Spending in Denmark
Policy Concerns Expenditure
Defence 18.1 2.9
Law & Order 27.5 1.9
Economy 28.9 5.7
Environment 13.8 1.0
Housing 4.8 1.0
Health Care 27.5 14.0
Education 12.7 13.8
Social Problems 36.7 43.5
Note: Policy concerns are the proportion of people stating that a policy issue is the most or the second-
most important. Public expenditure is the percentage of overall spending.
Table C5: Policy Concerns and Spending in Estonia
Policy Concerns Expenditure
Defence 5.4 6.1
Law & Order 31.6 8.7
Economy 61.7 17.3
Environment 4.8 3.6
Housing 3.1 1.4
Health Care 22.0 18.1
Education 9.3 24.2
Social Problems 37.6 44.4
Note: Policy concerns are the proportion of people stating that a policy issue is the most or the second-
most important. Public expenditure is the percentage of overall spending.
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Table C6: Policy Concerns and Spending in Finland
Policy Concerns Expenditure
Defence 3.9 2.9
Law & Order 17.6 2.7
Economy 37.4 9.3
Environment 8.2 0.6
Housing 3.2 0.7
Health Care 36.8 13.6
Education 3.6 12.2
Social Problems 55.6 42.4
Note: Policy concerns are the proportion of people stating that a policy issue is the most or the second-
most important. Public expenditure is the percentage of overall spending.
Table C7: Policy Concerns and Spending in France
Policy Concerns Expenditure
Defence 8.5 3.5
Law & Order 27.9 3.0
Economy 48.3 6.3
Environment 8.3 1.8
Housing 9.5 3.5
Health Care 10.6 14.3
Education 9.3 10.8
Social Problems 58.5 41.1
Note: Policy concerns are the proportion of people stating that a policy issue is the most or the second-
most important. Public expenditure is the percentage of overall spending.
Table C8: Policy Concerns and Spending in Germany
Policy Concerns Expenditure
Defence 7.1 2.2
Law & Order 17.4 3.4
Economy 56.6 8.2
Environment 3.7 1.3
Housing 1.1 2.0
Health Care 18.9 14.7
Education 13.7 8.9
Social Problems 63.0 44.5
Note: Policy concerns are the proportion of people stating that a policy issue is the most or the second-
most important. Public expenditure is the percentage of overall spending.
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Table C9: Policy Concerns and Spending in Greece
Policy Concerns Expenditure
Defence 6.2 6.4
Law & Order 22.8 3.3
Economy 63.6 10.9
Environment 3.2 1.2
Housing 0.7 0.8
Health Care 15.8 13.4
Education 10.4 8.1
Social Problems 58.7 34.0
Note: Policy concerns are the proportion of people stating that a policy issue is the most or the second-
most important. Public expenditure is the percentage of overall spending.
Table C10: Policy Concerns and Spending in Hungary
Policy Concerns Expenditure
Defence 2.1 2.3
Law & Order 19.1 4.0
Economy 68.3 11.8
Environment 4.8 1.4
Housing 5.1 1.8
Health Care 27.8 10.3
Education 5.5 11.0
Social Problems 53.4 35.2
Note: Policy concerns are the proportion of people stating that a policy issue is the most or the second-
most important. Public expenditure is the percentage of overall spending.
Table C11: Policy Concerns and Spending in Ireland
Policy Concerns Expenditure
Defence 4.6 1.3
Law & Order 44.6 4.2
Economy 47.2 15.3
Environment 4.8 2.6
Housing 12.5 4.6
Health Care 42.2 18.7
Education 5.8 12.9
Social Problems 28.2 30.3
Note: Policy concerns are the proportion of people stating that a policy issue is the most or the second-
most important. Public expenditure is the percentage of overall spending.
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Table C12: Policy Concerns and Spending in Italy
Policy Concerns Expenditure
Defence 12.4 2.7
Law & Order 27.0 4.0
Economy 64.4 8.4
Environment 4.3 1.8
Housing 3.4 1.4
Health Care 9.1 14.3
Education 4.1 9.4
Social Problems 40.9 38.2
Note: Policy concerns are the proportion of people stating that a policy issue is the most or the second-
most important. Public expenditure is the percentage of overall spending.
Table C13: Policy Concerns and Spending in Luxembourg
Policy Concerns Expenditure
Defence 7.0 0.7
Law & Order 21.2 2.4
Economy 44.1 11.0
Environment 7.8 2.7
Housing 21.3 1.8
Health Care 8.9 11.9
Education 21.3 11.6
Social Problems 48.5 42.4
Note: Policy concerns are the proportion of people stating that a policy issue is the most or the second-
most important. Public expenditure is the percentage of overall spending.
Table C14: Policy Concerns and Spending in Netherlands
Policy Concerns Expenditure
Defence 16.4 3.1
Law & Order 40.2 4.2
Economy 45.0 11.3
Environment 7.2 3.6
Housing 5.2 1.3
Health Care 34.1 14.3
Education 14.7 11.8
Social Problems 24.8 33.9
Note: Policy concerns are the proportion of people stating that a policy issue is the most or the second-
most important. Public expenditure is the percentage of overall spending.
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Table C15: Policy Concerns and Spending in Poland 
Policy Concerns Expenditure
Defence 3.9 2.8
Law & Order 17.6 4.3
Economy 46.6 11.0
Environment 2.3 1.5
Housing 5.5 2.8
Health Care 38.6 11.0
Education 3.4 13.2
Social Problems 55.7 37.5
Note: Policy concerns are the proportion of people stating that a policy issue is the most or the second-
most important. Public expenditure is the percentage of overall spending.
Table C16: Policy Concerns and Spending in Portugal
Policy Concerns Expenditure
Defence 4.0 3.0
Law & Order 19.5 4.4
Economy 65.0 9.4
Environment 1.3 1.4
Housing 2.9 1.5
Health Care 21.1 15.0
Education 6.2 14.2
Social Problems 57.8 34.2
Note: Policy concerns are the proportion of people stating that a policy issue is the most or the second-
most important. Public expenditure is the percentage of overall spending.
Table C17: Policy Concerns and Spending in Slovakia
Policy Concerns Expenditure
Defence 5.6 4.0
Law & Order 25.8 5.8
Economy 61.9 11.4
Environment 5.7 1.9
Housing 10.2 2.1
Health Care 27.9 17.0
Education 8.1 10.6
Social Problems 57.3 31.5
Note: Policy concerns are the proportion of people stating that a policy issue is the most or the second-
most important. Public expenditure is the percentage of overall spending.
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Table C18: Policy Concerns and Spending in Slovenia
Policy Concerns Expenditure
Defence 6.2 3.2
Law & Order 12.8 3.6
Economy 66.7 9.9
Environment 5.2 1.8
Housing 9.0 1.5
Health Care 16.6 14.0
Education 7.2 13.9
Social Problems 47.9 36.7
Note: Policy concerns are the proportion of people stating that a policy issue is the most or the second-
most important. Public expenditure is the percentage of the overall spending.
Table C19: Policy Concerns and Spending in Spain
Policy Concerns Expenditure
Defence 42.0 2.6
Law & Order 14.6 4.8
Economy 37.6 12.3
Environment 2.1 2.3
Housing 14.8 2.5
Health Care 3.9 14.3
Education 3.4 11.1
Social Problems 41.5 34.1
Note: Policy concerns are the proportion of people stating that a policy issue is the most or the second-
most important. Public expenditure is the percentage of overall spending.
Table C20: Policy Concerns and Spending in Sweden
Policy Concerns Expenditure
Defence 6.3 3.2
Law & Order 23.0 2.6
Economy 33.8 8.0
Environment 15.6 0.7
Housing 5.8 1.5
Health Care 39.9 12.8
Education 20.2 13.1
Social Problems 53.4 42.0
Note: Policy concerns are the proportion of people stating that a policy issue is the most or the second-
most important. Public expenditure is the percentage of overall spending.
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Table C21: Policy Concerns and Spending in Britain
Policy Concerns Expenditure
Defence 23.5 5.6
Law & Order 40.8 5.7
Economy 29.6 7.2
Environment 7.0 1.9
Housing 9.0 2.4
Health Care 24.7 15.8
Education 11.0 13.8
Social Problems 24.0 35.6
Note: Policy concerns are the proportion of people stating that a policy issue is the most or the second-
most important. Public expenditure is the percentage of overall spending.
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VI. The Conditions of Ideological Congruence
 Previous chapters have focused on the issue responsiveness of government 
towards citizens’ preferences. In the review of the literature I argue that issue 
responsiveness is the best approach to test the quality of effective political 
representation and its contextual effects. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 focus on investigating 
the conditions of issue responsiveness on the basis of veto player theory linked to the 
clarity  of responsibility  arguments. The analyses suggest that although using salient 
opinion appears to be a relatively good alternative to using spending preferences 
(Chapter 4), modelling issue responsiveness and its conditions is more complex. The 
results from Chapter 5 lend some confidence to one end of the veto player theory, in that 
the fewer institutional and situational veto players are created, the more responsive 
government is towards the public’s policy concerns. The impact of many situational and 
institutional veto players is less clear, because the results do not lend much confidence 
in terms of statistical significance. They do indicate, however, that the veto player 
theory  largely  applies. Whether opinion representation in terms of a budget increase 
occurs seems to depend heavily  on the issue domain regarded. This coincides with the 
findings from the first empirical chapter, where redistributive issues seemed to perform 
well in comparison to other issues such as defence. This is what the individual level 
analysis in Chapter 4 suggests. The aggregate analysis indicates that salient opinion also 
performs quite well in predicting actual spending in a bivariate setup, but once again it 
also depends on the issue domain regarded. Whenever people think an issue is 
important, they actually get more spending on the issue domain in the following year.
 In this chapter I move on to investigating the positional policy  congruence of the 
public’s ideological beliefs with government’s stance on the left-right continuum. 
Positional policy congruence (Jones and Baumgartner, 2004: 2) appears to be the 
dominant approach for examining the congruence of citizens and governments. Let me 
point to two important facts here. Firstly, I understand ideology approaches as a way of 
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testing effective policy representation as pointed out in the review of literature.  and not 
just as agendas setting. Secondly, ideology methods do not precisely examine the 
responsiveness of governments to their citizens in terms of the left-right position, but 
simply  the congruence of those at the same point in time. For responsiveness to occur, a 
reaction to opinion expression at a different point in time is required. Responses occur 
after opinion has been expressed. Ideally, we need continuous measures of citizens’ and 
government ideology over time so that we can explore whether governments shift 
towards citizens’ ideology in the following year(s). Although we have got over-time 
measures of public opinion on ideology over time, we lack continuous (annual) 
measures of parties and government’s stance on the ideological continuum. Such data 
are to date not available. I will get  back to this thought in more detail later in this 
chapter, when I elaborate on the models and measures of ideological congruence. 
 Here, I am interested in the circumstances under which congruence between the 
mean citizen’s position and governments’ position on the left-right continuum occurs. In 
addition, I ask whether the same institutions and situations have an impact on the 
opinion-policy  relationship  as for effective issue correspondence. After all, both kinds 
of political representation look at the relationship between public opinion and 
government outputs, yet rely on different measures and concepts of preferences and 
outputs. 
 I expect to find different circumstances to condition ideological representation 
and issue responsiveness. Issue priorities are “at heart, a forecast, and it seems 
reasonable to expect that these forecasts are established on a retrospective 
basis” (Enelow and Hinich, 1982: 493). They are, thus, more likely to be effected by 
short- and mid-term events than by  long-standing institutions. By  contrast, ideology is a 
collection of core-issue beliefs making up an ideological “super-issue” (Pierce, 1999: 
34). Ideology is something that is established and long-standing. “[I]deology, as the 
more general measure of people’s left-right tendencies, is more likely to miss reactions 
to a particular issue [...] one can, if necessary, use general or omnibus ideology 
measures to capture left-right tendencies” (Zaller, 1992: 27). It is also expected to be 
less affected by  short- and mid-term events, but rather affected by long-established and 
fixed factors such as political institutions. This is what I intend to show here by 
investigating the impact of (fixed) institutional clarity  and (time-varying) situational 
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clarity  on the linkage between ideological beliefs and governments’ position on the left-
right continuum.
 Indeed, it seems this is a step backwards from dynamic to static representation. 
There is no model that tracks the representation of ideology in government in a dynamic 
way – based on whether change in ideological preferences is mirrored in change in 
government ideology in the following year. This is due to a lack of data for the 
ideological positioning of government. While there are various ways to indicate 
government ideology, the available data usually  capture party/government ideology as a 
snapshot in time through expert judgements or collect it  from manifesto data or election 
surveys. This means there are large gaps between data points, which makes it hard to 
model representation dynamically. On the other hand looking at positional policy 
congruence and how it is affected by context enables me to compare the conditions of 
political representation of issues and ideology. While issue representation is volatile and 
subject to change as a result of to short- and long-term events, I argue that the 
ideological representation of the mean citizen is only  affected by  time-invariant 
institutions. I test this hypothesis here. This chapter is structured as follows. 
 I discuss the notion of positional policy congruence first (Chapter 6.1). I then 
present the citizens’ perceptions model of positional policy  congruence, also discussing 
alternative models of ideological representation (Chapter 6.2). My hypotheses are 
introduced in Chapter 6.3, where, similar to Chapter 5, I distinguish between the impact 
of institutional and situational clarity  on ideological congruence of government and the 
mean citizen. This includes a recap of the veto player theory  and clarity  of responsibility 
hypothesis. Next, I discuss my data and methodology in more detail (Chapter 6.4). I 
present some descriptive results of the mean citizens’ position, government ideology 
and the absolute distances between them in Chapter 6.5. This is followed by an analysis 
of the conditions of positional policy  congruence in Chapter 6.6, which looks at 
institutions (6.6.1) and situations (6.6.2) separately. I conclude and discuss my findings 
in section 6.7.
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6.1 The Citizens’ Perceptions Model of Positional Policy 
Congruence
 An extensive body  of literature on positional policy congruence suggests that  
governments’ ideology responds to citizens’ ideological beliefs by shifting towards the 
mean or median citizen (Powell, 2011, Golder and Stramski, 2010, Blais and Bodet, 
2006, Powell, 2009, Powell, 2000, Huber and Powell, 1994). Strictly  speaking, 
however, this literature does not examine the responsiveness of governments to 
citizens’ ideological preferences, but rather whether or not the ideology of governments 
and citizens coincides at the same point in time. This is a question of congruence, the 
idea that the public is represented in the government at the same point in time. By 
contrast, responsiveness is a directional reaction to opinion expression and occurs with a 
delay in time. 
 The positional policy  congruence model is based on the assumption that a shift 
in citizens’ average left-right  position leads to a shift  towards their beliefs in 
government’s ideology measured on the same scale. There are three major models of 
positional policy  congruence: 1) the manifesto model, 2) the expert model, and 3) the 
perception model of ideological congruence. Their main difference lies in the 
measurement of government ideology. Whereas public opinion is measured in the same 
way employing a self-assessment of where respondents would place themselves on the 
left-right continuum, there is a different indicator of government ideology. The 
manifesto model uses quantitative content analysis to define the parties’ stance on the 
left-right continuum, the expert model employs expert evaluations in order to place the 
political parties on the left-right  scale, and the perception model asks citizens’ to place 
the respective parties on the ideological scale. 
 The Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) analyses the content of party 
manifestos in order to place the respective parties on an ideological continuum that 
ranges from 0 to 100. Thereby, quasi-sentences are coded into 56 categories that are 
associated with the left or the right. 
In practice, most scholars [...] seek a low-dimensional representation of party policy 
positions. It is very common practice, therefore, for scholars to use the composite ‘left-
right’ scale developed and tested by the CMP. Based on subjective judgments about the 
meaning of particular categories, supplemented by exploratory factor analyses,  this simple 
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additive scale combines information from 26 CMP policy variables, 13 referring to left 
wing positions and 13 referring to right wing positions (Benoit et al., 2007: 6).
Manifestos are published in the context of an election, which means that they are only 
available in election years, but usually not between elections. Recent work on the 
validity  on the CMP data finds it to be inaccurate as the data contain measurement 
errors and lack cross-coder validation (Benoit et al., 2009). There are doubts that the 
CMP serves reliable data on party  positions. In addition, it  does not carry out continuous 
measurement.
 Another way  to capture parties’ ideologies is through expert surveys (Benoit and 
Laver, 2003-2004, Huber and Inglehart, 1995, Castles and Mair, 1984), where experts 
on political parties or party  systems rate the respective parties in their countries 
according to their left-right stance. Data on parties’ ideologies from expert surveys are 
also limited with regard to the date the survey was conducted. In addition, there are 
some doubts about the validity and reliability  of the measures (Whitefield et al., 2007, 
Budge, 2001). However in comparison with the CMP measure, Benoit and Laver find 
that:
 [T]he expert survey estimates are more accurate because they contain smaller measurement 
error. Due to the inherent structure of manifestos and the mathematically constrained nature of the 
saliency-based CMP left-right measure, CMP estimates, not only of left and right but also of specific 
policy dimensions, contain inherently more noise than summaries of expert placements. (Benoit and 
Laver, 2007: 103)
 Finally, a new way to investigate ideological congruence is to employ  a citizens’ 
perceptions measure. Here, survey respondents are asked to place the major political 
parties on the left-right continuum. The average across answers serves as the indicator 
of parties’ position from which the government’s stance can be derived. Scholars have 
found that citizens’ views on the position of parties on the ideological scale are fairly 
accurate and correlate with expert  views and manifesto measures (Golder and Stramski, 
2010, Powell, 2009, Blais and Bodet, 2006). However, the perception measure is a very 
new instrument employed in survey research, which means that data are limited to a few 
time points. In addition, the perception question is only employed in election surveys, 
which additionally  limits the data availability to election years. A perfectly accurate, 
continuous and over-time measure of parties’ ideologies is to date not available.
 Positional policy congruence engages in disentangling the effect of context on 
the opinion-policy linkage. Political institutions have been the focus of studies, in 
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particular, legislative characteristics such as the electoral and party system (Powell, 
2011, Golder and Stramski, 2010, Kang and Powell, 2010, Powell, 2009, Blais and 
Bodet, 2006, Powell, 2006, Powell, 2000, Powell and Vanberg, 2000, Huber and 
Powell, 1994). The conclusions drawn about the impact of the electoral and party 
system are inconsistent, however. Whereas earlier research asserts that proportional and 
multiparty systems outperform their counterparts (Powell, 2006, Powell and Vanberg, 
2000, Powell, 2000, Huber and Powell, 1994), more recent research finds only marginal 
differences across those institutional features (Powell, 2011, Golder and Stramski, 2010, 
Powell, 2009, Blais and Bodet, 2006). Yet, there is only little discussion about why 
findings on the contextual effects of institutions are inconsistent.40 From the economic 
and performance voting literature we get a more precise insight to the division of 
context effects. For instance, with regard to the economic voting literature, a more 
appealing differentiation of contextual factors looks at the clarity of responsibilities 
(Whitten and Palmer, 1999, Powell and Whitten, 1993). This has been further developed 
in a study  on performance voting that distinguished between fixed institutional and 
time-varying government clarity (Hobolt  et al., 2012). I follow this notion here. In 
accordance with Hobolt et al. (2012), I consider two sets of contextual effects that split 
between fixed institutions such as the electoral and party  system, level of federalism, 
bicameralism and regime type. I also do this for time-varying factors in terms of 
situational clarity such as single party versus coalition governments, the effective 
numbers of parties in the legislature and executive, minimum-winning versus over- and 
undersized governments. Such a classification of contextual factors allows me to clarify 
what impacts the relationship between public opinion and government ideology. 
6.2 The Clarity of Responsibilities Hypothesis
 In this chapter I explore the conditions of ideological congruence employing the 
perception model of positional policy  congruence. The chapter is motivated by  the 
overall research question: What are the conditions of ideological congruence? I have 
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40 In the meantime scholarship moves on to exploring other contextual effect such as globalisation. Ezrow 
and Hellwig (2012) and Ezrow et al. (2011) find that economic gloablisation has a significant impact on 
ideological representation of citizens by political parties , where in highly globalised countries 
congruence decreases. Although it is necessary to mention where scholarship is going, it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to also take into account globalisation or further context effects. Here I focus solely on 
the impact of political institutions and situations on the opinion-policy linkage.
argued above that there are two kinds of conditions I am exploring in my thesis: 
Institutional and situational clarity, where institutional clarity refers to the fixed and 
long-established institutional features of a country and situational clarity to 
characteristics that vary  over time with regard to the political situation of the legislature 
and executive. From this classification I derive two sets of hypotheses that cluster 
around institutional and situational clarity and which I discuss in more detail in the 
following. 
Positional Congruence Hypothesis
Positional congruence is higher when there is increased institutional clarity, 
but it is not affected by situational clarity.   
6.2.1 The Institutional Clarity Hypothesis 
 The first major hypothesis I examine is the Institutional Clarity Hypothesis. 
Ideology, I have argued, is a long-established, general preference on a collection of 
issues. While preferences on specific issues may differ from the overall ideological 
beliefs and stances on issues may change over time depending on the political climate 
and developments, it is more difficult  to change and affect a person’s general ideology 
(Zaller, 1992: 23 ff.). Thus, as a long-standing concept, ideological congruence is 
expected to be conditioned by the fixed, time-invariant institutional design of a country. 
However, it is of particular importance to examine how the fixed institutions affect 
positional policy congruence, which is why I test a set of five sub-hypotheses to 
examine the overall Institutional Clarity  Hypothesis. These are concerned with the uni- 
versus bicameral structure, federal versus unitary  organisation, (semi-)presidential 
versus parliamentary  executives, majoritarian versus proportional electoral rules and 
few versus multiparty representation. 
 H1a: Presidential governments are more congruent with the mean citizen 
  than parliamentary ones.
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 The regime type has been looked at with regard to the issue responsiveness of 
governments to public preferences before. It is likely that it also has an impact on 
ideological congruence of governments and citizens. A strong and decisive executive 
led by an independent  figure such as the US president might be more successful in 
shifting the ideological convictions of her party towards the mean citizen than an 
executive that is dependent on the legislature. Parliamentary  executives are known to 
have strong links with the legislature, which often includes mechanisms to abolish the 
government if the legislature believes it is not acting on behalf of the people. A 
parliamentary  government will thus take into account the overall ideological beliefs of 
the legislature and is thus more constrained than an independent president  in shifting 
ideology towards the mean citizen. 
 H2a:  Governments in two-and-a-half-party systems are more congruent 
  with the mean citizen than those in multiparty systems.
 A similar argument applies to few parties versus multipartyism. The type of the 
party  system is a direct consequence of the electoral rules. In short the same 
mechanisms for policymaking apply. In systems with fewer parties, they  are able 
position themselves around the mean before the election and stick to their ideologies 
throughout the electoral cycle when in government. Multipartyism is a characteristic of 
proportional electoral rules. The argument that parties pull each other back to the mean 
is conceivable, but again coalition bargaining processes may be dominated by the larger 
partner, who has more influence in the overall government ideology. I expect 
multipartyism to constrain congruence, whereas I expect government in systems with a 
limited number of parties to be more congruent with the mean citizen. 
 H3a: Governments federal states are less congruent with the mean 
  citizen than their unitary counterparts. 
 
Federalism has previously been found to have a negative impact on public 
responsiveness to government action because the public is not clear about who to 
address their preferences to (Soroka and Wlezien, 2010, Downs, 1999). Citizens may be 
unclear about who is responsible for the policy area concerned. In addition, political 
parties in federally-organised countries often cluster around the federal structure. This 
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also means that their ideological beliefs and position on the ideological continuum may 
be affected by  the federal structure. In addition, governments in federal states can also 
affected in policymaking. For example, are the sub-entities represented in a second 
chamber and hence involved in the decision-making process, this process may be 
slowed down or even blocked by consulting the sub-entities or the respective 
representative chamber. If a compromise is achieved, the negotiations may lead to 
concessions on both sides, which effects specific policies and also ideological beliefs. 
Unitary  states do not have another level of governance and have fewer veto players in 
the decision-making process than federal states. I expect a federal state structure to 
hamper the position policy congruence of the mean citizen and her government as it 
affects whether and how citizens express opinion as well as how fast  and in what form 
policymaking occurs. 
 H4a: Governments with unicameral legislatures are more congruent 
  with the mean citizens than their bicameral counterparts.  
 A bicameral structure indicates that the legislature is divided into two chambers, 
where the first  chamber represents the people as whole and the second chamber brings 
in minority interests in the wider sense. For instance, the second chamber in the United 
States, the Senate, represents that interests of the US States, as does the Bundesrat in 
Germany with interests of the German Länder, the House of Lords in the Britain on the 
other hand brings in expert knowledge and interests of its spiritual and temporal 
members. In any case, bicameralism means that a second chamber of some kind acts as 
an additional veto player for policymaking, whereas unicameral states do not have to 
negotiate with another body of legislation. More veto players, I have argued earlier, 
always mean more compromise on issues and, thus, on ideology. Agreement is achieved 
by moving ideological beliefs towards a compromise. A bicameral structure also makes 
it more difficult for people to address their preferences as legislation may be dominated 
one or the other chamber. For these reasons, I expect bicameralism to decrease the 
congruence of policy makers and the mean citizen, whereas governments in unicameral 
systems to be more congruent with the mean citizens’ beliefs. 
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 H5a: Majoritarian electoral rules increase positional congruence 
  between the mean citizen and her government. 
 The impact of the electoral rules on positional policy congruence has previously 
been explored by the literature. Early research on congruence finds governments in 
majoritarian systems to be more congruent than proportional ones, yet more recent 
studies find that proportional electoral systems outperform majoritarian ones with 
regard to the ideological congruence of governments and citizens (Powell, 2000, Powell 
and Vanberg, 2000, Huber and Powell, 1994). However, current research suggests that 
there are only  marginal differences across electoral systems (Powell, 2011, Golder and 
Stramski, 2010, Powell, 2009, Blais and Bodet, 2006). From a veto-player-theory 
perspective, it makes sense to follow up upon the early findings. Majoritarian electoral 
rules usually lead to few parties in the legislature and strong and decisive governments. 
The parties tend to position themselves around the mean citizen during the election 
campaigns and governments are thus fairly congruent with the electorate from 
beginning. In proportional electoral systems, many parties compete over votes and need 
distinct priorities. These get pulled back to the mean during the coalition bargaining 
process, yet negotiation usually ends in favour of the larger, senior partner, and not  quite 
where one would expect the mean citizens. Hence, I expect majoritarian electoral rules 
to lead to more congruence between the mean citizen and her government than 
proportional electoral systems. 
Table 14: Hypothesised Effect of Institutions and Situations on Positional Policy Congruence
Number of Veto 
Players
Clarity of 
Responsibility
Effect on 
Positional Policy 
Congruence
Situations Minor effect 
     High number of ENPP High Low -
     High number of ENPG High Low -
     Coalition Government High Low -
     Over-/Undersized Government High Low -
Institutions Major effect
     Bicameralism High Low -
     Federalism High Low -
     Parliamentarianism High Low -
     Proportional Electoral Rules High Low -
     Multipartyism High Low -
Note: The negative sign indicates a constraining impact of situations and institutions on responsiveness
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Overall, I assume the Institutional Clarity  Hypothesis to be confirmed if I find support 
for all sub-hypothesis on institutional clarity. Table 14 summarises my expectations.
6.2.2 Situational Clarity Hypothesis 
 The second major hypothesis I explore here is the Situational Clarity 
Hypothesis. I have argued earlier in this chapter that ideology is a long-established, 
general preference on a collection of issues. Whereas specific issue preferences may 
vary across short- and mid-term political circumstances because they are not necessarily 
that well established, ideological beliefs are rooted within individuals. Whether I 
consider myself to be more leftist or rightist is less likely to be affected by short- and 
mid-term events. I expect time-variant situational clarity  to have less of an impact on 
positional policy congruence than institutional clarity. In fact, I suspect situations to 
have no significant effect on congruence at all. In order to explore this I rely on four 
sub-hypotheses, using which I expect find an indication of directions, if only  marginal 
and insignificant ones. The time-varying factors I regard here are the effective number 
of parties in the legislature (ENPP), the number of parties in the government, single 
party  versus coalition governments as well as minimum-winning versus over-/
undersized governments corresponding with H1b to H4b (See Chapter 2.4.1.2). I do not 
set out individual sub-hypothesis as I do not expect to find any significant effects from 
any situational event on ideological congruence. Coefficients may indicate directions 
that will coincide with the veto-player theory. Whenever more veto players are involved 
I expect the coefficient  for congruence to be smaller than for situations characterised by 
few veto players. I assume the Situational Clarity Hypothesis to be confirmed if I find 
insignificant coefficients for the indicators of situational clarity  in the regression 
analysis.
6.3 Methodology and Data 
 In order to examine the circumstances under which ideological congruence 
occurs, I rely on the perceptions model of positional policy congruence. It is based on 
the assumption that citizens’ average left-right position on a 10-point  scale causes a shift 
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in the government’s ideology towards the public average. Thereby, the measure of 
government ideology is based on how people perceive the respective political parties in 
their countries or, in other words, where survey  respondents place the parties on the left-
right scale. 
 Estimating the perceptions model of positional policy  congruence has some 
advantages over other models of ideological congruence, e.g. it uses the same scale for 
citizens’ self-placement and party placements. However, one caveat is data availability. 
In order to examine the perceptions model of positional congruence, superior data are 
required. While there is no long time series accessible, the data quality of the CSES is 
one argument in favour of this approach, but the CSES are no time-series data.The 
CSES combines measures in one single survey, so that no data merging of different 
sources and qualities is necessary. In addition, the comparability of the left-right scale 
has been problematic in the past. Some measures are based on a 0 to 10 point scale and 
others on a 1 to 10 continuum (Blais and Bodet, 2006: 1248). With the CSES I 
overcome this issue. The perception model employs data from the same source where 
respondents were asked to place themselves and political parties at the same point in 
time on the same 0 to 10 point scale. Expert survey data on parties’ ideological stances 
are only  available for a few years and would also need merging from different sources. 
CMP data delivers a decent amount of data on parties’ position on the left-right 
continuum across time, but with larger gaps as data are only collected in election years.. 
However, the discussion about the reliability  of the data and particularly the inter- and 
intra-coder validity (Benoit et al., 2009, Mikhaylov et al., 2008, Benoit et al., 2007, 
Benoit and Laver, 2007,  Laver et al., 2003) indicate that these data are not the best 
accessible measure. Finally, scholars have shown that the perceptions model of 
ideological congruence is as accurate as other models of positional congruence. Hence it 
can be used interchangeably while predictions deliver solid and robust results. 
 In order to investigate the perception model of positional policy congruence 
superior data are required for a larger cross-sectional sample. The Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems (CSES) provides those data. The CSES is an on-going project that 
collects data in more than 50 countries over a time period from 1996 up until today. The 
latest module has only recently been released for research. CSES has collected three 
modules of data (Module 1:1996–2001, Module 2: 2002–2006, Module 3: 2007–2011) 
that combine micro and macro-level data. The main advantage for researchers is that the 
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data allow cross-national studies to be conducted and contextual factors to be 
incorporated into their models such as institutional attributes. The project  offers 
consistent data for election years from 1996 onwards. Still, the data are not intended to 
be time-series data and, amongst some regularly asked variables of interest, incorporate 
an individual survey module in each wave. 
 In this chapter I rely on these secondary data to indicate both citizens’ mean 
ideology as well as party governments’ ideological stance. After concise exploration of 
the data, I end up with a sample of 25 countries spread across Europe, North America 
and Austrasia, and a total of 60 elections in the time period of 1996 to 2010. Table 15 
presents the country sample and election years chosen for analysis. I include 
parliamentary  elections only and have excluded those countries and elections where 
sampling or data caused problems. In addition, I have dropped countries that used an 
alternative value scale to the left-right continuum, such as Korea.
Table 15: CSES Country Sample and Election Years
CSES Country Years
Australia 1996, 2004, 2007 
Austria 2008
Belgium 1999
Bulgaria 2001
Canada 1997, 2004
Czech Republic 1996, 2002, 2006
Denmark 1998, 2001
Finland 2003, 2007
France 2002, 2007
Germany 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009
Hungary 1998, 2002
Iceland 1999, 2003, 2007, 2009
Ireland 2002, 2007
Japan 2007
Netherlands 1998, 2002, 2006
Norway 1997, 2001, 2005
New Zealand 1996, 2002, 2008
Poland 1997, 2001, 2005, 2007
Portugal 2002, 2005, 2009
Slovenia 1996, 2004
Spain 1996, 2000, 2004
Sweden 1998, 2002, 2006
Switzerland 1999, 2003, 2007
United Kingdom 1997, 2005
United States 2004
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 In order to capture citizens’ ideological beliefs the CSES has frequently asked 
respondents: “In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place 
yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?” 
Furthermore, the CSES collects citizens’ perceptions of where they see the main 
political parties in their countries on the left-right continuum. The question wording is 
as follows: “Now, using the same scale, where would you place [PARTY A-F]?”41 
Respondents’ perceptions of political parties’ left-right stance are a valid measure of 
their actual left-right position. Blais and Bodet (2006) as well as Powell (2011, 2009) 
have shown that citizens’ perceptions of where the political parties stand on the 
continuum are consistent with expert placements of the parities on the same scale as 
well as the actual stance of parties according to the coding by the Comparative 
Manifesto Project (CMP). 
	
 I am interested in the congruence of governments with the mean citizen, which 
is why I average the ideology scores of citizens by election and country. Why the mean 
citizen? 
[T]he mean or the median provides a good estimate of the electorate’s view of a party’s 
stand on the issues. Projection effects that push or pull individual party placements along 
the scale tend to cancel out across respondents and make the measures quite robust. Mean 
placements generally accord well with expert judgments [...] and have the advantage of 
locating the parties on the same scale as the respondents (Macdonald, Rabinowitz, 
Listhaug, 1998:670). 
Huber and Powell state that their reason for using the median citizen instead of the 
mean citizens’ ideology is theoretical. They argue that a majority  will always prefer the 
median to the mean, because it is less likely to be biased by extreme positions at least in 
cases where the median and mean are not identical. The ideology scores of the median 
and mean citizens are largely identical, in case they differ these deviances are marginal 
(Huber and Powell 1994:296). Theoretically, it may matter after all to account for 
minority opinion. Especially in consensus democracies, which are not build on the 
notion of majority  rule, minority opinion is important and one should allow for it  to 
influence the average ideology score of citizens. While I acknowledge that very strong 
outliers may pull the average towards the left or the right and that  one has diagnose and/
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41 Please note that the order of these questions varies from module to module, the wording adjusts 
according to: “In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place Party A on a 
scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right? Using the same scale, where would you 
place, [PARTY B- F]?” And: “In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place 
yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?”
or correct for that, I also believe that it  is important to account for the full range of 
ideological preferences. This is not an issue in my data, however. The mean and median 
scores are very similar.42  Further, checking the distribution of the left-right scores by 
country  has shown that there are not extreme outliers that may pull the mean to either 
direction. In addition, it appears that using mean voter or mean citizens’ ideology scores 
are also an established measure in responsiveness research. More recent work on the 
effects of gloablisation on ideological congruence (Ezrow and Hellwig, 2012) as well as 
on party responsiveness (Ezrow 2011) also rely on the mean ideology scores instead of 
employing median preferences on ideology. I calculate mean party and government 
scores accordingly. Accordingly, I set up mean perceived party scores in order to place 
the governments’ positions on the left-right continuum. If a single-party government is 
in office, the ideology score of that single party is identical with the government’s 
stance. In countries with coalition governments I weight the ideology  scores of coalition 
parties depending on whether they are the senior or junior partner. The weight 
coefficient ranges from 0 to 1 depending on the vote shares of the parties. For example, 
in the German election 1998 the SPD has won 40.9% of the votes and the coalescing 
Green Party 6.7%. Thus, I have multiplied the SPD’s ideology score (3.36) by  0.75 and 
the score for the Green party (2.91) by 0.25, which results in an overall government 
stance on the left-right continuum of 3.25. 
 In order to capture context effects I divide between factors according to their 
institutional and situational clarity. The group of moderators for institutional clarity 
consists of five dummy variables that capture the fixed system characteristics: The 
regime type (presidential/semi-presidential versus parliamentary governments), 
federalism (unitary versus federal countries), bicameralism (unicameralism versus 
bicameralism), the electoral system (majoritarian versus proportional electoral rules), 
and the party system (three-party  versus multiparty systems). The group of factors that 
vary over time are summarised under situational clarity and include two continuous 
variables (effective number of parties in parliament, number of parties in government) 
and two dummy variables (single versus coalition governments, minimum-winning 
versus over-/undersized governments). I derive the codings for institutional and 
governmental clarity from the Parlgov (Döring and Manow, 2011), the Parline (IPU, 
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42 I report the descriptive statistics including both, the mean and the median citizens’ scores in Appendix 
D.
1996–2012) data base and the Database of Political Institutions (Beck, Clarke, Groff, 
Keefer, Walsh 2012) as well as Gallagher’s effective number of political parties in the 
legislature (Gallagher, 2012). 
 The modelling strategy  applied is transparent, efficient, yet simple. I rely on 
clustered Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analyses with interactive terms. I 
correct for country clustering by estimating the panel-corrected standardised errors. 
Thereby, my  dependent variable is the position of governments on the left-right 
ideological continuum. One key assumption is that public opinion in particular explains 
government ideology, which is why the mean citizens’ ideology is the main explanatory 
variable. Furthermore I am interested in the impact of a country’s institutional and 
situational clarity on the opinion-policy linkage. As argued above (Chapter 3) I abstain 
from using indexes for institutional and situation clarity, but work with interactive 
effects instead (Brambor et  al., 2006: 65), where the main predictor, public opinion, is 
interacted with the conditioning variables. I include the constitutive as well as the 
interaction terms in the model. The equation I am estimating is as follows: 
 GI = α + β1*PO + β2*IC/SC + β3PO*IC/SC + ε, 
where GI stands for the dependent variable, which is governments’ ideology. α is the 
intercept, β1 the estimate for the slope of citizens’ mean ideology, β2 the estimate of the 
slopes for the institutions tested in institutional clarity (IC) or the short-term 
characteristics tested in situational clarity (SC). The estimate for β3 accompanies the 
interaction term, ε is the unobserved error. The important estimates for me are the 
coefficients for the baseline model β1 and the interaction term β3. Most of the 
institutions and situations I interact opinion with are dummy variables, where the 
baseline gives an estimate for opinion times the dummy variable when it equals 0, and 
the interactive effect gives us the estimate for opinion times the dummy variable when it 
equals 1. For example, I look at the difference between presidential and parliamentary 
systems, where the regime type is a dummy variable (presidential systems equal 0 and 
parliamentary  one 1). In this case, the coefficient β1 indicates the impact of publics’ 
mean ideological preferences on government ideology in presidential systems and β3 the 
impact of mean citizens’ preferences in parliamentary ones. 
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6.4 The Mean Citizen, Government and Absolute 
Ideological Distances 
 I begin my analysis by presenting some descriptive results. Figure 11 shows 
citizens’ mean ideological preferences by country  and election. It is remarkable that 
there appears to be only little variation. The ideology scores vary  between 4.09 and 
6.23, but do not range across the whole 0 to 10 continuum. This is may be explained by 
a phenomenon in survey research called social desirability  bias. There is a “basic human 
tendency to present oneself in the best possible light” (Fisher, 1993: 303), which leads 
to inaccurate answers about sensitive issues. The left-right self-placement is a question 
about people’s political beliefs. It neither desirable to report that  one is extremely leftist, 
nor extremely rightist. Extreme left and right positions are socially  unaccepted and 
viewed as problematic. Even if there are some outliers on the individual level, these 
cancel out on the aggregate by country and election. When calculating the mean I do not 
find any extreme opinions on the ideological scale here, in fact citizens in all countries 
and elections cluster around the centre-left and centre-right. The little variance in public 
opinion can be a challenge for further analysis. Although the variability on this question 
is small, there is enough variation to examine responsiveness to the mean citizen. The 
results of the statistical analysis and conclusions drawn from it should yet account for 
this and be taken with a pinch of salt.43 The three most leftist citizens’ positions on the 
ideological scale are Germany in 1998 (4.09), Spain in 2004 (4.15) and Germany in 
2002 (4.29). The three countries and elections with the most rightist citizens’ beliefs are 
Polish people in the 2007 (6.23) and 2005 (6.06) general elections as well as the Irish 
citizens in 2002 national elections (5.81). The Dutch and British people in the general 
elections held in both countries in the year 2005 represent the average of the sample, 
which lies at the centre-right with an ideology score of 5.21.
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43 The impact of social desirability bias on analyses of social and political science phenomena has been 
discussed elsewhere. However, a more detailed discussion with regard to measuring ideological 
preferences would contribute to the study of positional policy congruence. However, this cannot be 
achieved by this thesis and will be subject of future research. 
Figure 12: Mean Citizens’ Ideology 
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 The mean governments’ ideologies vary a lot more across the left-right 
continuum. The three most leftist governments are the Polish government in 2001 (2.07) 
and the Hungarian (2.45) and German (3.2) governments in 2002. The most  rightist 
governments can be found in the Czech Republic in 2002 (8.76), France 2007 (7.99) 
and Sweden 2006 (7.94). On average, governments achieve an ideology score of 5.7, 
which means that governments are generally at the centre-right. The average ideology 
score can be found in Sweden in the year 2003.
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Figure 13: Citizens’ Perception of Governments’ Mean Ideology
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In order for congruence to occur, the distance between citizens’ and governments 
ideologies needs to be as small as possible. In order to get a first insight into this, I have 
calculated the absolute distance between the mean citizen and governments for each 
election and country. The results suggest that there is quite substantial variation across 
countries and elections. Considering that I am dealing with a 0 to 10 point scale, I get 
some smaller distances of less than 0.1, but also some large distances of almost 3.5 
points. Ideological distances between citizens and government are smallest in Finland 
2003 (0.02), Portugal 2002 (0.06), and Canada 2004 (0.06) and largest in Spain 1996 
(3.44), the Czech Republic 2002 (3.32) and Sweden 2006 (2.71). The average distance 
across all countries and elections is 1.16 points.44
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44 Please note that the ideology scores for the mean citizen and governments as well as the absolute 
distance between them broken down by country and election can be found in Table C1 in Appendix C. 
Figure 14: Absolute Ideological Distance between the Mean Citizen and Perceived Governments’ 
Positions
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 The bivariate relationship  between government ideology and the mean citizen 
already suggests that ideological congruence occurs. I find a highly significant and 
positive impact of the mean citizen on government ideology (+1.75) indicating that 
whenever the mean citizen moves to right, government ideology does too. This is 
demonstrated in Figure 14. 
 The bivaraite results suggest that there is already  positional policy congruence 
between the mean citizen and governments. However, this needs further investigation. 
There is some variation in the ideological distances across countries, which suggests 
that the congruence is moderated. In particular, it may be affected by the institutional 
setup and situational clarity within a country. I explore this in the following section.
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Figure 15: Bivariate relationship between the Mean Citizen and Government Ideology
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6.5 Analysing the Conditions of Positional Policy 
Congruence 
 In order to examine the conditions of positional policy congruence, I present the 
results in two steps. I begin looking at the time-invariant institutional conditions that I 
have clustered according to their impact on the clarity  of policymaking and opinion 
expression. Secondly, I examine the time-varying situational circumstances that vary 
over time. According to my hypotheses I expect to find that institutions have a 
significant impact on ideological congruence, but that situations have no significant 
impact on the opinion-policy  relationship. I have argued that ideology is rather static 
and thus potentially more affected by long-standing and invariant factors than by 
varying ones. I come back to the comparison by the end of this section. 
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6.5.1 The Impact of Institutional Clarity on Positional 
Policy Congruence
 I have run OLS regressions with interactive terms and produced clustered 
standardised errors to examine the moderating impact of the time-invariant institutions 
on the opinion-policy relationship. I discuss my findings for each institution in the 
following order: the impact of bicameralism, federalism, the regime type, the electoral, 
then the party system. The regression results are presented in Table 17. 
 I have argued that a bicameral nation state structure leads to a less clear 
distribution of responsibilities. Depending on what kind of bicameralism is 
implemented, this can have negative effects on the congruence of public opinion and 
government ideology. I expected a bicameral structure to have a strong negative impact 
on congruence and this is exactly what I find. While governments in unicameral states 
move to the right whenever the mean citizen shifts to the right (+3.248), this effect is 
depressed by -1.693 units when bicameral structures are concerned. The interaction 
term between the mean citizen and bicameralism, which suggests this, is significant at 
least at the 90% confidence interval. 
 The second institutional feature I have looked at is whether a country is 
structured as a federal or unitary state. In some countries this ties in with a bicameral 
state organisation such as in the United States or Germany, where the states and Länder 
are also the representatives in the second chamber. I argued that a federal structure 
decreases congruence, which is what the regression results indicate. Whereas I find a 
positive relationship between the mean citizen and governments in unitary systems 
(+2.69), congruence decreases by -1.52 units in federal systems. The interaction term 
that suggests this is also significant within the 95% confidence interval.
 In order for congruence to occur, I have argued that a decisive executive is 
expected to be more likely to shift  towards citizens’ ideological beliefs than 
parliamentary  executive. Parliamentary  systems are after all dependent on the 
legislature and thus have to compromise on issues, which also affects the ideological 
retrospective of parties in government. Whereas (semi-)presidential government indeed 
move towards the mean citizen (+2.69), parliamentary executives are less likely to do 
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so. The coefficient is significantly  (95% confidence) smaller for the interaction term 
(-1.02) than for the baseline model.
Table 16: The Impact of Institutional Clarity on Ideological Congruence
Perceived Government Ideology
Mean Citizen 3.25*** 2.56*** 2.69*** 4.65*** 3.41***
(-0.87) (-0.34) (-0.14) (-1.14) (-0.57)
Bicameralism 9.09*
(-4.91)
Mean Citizen*Bicameralism -1.69*
(-0.94)
Federalism 8.02***
(-2.84)
Mean Citizen*Federalism -1.52**
(-0.55)
Parliamentary System 5.92**
(-2.38)
Mean Citizen*Parliamentary System -1.02**
(-0.46)
Proportionality 15.81**
(-6.3)
Mean Citizen*Proportionality -2.94**
(-1.19)
Multipartyism 9.64**
(-3.61)
Mean Citizen*Multipartyism -1.75**
(-0.67)
Constant -11.42** -7.78*** -8.81*** -19.02*** -12.49***
(-4.53) (-1.73) (-0.60) (-5.98) (-3.07)
Observations 60 60 60 60 60
R-squared 0.29 0.3 0.28 0.27 0.29
Standard error in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The electoral and the party  system have previously  been examined with regard to their 
impact on ideological congruence. While early research finds that majoritarian and 2.5-
party  systems lead to increased congruence, more recent research has found that 
proportional and multiparty systems perform better than their counterparts. However, a 
handful of current studies suggest that differences in the type of the electoral and party 
system are marginal and conclude that systems perform equally well. My regression 
results support the early findings. While both majoritarian electoral rules (+4.65) and a 
smaller number of parties (+3.41) lead to a positive relationship between the mean 
citizen and governments, proportionality and multipartyism appear to decrease 
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congruence by  -2.93 and -1.75 units. All results lie within the 95% and 99% confidence 
intervals.
Figure 16: Marginal Effects of Mean Citizen on Perceived Government Ideology under 
Institutional Conditions 
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 The most important coefficients in the regression table are the baseline model as 
well as the interactive terms. For all institutional features β1, the coefficient for the 
baseline model is significant within the 99% confidence interval. The coefficient for the 
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interactive terms, β2, also achieves significance within the 90% and 95% confidence 
intervals. Brambor et al. (2006: 76) suggest plotting the marginal effects of the main 
explanatory variable on the dependent under the moderating condition. The 
recommendation is to use Stata’s grinter function, however, this is only appropriate for 
interactions with continuous variables. As I am dealing with interactions between a 
continuous and a group (dummy) variable I present the marginal effect in whisker’s 
plots with confidence intervals. Figure 15 displays the conditional impact of the mean 
citizen on perceived government ideology given certain numbers of institutional veto 
players. All graphs suggest that  the mean citizen has a significant impact on perceived 
government ideology  under condition of institutional veto players. They further indicate 
that fewer veto players lead to increased congruence. The whisker’s plot on the left 
hand side describes institutional constellations with fewer veto players, where as the 
chart on the right describes an institutional constellation with an increased number of 
veto players. It appears that the marginal effect  of institutions is stronger when fewer 
veto players are involved in the decision making process (whisker’s charts to the left), 
but lower when more veto players are involved (whisker’s chart to the right). 
Admittedly, the variance around the institutional design that leads to fewer veto players 
is larger than for the one that creates more veto players. Yet, the general pattern suggests 
where there is extreme clarity  of institutions, there is also highest congruence of the 
mean citizen and perceived government ideology. In turn, less institutional clarity  leads 
to a decrease in congruence, however, there is still significant impact under a higher 
number of institutional veto players. These results correspond with the regression output 
presented in Table 16. 
 The statistical analysis leaves me with some support for my argument as well as 
some new puzzles. First  of all, the results suggest that time-invariant institutional 
characteristics moderate the relationship between ideological preferences and the 
position of the government on the ideological scale, but time-varying situations do not. 
This supports my  argument. As ideology  is are longstanding and established preferences 
on a collection of issues grouped into a more general super-issue, I had expected the 
ideological congruence between the mean citizen and government to be affected by 
something as longstanding, such as the fixed political institutions. This is what I find for 
bicameralism, federalism, regime type, electoral and party system. These institutions are 
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fixed and normally written in form of a constitution. All five institutions showed a 
moderating effect on the opinion-policy relationship. It  seems the more veto players 
these institutions allow, the less congruent a government is with the ideological 
preferences of the mean citizen, based on these characteristics. A bicameral structure, a 
federal organisation, parliamentary executives, proportional electoral rules and 
multipartyism appear to lead to significantly  less congruence between the government 
and the mean citizen than their counterparts.With regard to time-varying political 
situations that may  lead to more or less clarity in policymaking, I do not find that any 
situation has a significant impact. The situations looked at here vary over time usually 
with the beginning of a new legislative period. They should have short-term effects on 
preference expression and policymaking. However, as ideology is long established, I did 
not expect short- and mid-term effects on congruence. The results generally support 
this. All of the characteristics looked at under situational clarity  suggested that 
congruence occurred, but also that the results were not conclusive as statistical 
significance has not been achieved. Further, the findings suggest that veto player theory 
does not apply here. 
6.5.2 The Impact of Situational Clarity on Positional Policy 
Congruence 
 In order to examine the impact of situational clarity  on positional policy 
congruence between the mean citizen and her government, I follow the same procedure 
as for the impact of institutions. Situational clarity  refers to time-varying factors that 
characterise the executive and legislature, for example, whether a single party or 
coalition government is in office. Here I look at four moderators: the effective number 
of parliamentary parties (ENPP), whether a minimum-winning government is in charge 
or an over- or undersized one, the effective number of parties in government (ENPG) 
and whether it is a single party or coalition government. 
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Table 17: The Impact of Situational Clarity on Ideological Congruence
Mean Government Ideology
Mean Citizen 1.69 1.58** 1.42 0.86
(-2.17) (-0.60) (-1.51) (-0.87)
ENPP -0.12
(-3.14)
Mean Citizen*ENPP 0.02
(-0.59)
Minimum-Winning Government -1.48
(-3.76)
Mean Citizen*Minimum-Winning Government 0.29
(-0.70)
ENPG -0.82
(-3.26)
Mean Citizen*ENPG 0.15
(-0.62)
Coalition -5.96
(-4.42)
Mean Citizen*Coalition 1.14
(-0.87)
Constant -3.00 -2.53 -1.67 1.2
(-11.71) (-3.24) (-8.00) (-4.37)
Observations 60 60 60 60
R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27
Standard error in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 I expect to find that situations have no significant impact on ideological 
congruence. Yet I expect to see an indication that the larger the number of parties in the 
parliament or in government is, the less congruence occurs. I addition, I would expect 
minimum-winning and single party governments to be more congruent with the mean 
citizen than over- or undersized and coalition governments. The results mostly confirm 
these expectations. Overall, situations appear to have no significant impact on the 
positional congruence between the mean citizen and her government. I discuss this in 
more detail later in this section and proceed with the presentation of the results in the 
following order: the impact of the ENPP, minimum-winning versus over-/undersized 
governments, the ENPG, then coalition versus single party  governments. The regression 
results are presented in Table 17. 
 I have argued that  the smaller the number of parties in the legislature is, the 
more congruence there should be with regard to the mean citizen and the government. 
The baseline model suggests that ideological congruence occurs in countries with few 
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parties. When citizens move to the right, governments follow (+1.69). It appears that 
there is also congruence in countries with a larger number of parties in the legislature. 
The coefficient even increases by 0.02 units to 1.89. However, the difference in the 
coefficients between few and many parties in the legislature is very  small.  In addition, 
neither of the coefficients reaches statistical significance. A final statement about the 
impact of the time-varying ENPP cannot be made relying on these numbers. 
 With regard to the time-varying government characteristics I have argued that 
minimum-winning governments should lead to increasing congruence between the 
government and the mean citizen. Indeed I find some indication for this hypothesis. 
While congruence between over- and undersized governments and the mean citizen is 
demonstrated by  the regression results, the coefficient for the baseline model, β1, is 
positive (+1.58) and also significant on the 90% confidence level, congruence is 
enhanced when a minimum-winning government concerned. The interaction term is 
positive (+0.29), yet not significant. The differences between government types seem to 
be marginal though. Surprisingly, higher numbers of parties in government appear to 
increase congruence. 
 Contrary  to the initial expectations that fewer parties in the executive lead to 
more congruence, the regression results suggest that a larger number of parties in 
government enhance congruence by 0.15 units. However, the effect is very small and 
the results do not reach any significance level, which suggests that results are not 
conclusive. 
 Finally, I have argued that  coalition governments may be more congruent with 
the mean citizen than single party  ones. The results indeed indicate that both types of 
governments are congruent with the mean citizen, but that coalition governments 
increase congruence by  1.14 units. Yet neither the coefficient  for the baseline model, nor 
for the interactive term reaches statistical significance. This is also why I abstain from 
presenting the conditional impact of the mean citizen on perceived government ideology 
given a certain number of situational veto players. There is no significant impact, which 
indicates that I cannot confirm the veto player theory.
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6.6 Conclusion
 In this chapter I explore the conditions of positional policy congruence. 
Although it seems as a step backwards from dynamic to static representation, it is 
important to investigate what makes government more or less successful in translating 
ideological demands into policymaking at election times. If there is no congruence 
between what people want and what governments provide at election times when 
opinion and policy should correspond extremely, there are sincere doubts about political 
representation in and between election years.
 Ideology  describes a more general preference than attitudes towards specific 
issues. Ideological positions are something that  gives a broad direction of where people 
stand on a collection of issues. It is usually long-established and it is harder to change or 
affect people’s ideological positions. Representing ideological positions in policies is 
difficult; there is no such thing as an effective ideological policy outcome. Ideology 
does affect the general line of policymaking, however. Previous studies suggest that 
context affects the congruence of ideological positions of the public and policy makers, 
but it is still unclear how it affects it. 
 Here I argued that  long-standing and fixed institutions may have more of an 
impact on positional representation than short-term events or changes such as changing 
situations. While both institutions and situations that lead to a larger number of veto 
players in the decision-making process decrease congruence, only the results for 
institutional clarity come up statistically significant. The analysis suggests that 
specifically federalism, bicameralism and parliamentarianism negatively affect the 
congruence of the public and government’s ideological conviction. With regard to 
situational clarity, veto player theory does not apply. The coefficients point in the 
opposite direction suggesting that more veto players lead to increased representation.
 Admittedly, the congruence of ideologies is not a dynamic way of modelling 
political representation, but it is not less important. If we know that government and the 
mean citizen correspond in election years, this is at least an indicator that elections are 
performing well in terms of representing opinion. A more dynamic and between-
election approach would be desirable, however. Pioneering research on dynamic models 
of positional representation shows that positional responsiveness takes place in Britain 
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(Warwick, 2012, Hakhverdian, 2010). The procedures for data collection, in particular 
to indicate government policy, are very time consuming and costly, which is why 
scholarship is only slowly moving forward. 
 It is important to continue work on positional representation. After all, 
ideological beliefs and convictions are an underlying dimension of policymaking. 
Conservative governments rarely implement liberal policies or vice versa. It is 
important to bring forward the field and test the ideological responsiveness of 
government to the mean citizen, preferably  using indicators of effective policy outputs. 
There are new techniques, e.g. content analysis, that capture left-right positions from 
texts that are not manifestos. Further, there is also a lot of leeway for future research 
with regard to the impact of context on positional representation. There are more 
institutional attributes that affect how successful government is in representing citizens’ 
general positions. Some indications are presented here. The large issue responsiveness 
literature also delivers evidence that other institutions than the electoral and the party 
system affect  representation, which may also be true for ideological positions. In 
addition, we would want to how institutions affect representation in interplay  with each 
other. 
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Appendix D
Table D1: Government Ideology, Mean Citizen and Absolute Distances by Country and Election 
Year
Country Year Government 
Ideology
Mean Citizen Absolute 
Distance
AUS
AUS
AUS
A
BEL
BG
CAN
CAN
CZ
CZ
CZ
DEN
DEN
FIN
FIN
F
F
DEU
DEU
DEU
DEU
HUN
HUN
ICE
ICE
ICE
ICE
IRE
IRE
JAP
NL
NL
NL
NOR
NOR
NOR
NZ
1996 6.4625 5.46 1.0025
2004 6.9275 5.34 1.5875
2007 4.35 5.29 0.94
2008 4.37 4.82 0.45
1999 4.424 5.19 0.766
2001 6.1925 5.71 0.4825
1997 5.41 5.33 0.08
2004 5.07 5.13 0.06
1996 7.86 5.78 2.08
2002 4.5125 4.68 0.1675
2006 8.76 5.44 3.32
1998 5.4225 5.56 0.1375
2001 7.2325 5.57 1.6625
2003 5.588 5.57 0.018
2007 6.6465 5.67 0.9765
2002 5.0575 5.47 0.4125
2007 7.99 5.47 2.52
1998 3.2475 4.09 0.8425
2002 3.2025 4.29 1.0875
2005 4.909 4.41 0.499
2009 6.4075 4.44 1.9675
1998 6.5775 4.87 1.7075
2002 2.45 4.79 2.34
1999 7.735 5.56 2.175
2003 7.74 5.41 2.33
2007 7.3325 5.5 1.8325
2009 3.7325 5.15 1.4175
2002 6.4075 5.81 0.5975
2007 6.05 5.78 0.27
2007 6.2175 5.51 0.7075
1998 5.1875 5.36 0.1725
2002 6.7975 5.22 1.5775
2006 6.86 5.29 1.57
1997 5.365 5.18 0.185
2001 6.425 5.51 0.915
2005 3.72 5.21 1.49
1996 7.12 5.36 1.76
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Country Year Government 
Ideology
Mean Citizen Absolute 
Distance
NZ
NZ
POL
POL
POL
POL
POR
POR
POR
SLO
SLO
ESP
ESP
ESP
SWE
SWE
SWE
CH
CH
CH
UK
UK
US
2002 3.745 5.22 1.475
2008 6.85 5.29 1.56
1997 7.515 5.57 1.945
2001 2.0675 4.59 2.5225
2005 7.34 6.06 1.28
2007 5.9525 6.23 0.2775
2002 5.395 5.34 0.055
2005 4.68 5.1 0.42
2009 5.02 5.15 0.13
1996 4.5675 4.94 0.3725
2004 6.631 5.01 1.621
1996 7.84 4.4 3.44
2000 7.11 4.71 2.4
2004 3.3 4.15 0.85
1998 3.48 4.96 1.48
2002 5.52 4.79 0.73
2006 7.939 5.23 2.709
1999 5.6475 5.19 0.4575
2003 5.675 5.05 0.625
2007 4.7289 5.3 0.5711
1997 3.97 5.03 1.06
2005 4.65 5.21 0.56
2004 6.69 5.61 1.08
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VII. Conclusion: Veto Players, Public Opinion and 
Government Responsiveness
 This thesis explores the role context plays in connecting public preferences and 
public policy  outcomes with each other. The analysis is based upon previous normative 
and empirical results, which indicate that there is a relationship  between public opinion 
and policy and suggest that  this relationship is moderated by political institutions. How 
institutions affect the quality  of opinion representation is still largely unclear, however. 
Inconsistent findings based on different models, measures and approaches give an 
inconsistent picture of the direction of the effect of different institutional concepts. 
 In borrowing the key  idea of veto player theory and linking it  to the clarity of 
responsibility argument, this study examines the contextual effects on policy 
representation more systematically. Here I distinguish between institutional veto 
players, which are understood as the fixed, time-invariant institutions, and situational 
veto players, which are defined as time-varying characteristics created by  the political 
game. In a nutshell, veto player theory paired with the clarity of responsibilities 
hypothesis states: The more institutional and situational veto players enter the political 
decision-making arena, the less clear the allocation of responsibilities is and the less 
likely is it that governments translate public opinion into public policy outcomes. 
 In order to test my theory  empirically, I assess the various models, measures and 
approaches according to whether they account for dynamics, effectiveness and 
comparability. The policy representation of public opinion through government policy is 
an ongoing process that is characterised by a dynamic relationship between opinion and 
policy. Policy representation of public preferences occurs with a delay in time and feed 
back into opinion expression. To test whether or not opinion is represented is also a 
matter of effective measurements of public policy outcomes. While policy intentions, 
expressed for example in party manifestos or speeches, can change after a government 
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is elected, effective outcomes in terms of spending outlays and implemented legislation 
are a better indicator of the quality of representation. Finally, in order to generalise the 
effect of context on the opinion-policy relationship, a comparative design is required. 
The empirical analyses in the preceding chapters disentangle the measurement validity 
of issue preferences in responsiveness research and trace under what conditions issue 
and positional representation occur. I cross the commonly used measures of the public’s 
issue preferences to validate the use of important problems as an indicator of public 
opinion. Issue salience serves an alternative measure to spending preferences in a 
significantly thinner survey environment where more direct measurements are not 
available. This applies to most environments outside the North American context, which 
gives particular importance to the measurement of salient opinion. Further, I test  veto 
player theory linked to the clarity of responsibilities hypothesis empirically looking at 
two dimensions of political representation, namely issue responsiveness and ideological 
congruence. Indeed, I find some empirical evidence that supports my theory in both 
frameworks. In this concluding chapter I recapitulate my  findings, discuss their 
implications as well as limitations and address some remaining issues and look at 
leeway for future research. 
7.1 Measures, Models and Conditions of Effective Policy 
Representation
 Chapter 4 discusses the measurement validity of public opinion measures in 
issue responsiveness research. There are two ways of measuring the public’s issue 
demands: 1) by  looking at people’s spending preferences in an issue domain and 2) by 
taking the proportion of people who think some issue is important. Scholarship  has 
expressed concerns about whether both measurements capture the same concept, but  has 
not delivered enough empirical evidence yet. Further, there are good reasons why 
salient opinion is employed to indicate the public’s issue demands in issue 
responsiveness research. Spending preferences are a direct  and directional measure of 
public opinion on issues. They  have been collected in a strong survey environment back 
to the early twentieth century in individual case studies for a handful of countries 
following the North American tradition. Salient opinion is also collected in a much 
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thinner survey environment outside the North American context in individual case 
studies and comparative surveys. Testing the quality  of representation using dynamic 
responsiveness models is data intensive, and even more so when the aim is comparison. 
Salient opinion, if valid, can serve as an alternative measure that enables scholars to test 
hypotheses in the context of comparing institutions. It is therefore important to know 
whether spending preferences and salient opinion are related. 
 The empirical analysis lends some confidence that this case. Although the results 
do not fully uncover how spending preferences and important issues are related, the 
results suggest that  they are related. The individual level analysis points in the direction 
that, while across social issues the indicators are linked, we need to be more cautious in 
using the indicators interchangeably in other areas such as defence. Spending 
preferences and important problems correlate with each other at least to some extent and 
they  have also been shown to have similar predictive power. For instance, age and vote 
choice predict preferences in the same way. Moreover, the results from the aggregate 
analysis indicate that spending preferences and important issue also predict spending in 
the same direction. Both support for more spending and important problems lead to an 
increase in public expenditure in the following year. These patterns do not show up 
consistently across all issue domains, however. Surprisingly, it  is salient opinion that 
seems to perform well when predicting spending on the specific issue domains. 
Whenever people think something is an important issue, they actually get more 
spending on the issue.
 With these results in mind, Chapter 5 explores the conditions of issue 
responsiveness of government to public opinion, employing the salience model of 
responsiveness. How institutions affect the success of government’s ability to respond is 
best investigated in a comparative study. While the thermostatic model may be the 
superior model, it performs weakly when it comes to comparison. Data on spending 
preferences are not available in cross-sectional sample or for a larger number of case 
studies. Salient opinion is available in individual case studies as well as in cross-
sectional surveys and opens up the opportunity  for a large n sample to test the 
conditions of responsiveness.  With some confidence that spending preferences and 
salient issues capture a similar concept, I rely  on the salience model of representation to 
test the institutional and situational clarity hypotheses of context. Both situations and 
institutions are expected to influence short-term issue representation in a similar way. 
222
More veto players mean less clarity, which results in decreased government 
responsiveness, where responsiveness is measured as an increase in budgets as a 
reaction to salient opinion on an issue. Yet, there were some issues with autoregression. 
When I corrected for autoregression in the dependent variable the empirical data display 
inconsistent results. Further investigation is required. 
 The empirical results for all issues taken together indicate that institutions and 
situations have an impact on the opinion-policy relationship. The directions of these 
effects support the clarity of responsibility  hypothesis and veto player theory. The more 
institutional veto players share decision-making responsibilities, the less clearly  these 
are allocated and the less responsive governments are towards public preferences. The 
pattern is similar for situational veto players. The more veto players created by the 
political game enter the decision-making arena, the less clearly  responsibilities are 
allocated and the less likely it is that government responsiveness occurs. Admittedly, the 
explanatory  power of the analysis is limited as many coefficients to not achieve 
standard levels of statistical significance. 
 These patterns do not consistently hold when looking at the individual policy  
domains, however. Coefficients do not reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance. Education and public law and order stand out as the domains where the 
veto player theory is supported. Most other domains display  an inconsistent picture of 
how context affects the linkage between public opinion and public policy. Some of the 
social domains at least in parts support the veto player argument, while especially the 
broader categories such as the economy and social problems show no pattern at all. This 
may be due to the imperfect  data, e.g. a short time-series. The results do suggest that the 
issue domains regarded matter to whether or not responsiveness occurs, as measured by 
the salience model. While the results applying the salience model of responsiveness 
indicate support for the veto player theory, they find their limitations in the explanatory 
power of the analysis. One explanation for this is that salient  opinion is not such a great 
measurement of public opinion after all and that scholarship needs to look into other 
alternatives to capture what people think. To date it is at least the best fall-back option 
in terms of public opinion measures that scholars have to test the issue responsiveness 
of governments to public preferences in countries outside the North American context. 
 Chapter 6 treats institutional and situational clarity  in a slightly different way. 
Ideology  as a broader measure of public opinion characterised by a collection of 
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attitudes towards a larger number of issues, I argue, is less volatile and less susceptible 
to short-term changes in terms of situational clarity than it is towards institutional 
clarity, which is by  definition based on continuity. In addition, Chapter 6 steps back 
from dynamic representation to a rather static form of opinion representation. It  traces 
the congruence of ideologies in election years. Ideological congruence is an important 
dimension to policymaking as party ideologies drive the general direction of public 
policy. The positional policy congruence of the mean citizen and government is an 
important basis for political representation. 
 The empirical results suggest support for veto player theory  with regard to the 
ideological congruence of governments and citizens, but only  with regard to the 
institutional clarity hypothesis. The coefficients for the interactive terms for the fixed 
institutions point in the expected direction - more veto players lead decrease ideological 
correspondence between citizens and governments. I do not find a significant effect for 
situational clarity and thus no support for the situational clarity hypothesis.  
 This chapter expands on previous research on the institutional impact on 
positional policy congruence by  accounting for a larger number of institutional 
characteristics in a systematic way. Previous work has only taken a country’s electoral 
rules and party system into account, but neglected other characteristics of the fixed 
institutional framework, as well as other time varying indicators of situational clarity. 
This research shows that there are more institutions that  affect the correspondence of 
governments’ ideology and the mean citizen. For instance, it suggests that the regime 
type, federalism and bicameralism also affect how congruent the mean citizen is with 
government ideology. Further, it also indicates that time-varying indicators affect the 
correspondence of the ideological positions of the public and policy makers, however 
the impact is statistically  insignificant. Overall, I find empirical support  for the veto 
player theory in Chapter 6. 
 The contribution of this research is threefold. Firstly, it contributes a systematic 
theory  of context effects on the opinion-policy relationship  and political representation 
in general. Secondly, it contributes to the debate on the measurement validity  of the 
public’s issue preferences and lends some confidence to the use of salient opinion as an 
indicator of public preferences in responsiveness research. Finally, it provides empirical 
evidence for the veto player theory of context effects. 
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This has theoretical implications for previous and future research. The veto player 
theory  of political context  is a more systematic way to test the effect of institutions on 
political representation. It has previously  proven useful for capturing political 
institutions with regard to the political stability of a country. Linked with the clarity of 
responsibility argument it seems to work well with regard to the institutional impact on 
the opinion-policy relationship. While previous research has come to inconsistent 
conclusions, for example about how the electoral and party system affect policy 
representation, the empirical results based on the veto player theory come to clear 
statements about their impact. For instance, those electoral rules that produce more veto 
players, e.g. majoritarian electoral formulas, lead to a less clear distribution of 
responsibilities and a decrease in government’s ability  to respond to public preferences. 
Applying this systematic theory of context to previous models in future research may 
give a clearer view on how context affects representation. Prior studies may want 
rethink their findings as well. 
 With regard to the measurement issues I explored in this thesis, the theoretical 
implication is a little less clear. While thinking an issue is important is related to 
wanting to increase spending and both measures seem to reliably predict expenditure, it 
is still unclear how exactly  both measures are related. The results from the analysis in 
Chapter 5 are rather deflating, which does not necessarily have to do with the 
measurement of public opinion, but may also be due to the data quality or indicators of 
policy outputs. It is important to know what people think and how this is mirrored in 
public policy  outcomes. Yet, the data environment is not equally well developed across 
the globe, which means that scholars need alternative models and measures to test the 
same or at least similar concepts. My findings lend some confidence in the use of salient 
opinion and it is up to future research to verify or falsify the correspondence of the 
measures or develop a new measure to capture the public’s issue preferences. The 
recommendations from this study are to rely on the better data and model whenever 
possible, but at the same time not to hesitate to fall back on alternative measures if the 
research question requires this. With particular regard to issue responsiveness research, 
the salience model should theoretically  work well, however the analysis here does not 
have the explanatory power to fully conclude that it also works in praxis. 
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7.2 Limitations of this Research & Future Projects
 While this dissertation contributes a new theory of context, a cross-validation of 
measurement and provides some empirical evidence for the more systematic way of 
thinking about institutions, it  finds it limitations as well. These issues mainly cluster 
around questions of data availability  and quality  and, thus, the explanatory power of the 
analyses. One key  aspect that came up throughout this thesis is the question of data 
availability. Public opinion research heavily relies on data that tell us what people are 
thinking. In particular, dynamic political representation is a data-intensive field. Adding 
context to this and widening analyses into cross-sectional comparisons increases the 
data volume on top of this. 
 The limitations of my  measurement chapter tie in with this. The individual-level 
analysis based on original data looks at only one country, Britain, and a single point  in 
time. Obviously, I am unable to make a statement about how spending preferences and 
important problems correspond over time, let alone across countries and over time. It is 
an important achievement to know how these measures are related at least in one 
country  and point in time, tracking them over time and across countries would increase 
the explanatory power and confidence in the measures enormously. At the same time if 
we had measures across countries and time, there would be no need to discuss validity 
of both measures as one could use spending preferences for analysis form the outset. 
The results from the aggregate data have limited explanatory power as well, as they are 
based on a constructed data set from three secondary data sources. The ISSP and 
Eurobarometer are large n survey studies with different quality  standards and samples. 
While many issues are cancelled out by  aggregating up  the data, others are not. After 
all, it is a constructed data source. In order to look at the predictive validity in a cross-
sectional way, it  would be better to have all questions in the same survey to ensure the 
reliability  of the data. If we had such data, which incorporated both measures cross-
sectionally (and over time) the validity question would not necessarily  have to be asked. 
Scholars could rely on the direct measurement of issue preferences we find in the 
spending preferences. 
 With regard to Chapter 5 and the question of models of issue responsiveness, I 
find some limitation in my research as well. Research on thermostatic representation 
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tells us that the model works and that public opinion is reflected in the policy  outcomes. 
While the model has developed in a strong survey environment and allows opinion to be 
tracked back over long time period, at the same time it is limited to a sample of 
countries that have a similar survey tradition. The trade off is between time and space. 
European research looks for alternative models and measures to investigate the 
responsiveness of governments to citizens’ issue preferences. It finds it in the salience 
model of representation. Yet again the availability of data limits the scope of the 
analysis. Europe has a much shorter survey tradition. Although salient opinion is 
frequently asked in surveys conducted as individual case studies, as well as in cross-
sectional surveys, the time period is limited to a significantly shorter number of years. 
There is a trade-off between space and time. My analysis here serves a larger country 
sample of 21 countries, but over a very limited and short time series of six to nine years. 
During the data cleaning and modelling process, as well as when taking into account 
special requirements of the data, the time component is even more limited. For instance, 
cross-sectional time-series methods rely  on a complete data matrix and observations 
with missing values are not included in the analysis. Further, accounting for the change 
structured in time, additional cases at the beginning or end of the time series get lost. 
 Another limitation in this dissertation is the data quality of issue preferences. 
The analysis relies on Eurobaromter data, which are generally high quality data. The 
specific question on salience, which captures the important issues facing a country at 
the time, inseparably collects the first two mentioned issues. It would be more valuable 
to be able to distinguish between first- and second-mentioned answers. In addition, the 
format of the question is not ideal as it  covers a closed list of topics. For the analysis 
this means that proportions exceed a hundred percent and may bias the overall analysis 
of responsiveness. This shows in the low explanatory power and the low level of 
confidence that I can have in the results of the analysis. Although my results indicate a 
relationship  and even indicate that the theory works in the expected direction, most of 
the results are not statistically significant. 
 Chapter 6, which explores the congruence of the ideological positions of the 
mean citizen and her government, steps back from analysing a dynamic model of 
representation to a rather static model. In this my research finds its limitation. I argue 
that political representation is a dynamic phenomenon and needs to be studied 
employing dynamic modelling techniques. Once again the availability of the data limits 
 
227
the analysis to static representation in election years. While many  surveys, individual 
case studies and cross-sectional studies ask about people’s self-placement on the left-
right continuum, research lacks continuous measures of government ideology on the 
same scale. Whatever indicator scholars use to capture parties’ and therefore 
governments’ ideologies, they are always limited to a specific year, usually the election 
year. This is true for manifesto data and election surveys, but not necessarily  for expert 
surveys. However, even expert surveys are conducted at interesting times, many in 
election years. Most  recent research uncovers government positions in terms of left and 
right between elections by  coding fiscal speeches by the head of the executive in left-
right terms. While I acknowledge that this is an enormous step  forward for the field of 
ideological representation, at the same time it is not enough. Capturing left-right 
positions from speeches is labour- and time-intensive, not to mention costly. So far 
research is limited to Britain. From the perspective of a comparativist this is not 
satisfactory with regard to the idea of comparing context. It is surely only  a matter of 
time until comparative data are available. Another drawback is that fiscal speeches do 
not capture what governments effectively implement, rather they indicate what they 
intend to do and links in with the representation of public opinion in the agenda setting 
strand of research. With regard to the results from the analysis in Chapter 6, the findings 
suggest that veto players stop things from happening. An increased number of, in 
particular, institutional veto players means they can stop things that mean voters might 
want. In reverse, this also means that veto players can also stop things that mean voters 
don’t want, retaining congruence. The country cases I look at in my analysis and the 
time period I look at may bias the results as they may  lend themselves to one set of 
conclusions – conclusions that may not necessarily apply to a wider country sample.
 My thesis focuses on context effects, especially the impact of institutions and 
situations on political representation. I examine the effect of institutions and situations 
by looking at them individually. In the real world, institutions and situations do not 
stand alone. An interplay  of various institutional features and a number of different 
political situations characterises modern state-building. While the individual effects 
suggest how one or the other impacts policy representation, it is perhaps even more 
important for political scientists to uncover how an interplay of institutions and 
situations affects representation. It is up to future research to overcome some of these 
limitations and fill the gaps in the literature. It  is important to study how public opinion 
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and public policy are linked. Whether or not government acts on behalf of the public is 
a core principle of representation and allows us to judge the quality of a democracy. 
 While the analysis in Chapter 4 suggests a relationship between spending 
preferences and important issue, it does not fully uncover whether this holds across time 
and counties. It is also a matter for future research to look out for a better alternative 
measure to capture public opinion towards issues consistently across context, regardless 
of the survey tradition a country has. This applies to measures of public policy outputs 
as well. After all, spending outlays are not all there is to policy. In order to capture the 
level of representativeness of a government we also need to take into account regulative 
acts. For instance, instead of coding the content of agenda-setting speeches, one may 
rather wish to code the most important topics covered in regulative acts or count the 
number or lengths of implemented bills in a policy domain. Some projects and studies 
already move in this direction. With regard to modelling the opinion-policy relationship, 
dynamic representation is what scholarship aims to elaborate on and perhaps find new 
and alternative models to the commonly  used ones. However, researchers should 
acknowledge the fact that there are discrepancies between research traditions. The field 
has developed and is developing rapidly in the North American context because 
resources are available. The thick survey environment allows researchers develop new 
measures and models. This is not the case outside this North American context, which is 
a fact that scholarship seems to forget. Scholarship may be too ambitious applying 
sophisticated models of political representation to contexts that cannot pick and choose 
from secondary sources as easily. Perhaps we need to step  back from the more complex 
models and develop techniques to investigate the relationship between public opinion 
and public policy using simpler and less sophisticated models – models that better 
match our data. This gives us more time to collect the data we need to conduct more 
complex analyses. For instance, the representation of ideological positions is about to 
develop from static to dynamic models of representation. If we have the methods to 
analyse speeches, we may  as well use these skills to analyse implemented legislation to 
better capture policy outcomes. There is also the opportunity  of linking the idea of 
spending to the representation of ideologies. If there is a relationship between left-
wingers and right-wingers’ spending preferences and a pattern between government 
ideology and spending, there may well be a relationship between being a left-/right-
winger’s views on increasing or decreasing budgets.  
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 As a matter of fact, the field of political representation is wide open for future 
research. This thesis sheds some light on the question of public opinion measurement. 
There is some confidence that issue preference, spending preferences and salient 
opinion are related to each other. It also contributes to the previous comparative 
literature by developing and testing a universally applicable theory of contextual effects. 
The results suggest the theory  works with regard to the linkage between public opinion 
and public policy. Governments appear to respond to preferences when the number of 
veto players is low. However, the limitations of research and previous work also 
indicate that there is a lot  of leeway for future research, namely with regard to theory, 
data collection, data analysis and context.  
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